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Context: The main aim in organizing academic conferences is to share and develop knowledge in the focus area of the conference. Most conferences, however, are organized in a traditional way: two or three keynote presentations and a series of parallel sessions where participants present their research work, mainly using PowerPoint or Prezi presentations, with little interaction between participants. Problem: Each year, a huge number of academic events and conferences is organized. Yet their typical design is mainly based on a passive way of sharing knowledge. No models for an adequate conference design and an appropriate learning environment are available. The overall conference design, however, is a crucial aspect in the learning of the participants and deserves special attention from conference organizers. Method: I have organized around 15 carefully designed conferences (and attended many more). These have been the steps of an ongoing exploration to learn from each of these events and develop a deeper understanding of adequate conference designs and stimulating learning environments. This paper reports on my understandings of the organization of a selection of these conferences (in architecture, arts and design) and on the way knowledge sharing and knowledge development was stimulated at these events. These conferences included less traditional conference designs, collective learning and explicit sharing of understanding between participants. Results: Collaboration in small groups and joint plenary discussions, plenty of time for interaction and generous feedback to presenters turn out to be very valuable for consolidating knowledge and envisioning future developments in a discipline. Also, it is our experience that the presence of design objects as a trigger and catalyst for discussing and learning makes a huge difference in sharing and developing new knowledge. This paper aims to highlight the importance and raise awareness of different methods of stimulating the construction of knowledge by conference participants. I hope it will inspire future conference organizers and help them to induce more deliberate knowledge construction amongst participants. Implications: Insights from this paper are relevant for all conference organizers, especially those in the domain of architecture, arts and design. It has become clear that it is beneficial to have exhibit-type presentations as well as moments of collective learning. Organizers are recommended to adopt an explicit conference design. constructivist content: Following a constructivist approach to learning environments, this paper stresses the importance of scheduling moments of active and collective learning and knowledge construction explicitly during academic conferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: The design of academic conferences, in which settings ideas are shared and created, is, we suggest, of more than passing interest in constructivism, where epistemology is considered in terms of knowing rather than knowledge. Problem: The passivity and predominantly one-way structure of the typical paper presentation format of academic conferences has a number of serious limitations from a constructivist perspective. These limits are both practical and epistemological. While alternative formats abound, there is nevertheless increasing pressure reinforcing this format due to delegates' funding typically being linked to reading a paper. Method: In this special issue, authors reflect on conferences that they have organized and participated in that have used alternative formats, such as conversational structures or other constructivist inspired approaches, in whole or in part. We review and contextualize their contributions, understanding them in terms of their connections to constructivism and to each other. Results: While this issue is of relevance across disciplinary boundaries, contributions focus on two fields: that of cybernetics / systems, and that of design. We identify the way that conference organization is of particular importance to these fields, being in self-reflexive relationship to them: the environment of a design conference is something that we design; while a conference regarding systems or cybernetics is itself an instance of the sorts of process with which these fields are concerned. Implications: Building on this self-reflexivity and, also, the close connection of design and cybernetics / systems to constructivism, we suggest that conference organization is an area in which constructivism may itself be understood in terms of practice (and so knowing) rather than theory (and so knowledge). This in turn helps connect ideas in constructivism with pragmatic fields, such as knowledge management, and recent discussions in this journal regarding second-order science. Constructivist content: As a setting for the creation of new ideas, the design of conferences is of importance where we understand epistemology in constructivist terms as a process of knowing. Moreover, the particular fields focused on -- design and cybernetics / systems -- have close connections to constructivism, as can be seen, for instance, in the work of Ranulph Glanville, on which we draw here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: Practice-based design research is becoming more widely recognized in academia, including at doctoral level, yet there are arguably limited options for dissemination beyond the traditional conference format of paper-based proceedings, possibly with an exhibition or "demonstrator" component that is often non-archival. Further, the opportunities afforded by the traditional-format paper presentations is at times at odds with practice-based methodologies being presented. Purpose: We provide a first-hand