The economic ascent and political self-assertion of a set of newly emerging powers holds the potential to transform the established institutional hierarchies of capitalist world order in the coming decades. There appears to be a growing consensus on the part of 'Western' elites that the increasing economic and political weight of countries such as China and India merits their integration into the upper echelons of international organization. The debate over reform of the Group of Eight (G8)â”a powerful informal grouping of major capitalist countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and, since 1998, Russia)â”epitomizes recent attempts to include emerging market economies in the structures of global governance. Membership in this exclusive forum has been a point of contention ever since, and problems of legitimacy and efficiency have been long-standing concerns. Against the backdrop of what seems to be an impending global power shift, the expansion of G8 membership has become a matter of utmost urgency. Unless extended to include at least some of the major emerging market economies, it is argued, the G8 can no longer contribute to the management of the global political economy. Numerous organizational schemes have been proposed, and important steps towards G8 expansion have been taken (for a comprehensive overview, see Hajnal 2007a). After two decades of fixed membership, the original Group of Seven (G7) officially admitted Russia in 1998. One year later, a joint 'Group of Twenty' (G20) of the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors and their counterparts from 'systemically significant' countries was established. Consultations with emerging market economies have become regular fixtures of the G8 summits, and since 2003 a permanent 'outreach group' including Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa has formed. At the most recent summit in Heiligendamm, a two-year, issue-specific dialogue between the G8 and the 'outreach five' was initiated. Some observers have argued that the G8+5 process may conclude with the admission of these countries into the G8 and give impetus to the reform of other international organizations such as IMF, World Bank and OECD (Kirton 2007; Gnath 2007). These developments raise the fundamental question of whether a more closely coordinated, globally integrated form of political-economic regulation is in the making. The specialized literature on the G8 seems to answer this question in the affirmative. Approaching the issue of institutional reform almost exclusively from the point of view of how the legitimacy and efficiency of the G8 can be enhanced, most scholars tend to view the increasing involvement of emerging market economies in the G8 system as necessary and desirable steps towards a more inclusive and effective form of global governance. While providing a wealth of information and detailed political analysis, the extant literature can be said to be guided by a 'problem-solving' approach: it takes the existing social relations in which the G8 is embedded as given, and seeks to give policy advice on what adjustments are necessary for the governance mechanism to operate under changing conditions (Cox 1981). Such an approach, however, takes for granted what is arguably the most striking institutional feature of the G8. More than a preference of summit leaders (Garavoglia 1984, 5) or unavoidable trade-off between efficiency and breadth of participation (Bayne 2002, 26), the informal and exclusive institutional format of the G8 architecture points to an underlying power relationship between 'insiders' and 'outsiders'... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]