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The paper focuses on recent changes in the organisation of Anglo-American occupational pension schemes, analysing these changes in relation to the structural power of finance. It offers a constitutive reading of the structural power of finance that stresses the discursive, decentred, calculative and productive features of power relations. The discourse and institutions of asset management are identified as key to the power relations at work in the investment practices of Anglo-American pension funds. Under asset management, occupational pension saving becomes a form of largely speculative investment that is only indirectly and marginally concerned with plant or production. The paper also explores the current crisis of ‘final salary’ pension schemes. It argues that the tactics of state managers and the corporate sponsors of schemes in the course of the crisis are framed by commitments to actuarialism and ‘shareholder value’ respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike commercial banks, which can write off bad debts with impunity, sovereign creditors are burdened with ethical concerns when the loans they extend become unrepayable. The reason, the paper argues, is that, unlike commercial creditor-debtor relations, the relations between states cannot simply be written off. This paper examines the nexus between the social conditions and notions of justice in different types of loan relations a sovereign state may have. It argues that the pervasiveness of the restitutive notion of justice in sovereign debt relations -- as in the resort to ethically charged terms like ?forgiveness? when debtor states cannot repay -- reflects the under-socialization of international financial institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Israel and Turkey have more in common than their recent military and economic cooperation and their secular and democratic credentials. In both states there was a crisis of national identity in the 1990s as the previously dominant conceptions of the national identity were challenged and unsettled. The crises of national identity in Israel and Turkey share some important features. They also have a potentially broader relevance since such crises are now becoming increasingly common. By examining these identity crises and comparing them, this paper attempts to offer a theoretically grounded and empirically informed understanding of national identity crises and their causes. A crisis of national identity occurs when the prevailing conception of the national identity is undermined and loses its ‘taken-for-granted’ nature making it subject to extensive contestation and debate. No objective criteria, however, can be specified for precisely when this point is reached. On the basis of a comparison of the crises of national identity in Israel and Turkey, this paper argues that a change in state-society relations is behind the identity crises in both countries. The gradual loss of the state’s monopoly in defining the national identity resulted in growing societal discord over the definition of the national identity, with the persistence and intensity of this discord being widely interpreted as indicative of a crisis of national identity. Thus, this paper contends that a crisis of national identity occurs when a national identity was imposed largely from above by the state, and when the states loses this ability?as it invariably does, especially as a result of globalization?opening the way for a variety of different social groups to advance different conceptions of the national identity and compete with each other to make their conception of the national identity hegemonic. When no societal consensus is reached over the proper definition of the national identity and there are multiple definitions of the national identity in competition, this situation is perceived by many as indicative of a crisis of national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of the power relationship among crisis adversaries on the extent of mediation efforts, the effectiveness of various styles of mediation, and the impact of mediation on crisis management and conflict resolution. Its methodology is both cross-national and experimental. Its objective is to advance our understanding of the circumstances in which mediation is likely to make a difference in managing international crises, by far the most pervasive and serious form of disruptive interactions among states in the international system. Our previous work in this area (Wilkenfeld et al. 2003) has laid the groundwork for the present analyses by examining the circumstances in which crises are likely to be mediated, and the style of mediation most closely associated with successful crisis outcomes. In the present paper, we add consideration of an additional factor?the relative power of crisis actors. Our findings indicate that mediation, particulary manipulative mediation, does have a significant impact on crisis dynamincs and outcomes, but this impact is significant only in asymmetric crises. Mediation is more likely to occur when crisis actors are equal powers, but its effect in this symmetric power context is greatly reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins by providing an overview of the dependent variable, financial crisis management and reform outcomes, in Japan. It then goes on to link these outcomes to an incremental and less than comprehensive financial reform process. The paper reviews the sequencing of financial reform measures undertaken by Japanese since the bursting of the bubble, focusing on the period of 1996-2003, with particular emphasis on the period of 1999-2003. To explain the nature of reforms, their sequencing, and the elusive outcomes to which they correspond, the paper assesses the relative bargaining power of foreign investors, bureaucratic actors, elected officials and private business in Japan’s tortuous