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Abstract: Internationally, there is wide cross-country heterogeneity in government responses to dual practice in the health sector. This paper provides a uniform theoretical framework to analyze and compare some of the most common regulations. We focus on three interventions: banning dual practice, offering rewarding contracts to public physicians, and limiting dual practice (including both limits to private earnings of dual providers and limits to involvement in private activities). An ancillary objective of the paper is to investigate whether regulations that are optimal for developed countries are adequate for developing countries as well. Our results offer theoretical support for the desirability of different regulations in different economic environments. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Increasing attention has been paid in recent years to the problem of “too much medicine”, whereby patients receive unnecessary investigations and treatments providing them with little or no benefit, but which expose them to risks of harm. Despite this phenomenon potentially constituting an inefficient use of health care resources, it has received limited direct attention from health economists. This paper considers “too much medicine” as a form of overconsumption, drawing on research from health economics, behavioural economics and ecological economics to identify possible explanations for and drivers of overconsumption. We define overconsumption of health care as a situation in which individuals consume in a way that undermines their own well-being. Extensive health economics research since the 1960s has provided clear evidence that physicians do not act as perfect agents for patients, and there are perverse incentives for them to provide unnecessary services under various circumstances. There is strong evidence of the existence of supplier-induced demand, and of the impact of various forms of financial incentives on clinical practice. The behavioural economics evidence provides rich insights on why clinical practice may depart from an “evidence-based” approach. Moreover, behavioural findings on health professionals’ strategies for dealing with uncertainty, and for avoiding potential regret, provide powerful explanations of why overuse and overtreatment may frequently appear to be the “rational” choice in clinical decision-making, even when they cause harm. The ecological economics literature suggests that status or positional competition can, via the principal-agent relationship in health care, provide a further force driving overconsumption. This novel synthesis of economic perspectives suggests important scope for interdisciplinary collaboration; signals potentially important issues for health technology assessment and health technology management policies; and suggests that cultural change might be required to achieve significant shifts in clinical behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper aims to estimate the pattern of physician visits and hospitalisation by socioeconomic position in Great Britain and Spain before and after important changes in their health systems during the 1990s. These changes have been accompanied by a trend toward pro-rich inequality in physician use, especially in outpatient consultation in Great Britain, whereas the pro-poor inequality in GP consultation and the pro-rich inequality in specialist consultation in Spain before the changes have been maintained. Although the pro-rich inequality in hospitalisation observed in both countries before their health system changes continues to be seen, the differences have been reduced, suggesting a trend toward socioeconomic equality in hospitalisation. In any case, with the exception of visits to GP in Spain, in both countries greater use of health services by professionals and managers is observed than for the rest of the population. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]