descriptive account of developing and running a new international conference with an experimental format that aims to support more analogously the dissemination of practice-based design research. Method: Our approach herein is broadly interpretative, phenomenological and critically reflective in orientation, to analyze our own experiential insights from the conference conception, through to the event itself and post-conference reflections, alongside the reflections fed back by conference delegates. Results: We have found the roundtable format continues to function well for creating a discursive interactional context. However issues arose around the crucial nature of the session chair's role in enabling rich and multi-voiced discussion and how presenters', organizers' and delegates' voices were captured and documented, with implications for further developing the conference design. Looking forward, there are also questions raised about: balancing the stringency of a rigorous review process with provision of an encouraging platform for early-career researchers; and balancing the need for clear criteria and formatting standards (for assessing quality and rigor in submitted work) with the "openness" of the submission template and formatting guidelines (to encourage pioneering developments in visual argumentation). Implications: The article provides a valuable resource for practice-based design researchers who are committed to generating research understanding through applied endeavors (making things) and / or writing. This includes designers who are new to research cultures. It should also appeal to those working in interdisciplinary research in collaboration with design practitioners (but who may not be practitioners themselves). The conference aims to foster and support a burgeoning "research through design" academic community and to provide a fitting dissemination platform for this community. We hope that the conference will encourage academic communities to give proper consideration to the concept of design as a knowledge-generating activity. Constructivist content: Knowledge about design research is generated from meaningful interaction between people and artifacts as part of the unfolding conference experience. The organizational features of the conference aim to support knowledge dissemination through dialogical relations between people and things in particular contexts of interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · In the digital era, it is important to investigate the potential impact of digital technologies in education and how such tools can be successfully integrated into the mathematics classroom. Similarly to many others in the constructionism community, we have been inspired by the idea set out originally by Papert of providing students with appropriate "vehicles" for developing "Mathematical Ways of Thinking." Problem · A crucial issue regarding the design of digital tools as vehicles is that of "transfer" or "bridging" i.e., what mathematical knowledge is transferred from students' interactions with such tools to other activities such as when they are doing "paper-and-pencil" mathematics, undertaking traditional exam papers or in other formal and informal settings. Method · Through the lens of a framework for algebraic ways of thinking, this article analyses data gathered as part of the MiGen project from studies aiming at investigating ways to build bridges to formal algebra. Results · The analysis supports the need for and benefit of bridging activities that make the connections to algebra explicit and for frequent reflection and consolidation tasks. Implications · Task and digital environment designers should consider designing bridging activities that consolidate, support and sustain students' mathematical ways of thinking beyond their digital experience. Constructivist content · Our more general aim is to support the implementation of digital technologies, especially constructionist learning environments, in the mathematics classroom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: The detection of objective reality, truth, and lies are still heated topics in epistemology. When discussing these topics, philosophers often resort to certain thought experiments, engaging an important concept that can be broadly identified as "the global observer." It relates to Putnam's God's Eye, Davidson's Omniscient Interpreter, and the ultimate observer in quantum physics, among others. Problem: The article explores the notion of the global observer as the guarantor of the determinability and configuration of events in the world. It analyzes the consistency of the notion "global observer" from the standpoint of logic and philosophy, and discusses why application of this notion in some contexts poses challenges and appears to be paradoxical. Method: The paper uses conceptual methods of argumentation, such as logical (deduction) and philosophical (phenomenology) kinds of proof. Its key approach is the engagement of thought experiments. Results: The notion of a global observer is incoherent: "being global" and "being an observer" appear to be incompatible features. It is claimed that from the standpoint of global observation, there are no events occurring in the world. Furthermore, the indefiniteness of the world as a whole is asserted, which is related to the uninformedness of the global observer regarding the "true state of affairs." "Global observation" turns out to be incompatible with the concept of the observer, blocking, as a result, the opportunity for a determinable configuration of events. It only makes sense to discuss local observations, which are limited to mutual observation or introspections, and not to assume the existence of some absolute truth, reality, or the state of affairs beyond the local