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Under the left wing government of Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva, Brazil has made a far-reaching turn in its foreign trade policy. Since 2003, the government has started active coalition building both within the WTO as well as on a regional scale: Firstly, Brazil has created several negotiation groups inside of the WTO. It is playing a leading role in the G-20, NAMA-11 and the G-110. The "Lula" administration is also focusing on alternative south-south coalitions outside the WTO, with the new India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA). Secondly, Brazil has begun to oppose the US project of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Together with Venezuela and Argentina the country has blocked further negotiations.Brazil has apparently returned to a policy similar to 1970's "terceiro mundismo" (Third Worldism). Its move towards a "New Axis of the South" has already changed trade flows. For example, between 2001 and 2008 the share of the traditional core countries (US, EU and Japan) in Brazilian foreign trade decreased about 15 %.This paper analyzes Brazil's project of "Neo-Third Worldism". It is argued that both a coalition of left wing nationalists in the Brazilian foreign ministry as well as the Workers' Party PT are pushing forward the new agenda. However, there have been constraints. For instance, Brazil's attempts to achieve a deeper regional integration of South America have hardly made progress. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy is supposed to give citizens oversight of the behavior and choices of their political leaders, while providing leaders with electoral incentives to respect the preferences of citizens. A shift from authoritarian to democratic rule consequently ought to alter policymaking. Using the case of Brazilian trade policy, we explore changed versus consistent patterns of post-transition interest aggregation, political participation, and economic goal-setting. Contrary to expectations of a notably enlarged role for Congress, we find that Brazil's executive still dominates trade policymaking. However, significant and increasingly transparent interest aggregation occurs within the executive. Moreover, policy capture by sectoral special interests is down, non-traditional civil society participants have gained some influence, and trade policy outcomes are arguably more public-regarding. We judge that Brazil's trade policy process has been incrementally democratized. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]