reform process. In doing so, the paper shows the ways in which these interests are mediated by Japan’s distinctive institutional arrangements. The theoretical baseline of this paper is that different institutional arrangements not only manage change differently but are also fundamentally more difficult to change than others. More specifically, Japanese institutional arrangements have mediated the pressures of global capital in ways that minimize the impact of this capital on rules or behaviors. Likewise, these institutions have proven remarkably resilient to being fully transformed, even in the face of unprecedented regulatory breakdown and vulnerability to external pressures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the changes to the Fund's bilateral surveillance policy as a response to the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Specifically, the paper asks about the factors that caused the quick and deep shift to a systemic approach to IMF surveillance. In doing so, the paper casts doubt on exclusive reliance on theoretical models that interpret change as exogenously-driven. In other words, although the financial crisis was certainly an important catalyst, the causes of the quick and deep transformation of IMF surveillance lie in the cumulative effects of previous policy changes. Specifically, policy entrepreneurs capitalised on the changes adopted over the 1990s in order to advance their preferred (but complex) reform proposal and shape a supportive coalition around the role of the IMF as a systemic supervisor. Advancing this argument, the paper contributes to the literature that aims at showing the importance of temporality and process sequencing to explain policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper recasts the debate taking place in five major American newspapers and magazines over the meaning and the extent of ‘sacrifice’ called upon the United States by the War in Iraq in a historical perspective. It argues that the underlying tensions informing the debate can best be understood as a crisis of the "American imperial society". I argue that the United States may also qualify as an ‘empire’ before we even begin to look at its ‘foreign relations’ or its global politics . This is especially true of the place occupied by three founding minorities of the Republic: Blacks, Native Americans and Hispanics. The "imperial society model" also offers an explanation as to why race has seemed to play almost no part in the present journalistic contest over military sacrifice in the War in Iraq by alluding to the political technologies set in place in response to the crisis of the Vietnam era. Rather than suggesting that past imperial dynamics no longer adequately describe tensions in American society, this paper concludes by showing how affirmative action policies on minority sacrifice in the US army point to the persistance of imperial social relations. It also sketches out how the War in Iraq has exacerbated many of the contradictions inherent in the all-volunteer army. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conflict resolution theorists have long posited that mediation style must be properly suited to the characteristics of particular conflicts. The focus of this paper is the varying effectiveness of three mediation styles -- facilitation, formulation, and manipulation - on international crises. Effectiveness is assessed in terms of termination in agreement, satisfaction of the parties with the outcome, the extent to which subsequent crises occur among the parties, and mediation’s influence on crisis abatement. We analyzed new data on the mediation process from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project for the period 1918-2001 to assess the impact of mediation. Congruent with our hypotheses, mediators often pursue at least one of two strategies - integration and cost maximization - and each strategy seems to have varying effects on different outcomes. Our findings suggest that mediators should use a combination of strategies and styles if they are to maximize their effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Asian Financial Crisis context there remains doubt over the importance of state structures in an era dominated by global finance. The restructuring experiences of the Crisis-affected countries in 1997-1998 highlighted the increasing importance of international financial guidelines in the development and evaluation of financial sectors in developing countries. Although the debates as to the importance of these international guidelines have not focused explicitly on the apparent ?retreat of the state?, the terms of this debate, so dominant in the International Political Economy literature, and the assumptions on which it is premised, continue to inform the evaluation of the relative positions and influence of states in the global economy. Through the adoption of Colin Hay?s ?moments of stateness? this paper evaluates the efforts made by the Indonesian governments in the restructuring of the banking sectors. I argue that instead of leading to a diminution in the role of the state in a globalised financial market, the international guidelines actually require governments to strengthen, extend and broaden the remit of the state structures. This undermines the neo-liberal economic assumptions that privatisation and reform after a crisis should, and will, result in greater market-centred activity and stronger market discipline accompanied by the withdrawal of the state. Underlying the ongoing importance of the state within the banking sectors is the extent to which political decisions and political will provide essential support and direction for private actors in developing countries if these banking systems are to retain any degree of international creditworthiness. An underlying tension within the retreat of the state debate is the expectation that change to a state structure will result in