observations. Constructivist content: The article emphasizes the role of the observer and observation. It opens up some problematic consequences of the core philosophical assumptions of globally observing existence. Referring to von Foerster's and Luhmann's idea that we can only speak reasonably about local observations, the paper argues that reality is neither external to nor independent of the observer. Implications: The paper could be productive for epistemic theories, theories of quantum physics, and theories of non-classical logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: In the literature concerning the theory of social systems, interest in epistemological and ontological questions has increased in recent years. The controversies regarding a realist vs. constructivist interpretation of Luhmann's theory, as well as the concept of many realities that correspond to many ontologies, deserve attention. Problem: The paper discusses interrelated ontological and epistemological problems in Luhmann's systems theory, such as ontology and de-ontologization, realism vs. constructivism, contingency and its limits and one vs. many realities. Method: The paper proposes an interpretation, according to which systems theory is based on an epistemology - radical operative constructivism. Results: Luhmann is not a realist. The last word belongs to radical operative constructivism, and naïve realism with reference to social systems has only a preliminary, methodological significance. However, taking a position in the dispute between realism and constructivism inevitably involves an ontological "vocabulary," that is, usage of the reality/construction distinction. Furthermore, operative constructivism formulates the necessary conditions of the possibility of cognition, which limit the contingency of the theory and constitute one reality that is a construction of systems theory. Luhmann rejects ontology, but he does not renounce epistemology, and consequently the project of de-ontologization remains incomplete. Implications: The paper offers a new, coherent interpretation of ontological and epistemological questions in Luhmann's theory, and also throws light on some problems of radical constructivism in general, such as the ontological implications of epistemology or the constructivist self-reference of theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context This conceptual paper tries to tackle the advantages and the limitations that might arise from including second-order science into global climate change sciences, a research area that traditionally focuses on first-order approaches and that is currently attracting a lot of media and public attention. Problem The high profile of climate change research seems to provoke a certain dilemma for scientists: despite the slowly increasing realization within the sciences that our knowledge is temporary, tentative, uncertain, and far from stable, the public expectations towards science and scientific knowledge are still the opposite: that scientific results should prove to be objective, reliable, and authoritative. As a way to handle the uncertainty, scientists tend to produce "varieties of scenarios" instead of clear statements, as well as reports that articulate different scientific opinions about the causes and dynamics of change (e.g., the IPCC). This might leave the impression of vague and indecisive results. As a result, esteem for the sciences seems to be decreasing within public perception. Method This paper applies second-order observation to climate change research in particular and the sciences in general. Results Within most sciences, it is still quite unusual to disclose and discuss the epistemological foundations of the respective research questions, methods and ways to interpret data, as research proceeds mainly from some version of realistic epistemological positions. A shift towards self-reflexive second-order science might offer possibilities for a return to a "less polarized" scientific and public debate on climate change because it points to knowledge that is in principle tentative, uncertain and fragmented as well as to the theory- and observation-dependence of scientific work. Implications The paper addresses the differences between first-order and second-order science as well as some challenges of science in general, which second-order science might address and disclose. Constructivist content Second-order science used as observation praxis (second-order observation) for this specific field of research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • Structural design education in architecture is typically conceived as a scientific subject taught in a lecture format and based on a transactional view of learning. This approach misses opportunities to contribute to and integrate with design-studio-based architectural education. Problem • How can radical constructivism inform a design-based pedagogy of structural design in the context of large cohorts of Chinese learners? Method • The paper outlines how radical constructivist and second order cybernetic perspectives are reflected in an alternative educational approach to structural design. This approach encourages students' individual learning while negotiating constraints deriving from large cohorts as well as the educational expectations of Chinese learners. Results • Teaching outcomes as well as students' comments show successes in engaging students in adopting a more personal and active attitude in their learning. Students appreciate and praise learning grounded in experience as well as collaborative, peer-led learning. Challenges remain in establishing a more dialogical learning situation and in supporting individual students' learning in large student cohorts. Implications • Limitations arise from the constraints