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The failed referenda in France and the Netherlands on the EU constitution in May 2005 as well as Eurobarometer data reveal a lack of popular support for the EU as a political actor and the integration process. Theorists hold that this phenomenon can be attributed to (1) a lack of an EU-wide public sphere that would facilitate deliberative processes, (2) a distinctly “European”, as opposed to “national”, identity, and (3) a legitimacy deficit arising from the fact that EU institutions predominantly deal with issues that citizens consider non-salient.This paper seeks to qualify arguments (1) and (2). It holds that basic structures of a shared public sphere do indeed exist albeit being distinct from national ones. Further more, a shared identity can be traced in so-called “sites of memory”. Concerning argument (3), the paper holds that despite its limited capacity for policy-making, the EU is a potent political actor in terms of agenda setting as can be extracted from public political statements and election campaigns. The paper suggests that the lack of support is â€" at least partially â€" due to an insufficient communication strategy which fails to mediate political processes originating from the EU. Without such a strategy, however, potential benefits of EU policies will remain obscure to the citizenry. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immigration policies serve a number of functions for states. Governments may use policies as instruments of foreign policy, economic growth, population growth, and/or national security. In this post-September 11, 2001 global environment, integration policies have become more assimilationist and immigration restrictions toward nationals from Muslim countries of origin have increased in the name of national security. While this trend is common among many Western states, Britain's immigration stance toward Muslim migrants remains unchanged. What explains the radical reforms in the Netherlands, Germany, and France while British immigration policy remained unchanged? This study examines change in immigration policies in Netherlands, Germany, France, and the absence of this change in the UK, towards migrants from predominantly Muslim countries of origin. Based on a comparative case study analysis using process tracing, findings indicate that Dutch immigration/integration policy choices influence government policy changes in other West European countries. Governments experiencing similar sociopolitical 'problems' and observe overlapping societal responses to them, optimize in creating policy alternatives by using short-cuts and adopting policies implemented in comparable states and situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU's new Lisbon Treaty has replaced the Constitutional Treaty that was rejected in referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005. How different is the new treaty and why did the member states go ahead with a new treaty without the symbols of constit ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, I compare America?s 18th century antifederalists and Europe?s 21st century counterparts, giving special attention to the similarities in the set of principles that underlie each opposition to the Constitution. This study examines opposition to the Constitution in a number of EU member states, but it focused on the successful antifederalist cases of France and the Netherlands. Through a comparison of the role of antifederalist opposition in the American and European Constitutional crises, this study contributes to the theory of federalism as it relates to Constitution building. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I propose to analyze recent immigration legislation in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom in regards to the legislations? focus on attracting the ?best and the brightest? or the high-skilled to these countries? labor markets. I plan on answering three questions:1. Are immigration laws that focus on attracting the high-skilled simply the reverse side of restrictive immigration practices that severely narrow the rights of asylum-seekers, refugees, and illegal immigrants? In other words, has a new ?first world? (high-skilled from developed world), ?second world? (high-skilled from less developed world), and ?third world? (everyone else) been created with selective migration practices?2. Does competition for the highly-skilled immigrants among EU member states (specifically Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) create divisions which negatively affect the single market? In other words, does this competition make a charade out of the idea of a European single market and effect the future integration of the European Union?3. What is the probability of these selective migration policies being effective? (A short comparison with similar policies applied for longer periods of time in Australia and Canada may be helpful in this section). Can these European states effectively control who gains residency and entry into their country? What does this bifurcation (restrictive for low-skilled, open for high-skilled) of migration mean for the future integration of Europe? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the debate over the rise of the Front National has been over areal assessment of their growth and influence. One reasoning in thefield seem to propose that there is nothing out of the ordinary in therecent growth of the Front National, and in fact they suggest that thisgrowth is normal as sign of protest. The prediction is that the supportfor this party will wither away as time goes by and a new politicalconsensus is reached in France. Other opinions seem to suggest that therise of the Front National is due to an European wide phenomenon offear. Fear for economic uncertainties, fear and a latent racism againstMuslim and African immigrants. However the immigration of these groupsand their influence in France is nothing new. The Front National is nota new movement either, and the economic situation of Europe has actuallybettered in the years that have seen the rise of the FN in electoralsupport. Furthermore, there are other radicalized parties, of the leftand the right, that have won support and even notoriety. This paperseeks an explanation to the conditions that have lead to a growth ofmarginal parties, and in particular the Front National. I will proposethe existence of a "threshold" of acceptability, which once attained;the label of "extreme" doesn't seem to register in the perception ofvoters that otherwise would not be inclined to vote for such a party. Iwill use arguments based on the non-linear, agent based simulationliterature as my methodology to try to emulate the basic principles ofthis dynamic evolution, and will base the theoretical principles ofvoter's and parties' behaviour and preferences on current politicalsociology and rational choice as contrasting, if not complementing,approaches. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]