a neo-liberal state, and that this is the result of a decrease in the functions of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the influence of ideas in the Spanish management of the 1964 Cuban Crisis. The analysis of Spanish and US primary sources (diplomatic documents and the press) seems to suggest that Madrid?s attempt to advance its position vis à vis Washington and the Spanish policy-makers? pragmatism were the elements in the realm of ideas that mostly influenced Spain?s management of this crisis. Furthermore, cultural and historical factors and the media coverage of these events are also to be taken into account to grasp these policy makers? mindset throughout the crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Liberal theory suggests that democracies are more prone to manage their conflicts with the assistance of international organizations than are non-democracies. Although widely accepted, this claim has yet to be corroborated through rigorous empirical research. While several studies have investigated the connection between regime type and third-party involvement, most do not distinguish between the role played by international organizations and other types of agents, such as allied or hegemonic states. Moreover, the few quantitative studies that do focus directly on the relationship between regime type and international organization involvement have not only produced rather mixed empirical results but also fail to control for the potentially confounding impact of variables other than regime type. To address these shortcomings in the existing literature, this paper develops a multivariate model of the link between regime type and states? propensity for managing their conflicts with the assistance of international organizations. Focusing on the case of the United Nations (UN), I examine the behavior of state actors in a set of more than 200 international crises between 1945 and 2001. Testing liberal arguments about the effects of regime type against hypotheses drawn from realist, institutionalist, and constructivist theories of international politics, my analysis generates results that are strongly at odds with the notion that democracies are more inclined to channel their conflicts through international organizations than are non-democracies. Once we properly control for the impact of other factors likely to shape states? attitudes toward UN involvement (such as conflict severity, polarity, relative power, and permanent membership in the UN Security Council), democracy has no statistically significant effect on states? propensity to approach the UN when engaged in an international crisis. Remarkably, this finding holds at the dyadic as well as the monadic level of analysis, suggesting that even in disputes amongst themselves, democracies are neither more nor less likely to resort to international organizations than are non-democracies. Among democratic states, only the three permanent members of the UN Security Council ? Great Britain, France, and the United States ? display a disproportionate willingness to involve the UN during times of international crisis; a finding that appears more consistent with realist theories of power transition and hegemonic stability than with liberal models of state behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses securitization theory and security communities theory to examine the Suez Crisis of 1956 and its effects on political community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an overview of the direction of constitutionalism in international law under the impact of the crisis of global capitalism and the emergence of a new cohort of powerful states (rebranded herein as BRICKS). It anticipates the nature of conflicts over the meta-rules for multilateral governance of markets, the use of force, human rights, and the environment. Meanwhile, global constitutionalism, undergirded by neoliberal discourse, has been distorting, but has not fully displaced Westphalian constitutionalism, built upon the ideal-type of the nation-state, the fiction of sovereign equality of states and the reality of Great Power rule. New ideological departures are likely, and with them, new ways of reading, measuring and setting standards in the world economy, beyond what has become normative in neoliberalism. Despite these changes, the age-old tension between power and moral/scientific reason as paradigms of constitutionalism, is unlikely to be resolved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed different and heterogeneous series of events such as those inaugurated by 9/11 or the financial crisis of September 2008. While some have argued that these events are markers of crisis of neoliberalism as ideology or system of economic governance, it is now widely conceded that they have not lead to its demise or replacement by another regime (a 'Berlin Wall moment'), and seem to confirm its remarkable 'resilience'. This gives credibility to an alternative view, that crisis has become intrinsic to the logic of neoliberalism's implementation and extension. In this context, it is worth examining the relationship between the event and neoliberalism. The paper explores the notion of the event and distinguishes three aspects of neoliberalism: as 'thought collective', as regime of government, and as metaphysics. It then examines the treatment of the event as rupture, exception, crisis and catastrophe. It proposes that the event can occasion rapid shifts in neoliberal metaphysical world picture, and exposes the multiplicity of the neoliberal thought collective. The notion of catastrophe might be more important in indicating a shift in regimes of government to one based on a knowledge of complex adaptive systems and the quality of resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we study the political economy of market reforms in Korea since the 1997/98 financial crisis. We focus on the political and fiscal capacity of the state to implement these reforms, and challenge the view that successfully implemented market reforms follow a technocratic "best practice" approach. On the contrary, we argue that reforms in Korea were relatively successful because they were political projects, and join the ranks of those who challenge the view that market reforms equal less state interventions. We show that market reforms in Korea went hand in hand with an expansion of the state. The formation of interest coalitions constituted the reform machinery while government expenditures have been the grease to make the machinery run smoother and prevent it from breaking. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL FINANCETimothy J. SinclairUniversity of WarwickFinance tends to be thought of as something essentially modern in nature. Like bridges, airplanes and computers, finance is understood to be subject to all the methods that positivist knowledge can deploy. But what if this is not the case? What if, like the state and other institutions, finance is not a brute or natural fact at all, but a social structure for which positivist methods, premised on the neutrality of the observer, get the way finance works quite wrong. This paper explores this notion and suggests the analysis of finance must start instead with cognitive or social facts. This perspective on finance implies very different behavioral expectations about finance, ones better suited to the volatile world of global finance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past decade, we have seen a proliferation of economic crises in the developing world. These crises have had disastrous effects on national economies as entire banking sectors collapsed, currencies depreciated and millions fell below the poverty line. At different points in history, economic crises have led to democratic breakdown or to democratic transition. These periods corresponded roughly with Samuel Huntington’s waves of democracy. However, the literature has insufficiently addressed how economic crises affect regime change in these third wave democracies. I argue that while financial crises may engender regime change in authoritarian countries, in third wave democracies, one will not see economic crisis generating a regime change but instead a regime shift. I define regime shift as a movement among alternatives within the democratic structure. For example, if the right is in power when an economic crisis hits, one may see left and far-left parties making substantial gains in the next election. In order to test this hypothesis, I will use multivariate analysis through employing the most similar systems case study methodology. I chose the three cases of Turkey, Poland and the Philippines to ensure sufficient geographic variation. In addition, these countries vary in terms of how their democratic transition took place (i.e. controlled from above vs. spurred from below). I believe this choice of cases is significant, for it refutes the argument that the regime shift phenomenon is region specific. The results of this study suggest that a robust correlation exists between economic crisis and regime shift. This analysis can strongly affirm two factors: first, third wave democracies are not collapsing in the wake of economic crises. Second, during economic crises, incumbents are typically rejected in favor of alternatives to the status quo. In Turkey, far right and Islamic parties made substantial gains during the three economic crises. In Poland, the Solidarity party was defeated during each economic crisis in favor of the former communist SLD. In the Philippines, the establishment presidential candidate was rejected in favor of the most anti-establishment candidate on the ticket. These findings will, I hope, make a contribution to the literatures on economic crises and democratic transitions. Most notably, it will show that the third wave democracies are not reverting back to authoritarianism when they hit rough periods. Instead, they are showing the first signs of democratic consolidation by holding their leaders accountable for policy failures. They are choosing from the systemic parties available, rather than rioting. This shows that they have faith in the democratic institutions of government to rectify their problems. For third wave democracies, this is a promising finding indeed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a perception gap between the Bush and Clinton administrations about the true nature of the North Korean regime and the best ways to deal with the regime, and this perception gap has produced divergent policies between the two administrations. Drawing on recent developments in realist literature, however, I argue that another important variable to explain U.S. policy is the international situation around the Korean peninsula - offensive or defensive - that each administration perceives. The second nuclear crisis has been strongly influenced by the offensive strategy of the U.S. after the terrorist attacks of 2001. Such an offensive movement has dramatically worsened North Korea?s security fears and led to the current nuclear deadlock. Thus, the U.S. needs to resolve the North Korean security dilemma by taking conciliatory measures, and North Korea also needs to engage in cooperative behavior with the U. S. simultaneously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Warnings of the immenent collapse of the multilateral trading system are not new. Indeed, the fear that a breakdown in multilateral trade liberalisation would help bring about a 1930s style retreat into economic autarky has been an intrinsic part of that process since it was first created. What is seldom acknowledged, however, is the role that this language of crisis and collapse - what might be called a 'crisis discourse' - has had (and continues to have) on shaping trade negotiations and in maintaining forward momentum in the liberalisation process. This