imposed by large cohorts, limited manpower and an institutional preference for teaching towards written examinations. The research and teaching development presented are ongoing. This paper may inform educators in the fields of architecture and engineering as well as, more generally, educators who seek to develop their teaching based on a radical constructivist epistemology in the context of large cohorts. Constructivist content • The teaching approach presented links a radical constructivist perspective based on Ernst von Glasersfeld's work with second-order cybernetics in the context of design-based education. The paper discusses challenges and opportunities for this approach in the context of large cohorts of Chinese learners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • The paper utilizes a conceptual analysis to examine the development of abstract conceptual structures in mathematical problem solving. In so doing, we address two questions: 1. How have the ideas of RC influenced our own educational theory? and 2. How has our application of the ideas of RC helped to improve our understanding of the connection between teaching practice and students' learning processes? Problem • The paper documents how Ernst von Glasersfeld's view of mental representation can be illustrated in the context of mathematical problem solving and used to explain the development of conceptual structure in mathematical problem solving. We focus on how acts of mental representation play a vital role in the gradual internalization and interiorization of solution activity. Method • A conceptual analysis of the actions of a college student solving a set of algebra problems was conducted. We focus on the student's problem solving actions, particularly her emerging and developing reflections about her solution activity. The interview was videotaped and written transcripts of the solver's verbal responses were prepared. Results • The analysis of the solver's solution activity focused on identifying and describing her cognitive actions in resolving genuinely problematic situations that she faced while solving the tasks. The results of the analysis included a description of the increasingly abstract levels of conceptual knowledge demonstrated by the solver. Implications • The results suggest a framework for an explanation of problem solving that is activity-based, and consistent with von Glasersfeld's radical constructivist view of knowledge. The impact of von Glasersfeld's ideas in mathematics education is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • This paper outlines how radical constructivist theory has led to a particular methodological technique, developing second-order models of student thinking, that has helped mathematics educators to be more effective teachers of their students. Problem • The paper addresses the problem of how radical constructivist theory has been used to explain and engender more viable adaptations to the complexities of teaching and learning. Method • The paper presents empirical data from teaching experiments that illustrate the process of second-order model building. Results • The result of the paper is an illustration of how second-order models are developed and how this process, as it progresses, supports teachers to be more effective. Implications • This paper has the implication that radical constructivism has the potential to impact practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • The paper is a selective survey of radical constructivist (RC) research that relates to education. Problem • Over the past 40 years there have been developments in the research reviewed. Earlier work was often concerned with conceptual clarification and showing different ways children and teachers think, whereas recent work is more systemic and applied. Method • Research with educational implications done by the author and colleagues is surveyed. This survey shows how RC influenced research in a variety of psychological domains including attitudes to different others, science education, and teacher professional development. Results • While initial work by the author in this area focussed on conceptual clarification, the more recent work is classroom-based, with implications for educational practice in schools. The final part of the paper on research by colleagues emphasises how teachers might work together in schools and the broader school system. Implications • RC plays a significant role in national curricula as a theoretical approach to facilitating diversity in schools and empowering children in their education. There is an urgent need to focus on student learning. The work on educational applications cited provides important insights into the resolvable problems of enabling genuine learning communities. Constructivist Content • The paper addresses theoretical clarification, variations in children's concepts about different others, inclusion, and implementation of educational programmes that use RC frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · W. R. Ashby's work on homeostasis as the basic mechanism underlying all kinds of physiological as well as cognitive functions has aroused renewed interest in cognitive science and related disciplines. Researchers have successfully incorporated some of Ashby's technical results, such as ultrastability, into modern frameworks (e.g., CTRNN networks). Problem · The recovery of Ashby's technical contributions has left in the background Ashby's far more controversial non-technical views, according to which homeostatic adaptation to the environment governs all aspects of all forms of life. This thesis entails that life is fundamentally "heteronomous" and it is conceptually at odds with the autopoiesis framework adopted by Ashby's recent defenders as well as with the primacy of