discourse has played a key role in facilitating the kind of institutional development that the GATT/WTO has undergone; helping to push through bargains among GATT contracting parties and WTO members that have been (and remain) deeply asymmetrical; and driving the trade agenda forward at moments when the institution appears deadlocked. It has also played a role in the restart of the Doha Development Agenda in the wake of the negotiations' July 2006 collapse.The aim of this paper is to illustrate the role that the crisis discourse plays in driving forward multilateral trade liberalisation and to show how the discourse is currently being deployed. The paper argues that since the GATT was created trade negotiations have proceeded against a backdrop of a perception of the consequences that might result should the negotiations break-down. Moreover, at moments when progress has become lacklustre, when the outcome of trade negotiations appears uncertain, when a blockage occurs, or when a ministerial meeting collapses, an increase in the usage of the language of crisis and collapse occurs. The intensification of this discourse varies depending on the perceived gravity of the 'crisis' as does the extent to which the discourse radiates out from a core group of practitioners and public intellectuals involved with, or who have a vested interest in, the negotiations. The effect is nevertheless the same: to encourage behaviour consistent with the conclusion of the negotiations by structuring the realm of possibility. This, in turn, assists in maintaining and perpetuating the unequal relations of power that underpin the trading regime. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many have noted the roles of wars and crises in reshaping state interests, identities, and policies, this paper examines the impact of events deemed to be emergencies and the art of crisis-making at the domestic level. During the 1990s, Russian politics was fraught with uncertainty, as communism and the USSR collapsed and the nation, state, polity, and economy underwent transformations. During two key election cycles (1995-1996 and 1999-2000), the Russian leadership attempted to construct crises to gain the support of the population. In both time periods, there were many good reasons for accepting that the country was at a crossroads; interestingly, however, the executive’s spin on events did not always win the day. The idea that the country was truly at a turning point had to ring true to society on both a cognitive and an affective level. This paper explores why leaders are successful at defining some events as crises, while at other times they fail in convincing citizens that a situation is dangerous. Thus, the purpose here is to look more closely at the crisis-making process and suggest that agents play key roles interpreting events and societies are not simply “takers” of these understandings. Thus, there is an art of crisis making that is both distinct from the material factors surrounding the critical events and an interactive, social process, engaging the leadership and the community as a whole. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between the Global North and the Global South is often characterized by the North acting as parent who advises, disciplines, and guides the South with a view toward enhancing her political and economic development. In Africa, powerful international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank condition possibilities for change and continuity. Another way of conceptualizing the North-South relationship is through the lens of International Relations (IR) (dominated by the North) and domestic politics (in this case, on the African continent). As Gourevitch argues in his "Second Image Reversed" article, IR is shaped by domestic politics, but the international environment also clearly affects domestic politics, not so much in a deterministic sense, but parameters are laid out and choices are framed, particularly for peripheral countries, by powerful international actors. Yet Gourevitch challenges us to go beyond this mutual cause-effect idea, to treat IR and domestic politics as wholes. (I will offer some ideas on how to conceptualize this ideal toward the end of the paper.) This paper will first propose a perspective about the way conditions in the international system have affected the possibilities for change at the domestic level in Africa. For that section of the paper I will argue that in a climate of “crisis” – economic downturns or political unrest at the state level in Africa, and high tension at the international level – there seems to be a pattern of stability and continuity that emerges, a tendency encouraged by both international actors and domestic political leaders. The second part of the paper will explore, through newspaper sources in several countries that have held elections recently, how domestic actors manipulate the language of stability and change, and appeal to international actors and preoccupations in order to promote their agendas. Thus the interface between domestic and international is the paper’s analytical space. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between the pre-existing beliefs of decision makers and learning following exposure to foreign policy crises. Specifically, I look at U.S. Presidential (from Reagan to George W. Bush) images of the "other" and feelings of control, and test whether high and low levels on these indices lead to predictable, systematic influences on learning from crises. Additionally, I test the role of crisis outcome, the order in which the crisis was experienced, and other crisis-related factors as they influence the type and degree of learning that results from crisis exposure. Results give strong support to the hypothesis that those who initially view the world as friendly, and who feel high levels of control, when exposed to crises, then see the world as more hostile, and feel less control in comparison to their initial beliefs than do those who exhibit moderate or low scores on these belief indicators. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The international dimensions of ethnic conflict have increasingly become of interest to scholars of international relations. While much of this literature has helped to explain how ethnicity affects violence and international conflict, there are many issues related to ethnicity and interstate war that have yet to be explored. In particular, the possible interaction between ethnicity and international issues, such as rivalry and territorial disputes, needs to be explicitly analyzed. Using crisis data from the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB), this paper examines how various interactions between ethnicity, territorial disputes and rivalry may affect the likelihood of violence and war during crisis. It is argued that the effects of ethnicity, a largely domestic concern, are strongest when combined with international elements, such as rivalry and territory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criticizing US neglect of Latin America has become a popular exercise in US journals and newspapers. Indeed, when reviewing the recent political crises throughout the region as well as the ‘turn to the left’ that has taken place at least in South America, US actions and reactions may seem erratic or entirely ignorant. By analyzing the US role during recent political turbulences in South America, the paper takes issue with this attempt to explain US behavior by simply pointing towards some general stance of neglect. In contrast, it is argued that the complex processes of crisis, continuity and change in South America imply contradictory incentives and limits to a US government that frames its activities as guided by the democratic ideal and yet cannot renounce its specific national preferences in the name of democracy’s intrinsic value. The frame constituted by democratic rhetoric appears as, at the same time, constraining and enabling US policies towards South America: While the dual goal ‘democracy promotion and protection’ clearly constrains the range of justifiable (re-) actions, its normative indecisiveness opens important margins for the pursuit of particularistic prefer-ences. When taking into account the concrete settings in the different ‘target’ countries, US actions, reactions and inactions can be explained quite well without assuming some general inattention that proves overly simplifying. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of groupthink has received a lot of attention in various academic disciplines such as psychology, business adminstration, political science, and communication since Janis coined the term in 1972. However, this theory has undergone a lot of scrutiny over the last 34 years because of a number of flaws within the framework. One of the areas that needs further research is the conditions in which groupthink is most likely to appear. Janis claims that this phenomenon occurs due to three factors: group cohesiveness, a flawed group structure, and a provocative situational context, which lead to concurrence seeking. Of the three causal factors, the only one that systematically appears to be an important predictor is the flawed group structure. Although group cohesiveness appears in most cases of groupthink, it is also present in cases in which this phenomenon did not occur. The situational variables on the other hand appear in some cases, but are not present in others. This paper argues that one of the reasons situational contexts do not appear to be significant is because groupthink can occur in a number of very different conditions. Although the ultimate outcome increases the likelihood of concurrence-seeking behavior, the cases differ in stress level, amount of time exposed to the problem, amount of perceived losses (or gains), and/or levels of responsibility seeking. This essay uses literatures on groupthink, escalation of commitment, prospect theory, and the role of stress in decision-making to explain different situations that increase the likelihood of concurrence seeking which, together with certain problems with the group structure, can lead to groupthink. Examining which situational factors are conducive to concurrence seeking is not only important because it helps streamline the framework. It will also aid in identifying more cases of groupthink, which will be less focused on fiascos, and can help policy-makers notice when this phenomenon might occur. Based on the current state of the groupthink framework, cases of this phenomenon were mainly identified through the analysis of the symptoms, and then evaluating which antecedent factors could be observed. One of the reasons this happens is because the framework is very unclear as to what conditions can cause groupthink, and the variables that have been demonstrated to be important are not easily identified because they occur within a small group of high-level decision makers. This meant that if the outcome were not an extreme case, it would probably go unnoticed. Because scholars were forced to rely on the dependent variable to identify cases, they most often focused on the most obvious cases: fiascos. However, groupthink does not always have to lead to suboptimal outcomes, let alone fiascoes (‘t Hart: 1990: xi). On the other hand, good decision-making also does not always lead to optimal outcomes. Another indicator of the problem with identifying cases of groupthink is the small number of specific situations in which groupthink has been identified. In 1998, Esser demonstrated that there are only 10 clear cases of groupthink, and five vigilant cases. Given the problem with identifying cases, it is important to find a way to locate cases of groupthink based on their antecedents, instead of their symptoms. Discovering specific conditions in which concurrence seeking is most likely by drawing on the literatures in social psychology, public administration, and foreign policy analysis, increases the likelihood that cases of groupthink will be found. According to the groupthink framework, when certain provocative situational factors are present, combined with a cohesive group with certain structural flaws, concurrence seeking will occur, which leads to groupthink. Identifying more concrete situations in which groupthink is possible can also have significant policy implications... ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research focuses on media, crisis and conflict for over four decades after World War II. Previous studies have pointed to media implications regarding the dynamics of both internal and international politics, with a debate on the nature and magnitude of their impact. Our two goals are to introduce the Media and Crisis (MAC) Project and to apply part of its framework using data on short crises. To meet these goals we describe the MAC framework, new dataset and initial findings. We focus on salience and complexity in press coverage by observing fourteen crises belonging to the Arab-Israel and the East-West conflicts. Three answers to our core questions emerge: (1) Yes, press coverage changed when conflict attributes differed, though some similarities remained intact, particularly, the resort to text at the expense of pictures and like issues that were interwoven into the news agenda. (2) Indeed, salience and complexity differed within and between conflicts with individual profiles at the regional and global levels. (3) Findings cast doubt on the validity of a single high salience -low complexity model expected by our hypothesis. The existence of multiple salience-complexity modes calls for further studies on the relationship between media and crisis systems in world politics. Cumulating knowledge from such research would highlight the shared responsibilities of decision-makers and media practitioners in shaping international confrontations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A common mode of contemporary political communication is the emotion-laden appeal for social justice causes. Entire industries are built around the success of these advertisements. Why do some appeals work where others fail? Do advertisements compel de ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural models of conflict usually assess a situation's tendency to instability, giving a relative risk of conflict erupting in a certain time period. Identifying "random" events that may act to accelerate, trigger, or delay conflict onset are usually considered as the key to more precise prediction of the onset of instability. However, it appears that conflictual events are diverse and poor predictors of instability onset. More useful is identifying cooperative events, which indicate when instability is likely to be avoided even in countries that appear vulnerable to severe political conflicts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can international crises help to push long-term rivals toward peace? If so, how and under what circumstances are such crises likely to promote rivalry de-escalation or termination? In an effort to address these questions, I examine an understudied but highly volatile Cold War crisis. Precipitated by an ambitious NATO military exercise, the Able Archer 83 crisis, like the Cuban Missile Crisis 21 years earlier, appears to have pushed the superpowers to the brink of nuclear warfare. Information revealed by Soviet defectors about Moscow's anxiety and possible nuclear response jarred U.S. President Ronald Reagan, altering his understanding of Soviet threat perceptions and pushing him toward negotiation, arms control, and peacemaking with what he had dubbed the "evil empire." By revealing information, the Able Archer 83 crisis had a profound impact on a key individual, cracking mirror images and triggering a reevaluation of attitudes and policy orientation toward the Soviets that may have constituted the very first step toward a thaw in Soviet-American relations. The case illustrates how volatile, sudden events can act as catalysts of rapprochement between rivals, helping to address the question of timing of initial moves toward peacemaking. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of whether policy makers learn from past experience is both a central and a vexing to students of foreign policy analysis. As Levy (1994) has noted, it is the latter because it is fraught with conceptual and methodological problems, but it is central because establishing the presence of learning would legitimate the idea that leadersÂ’ beliefs, cognitions and attitudes mattered when predicting the behavior of states in the international system. While some attempts have been made to systematically assess the impact of prior success or failure on foreign policy choices, most of these have focused on behavioral indicators of learning (i.e. change in strategy over time) rather than systematically assessing changes in the mental states of the decision makers. This analysis of the belief systems of US Presidents in response to crisis outcomes attempts to fill this void. The International Crisis Behavior project dataset provides a subset of crises for which we examine US behavior, target behavior and crisis outcomes. We use using the Verbs in Context system of content analysis to generate operational code indicators for the relevant US President before and after the crisis in order to establish whether congruence or disparity between each PresidentsÂ’ subjective representation of the situation and his anticipated behavior of the opponent interacts with outcome quality to reinforce or change his belief structures. We then determine whether Presidents exhibiting belief change are more likely to demonstrate learning by acting differently in the next crisis. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]