autonomy in human life that most of the Western philosophical tradition upholds. The paper argues that the use of computer simulations focused on the more conceptual aspects of Ashby's thought may help us recover, extend and consequently assess an overall view of life as heteronomy. Method · The paper discusses some computer simulations of Ashby's original electro-mechanical device (the homeostat) that implement his techniques (double-feedback loops and random parameter-switching). Results · First simulation results show that even though Ashby's claims about homeostatic adaptivity need to be slightly weakened, his overall results are confirmed, thereby suggesting that an extension to virtual robots engaged in minimal cognitive tasks may be successful. Implications · The paper shows that a fuller incorporation of Ashby's original results into recent cognitive science research may trigger a philosophical and technical reevaluation of the traditional distinction between heteronomous and autonomous behavior. Constructivist content · The research outlined in the paper supports an extended constructionist perspective in which agency as autonomy plays a more limited role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · The advent of a general artificial intelligence mechanism that learns like humans do would represent the realization of an old and major dream of science. It could be achieved by an artifact able to develop its own cognitive structures following constructivist principles. However, there is a large distance between the descriptions of the intelligence made by constructivist theories and the mechanisms that currently exist. Problem · The constructivist conception of intelligence is very powerful for explaining how cognitive development takes place. However, until now, no computational model has successfully demonstrated the underlying mechanisms necessary to realize it. In other words, the artificial intelligence (AI) community has not been able to give rise to a system that convincingly implements the principles of intelligence as postulated by constructivism, and that is also capable of dealing with complex environments. Results · This paper presents the constructivist anticipatory learning mechanism (CALM), an agent learning mechanism based on the constructivist approach of AI. It is designed to deal dynamically and interactively with environments that are at the same time partially deterministic and partially observable. CALM can model the regularities experienced in the interaction with the environment, whether on the sensorimotor level or by constructing abstract or high-level representational concepts. The created model provides the knowledge necessary to generate the agent behavior. The paper also presents the coupled agent environment system (CAES) meta-architecture, which defines a conception of an autonomous agent, situated in the environment, embodied and intrinsically motivated. Implications · The paper can be seen as a step towards a computational implementation of constructivist principles, on the one hand suggesting a further perspective of this refreshing movement on the AI field (which is still too steeped in a behaviorist influence and dominated by probabilistic models and narrow applied approaches), and on the other hand bringing some abstract descriptions of the cognitive process into a more concrete dimension, in the form of algorithms. Constructivist content · The connection of this paper with constructivism is the proposal of a computational and formally described mechanism that implements important aspects of the subjective process of knowledge construction based on key ideas proposed by constructivist theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · Current theories of art, particularly those developed from a neuroscientific perspective, fail to take adequate account of the role, methods or motivations of the artist. The problem is that the lack of the artist's voice in interdisciplinary theoretical research undermines the basis of current theoretical models. Problem · How can artists purposefully engage with contemporary consciousness studies? The aim of the research was to develop new methodologies appropriate for cross-disciplinary research and to establish what value, if any, neuroaesthetic or phenomenological theories of art could hold for contemporary arts practice. Method · My approach to the topic was to explore the application of neuroaesthetic and phenomenological theory through practice-based research in contemporary art. Results · The paper maps out a proposed avenue of research, and some initial findings, rather than the results of an inquiry. Implications · This paper will be of interest to those who work in philosophy of art and visual perception and those who are exploring empirically-based research methodologies in philosophy. Insights will be beneficial to arts practitioners, philosophers and scientists researching aesthetic experience. Constructivist content · The paper explores Noë's sensorimotor theory of perception and the extended temporal relation between visual elements of an artwork as its forms are created in consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · Neurophenomenology lies at a rich intersection of neuroscience and lived human experience, as described by phenomenology. As a new discipline, it is open to many new questions, methods, and proposals. Problem · The best available scientific ontology for neurophenomenology is based in dynamical systems. However, dynamical systems afford myriad strategies for organizing and representing neurodynamics, just as phenomenology presents an array of aspects of experience to be captured. Here, the focus is on the pervasive experience of subjective time. There is a need for concepts that describe synchronic (parallel) features of experience as well as diachronic (dynamic) structures of temporal objects. Method · The paper includes an illustrative discussion of the role of temporality in the construction of the awareness of objects, in the tradition of Husserl, James, and most of 20th century phenomenology. Temporality illuminates desiderata for the dynamical concepts needed for experiment and explanation in neurophenomenology. Results · The structure of music - rather than language - is proposed as a source for descriptive and explanatory concepts in a neurophenomenology that encompasses the pervasive experience of duration, stability, passing time, and change. Implications · The toolbox of cognitive musicology suddenly becomes available for dynamical systems approaches to the neurophenomenology of subjective time. The paper includes an illustrative empirical study of consonance and dissonance in application to an fMRI study of schizophrenia. Dissonance, in a sense strongly analogous to its acoustic musical meaning, characterizes schizophrenia at all times, while emerging in healthy brains only during distracting and demanding tasks. Constructivist content · Our experience of the present is a continuous and elaborate construction of the retention of the immediate past and anticipation of the immediate future. Musical concepts are almost entirely temporal and constructivist in this temporal sense - almost every element of music is constructed from relations to non-present musical/temporal contexts. Musicology may offer many new constructivist concepts and a way of thinking about the dynamical system that is the human brain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · Neurophenomenology is a relatively new field, with scope for novel and informative approaches to empirical questions about what structural parallels there are between neural activity and phenomenal experience. Problem · The overall aim is to present a method for examining possible correlations of neurodynamic and phenodynamic structures within the structurally-coupled work of Alexander Technique practitioners with their pupils. Method · This paper includes the development of an enkinaesthetic explanatory framework, an overview of the salient aspects of the Alexander Technique, and the presentation of an elicitation interview technique as part of a neurophenomenological method. It will propose a way of testing the hypothesis that if, in the effective practice of Alexander Technique, there is a union between the nervous systems of teacher and pupil, it should be visible neurologically and affective phenomenologically, and thus it should be possible to investigate both its neural and phenomenal signatures. Results · The proposed means of testing the hypothesis is to use the elicitation interview technique alongside neural monitoring during the teaching of the Alexander Technique in four paired sets of subjects. Constructivist content · At the heart of this paper is the claim that all activity is co-activity. I make no assumption of an ontological primacy of mental or physical, or explanatory primacy of any methodology. Implications · This has important ramifications for somatic education and therapies, for establishing frameworks of co-engagement and care in health-care situations, and for understanding empathy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · Seventeen years ago Francisco Varela introduced neurophenomenology. He proposed the integration of phenomenological approaches to first-person experience - in the tradition of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau- Ponty - with a neuro-dynamical, scientific approach to the study of the situated brain and body. Problem · It is time for a re-appraisal of this field. Has neurophenomenology already contributed to the sciences of the mind? If so, how? How should it best do so in future? Additionally, can neurophenomenology really help to resolve or dissolve the "hard problem" of the relation between mind and body, as Varela claimed? Method · The papers in this special issue arose out of a conference organised by the Consciousness and Experiential Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society in Bristol, UK, in September 2012. We have invited a representative sample of the speakers at that conference to present their work here. Results · Various papers argue that the first-person methods of phenomenology are distinct from, and more robust than, the failed "introspectionist" methods of early modern psychology. The "elicitation interview" emerges as a successful and widely adopted method to have emerged from this field. Phenomenological techniques are already being successfully applied to neuroscientific problems. Various specific proposals for new techniques and applications are made. Implications · It is time to take neurophenomenology seriously. It has proven its worth, and it is ripe with the potential for further immediate, successful applications. Constructivist content · Varela's key aim was to develop a non-dualising approach to the science of consciousness. The papers in this special issue look at the philosophical and practical details of successfully putting such an approach into practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · Affective neuroscience has not developed first-person methods for the generation of first-person data. This neglect is problematic, because emotion experience is a central dimension of affectivity. Problem · I propose that augmenting affective neuroscience with a neurophenomenological method can help address long-standing questions in emotion theory, such as: Do different emotions come with unique, distinctive patterns of brain and bodily activity? How do emotion experience, bodily feelings and brain and bodily activity relate to one another? Method · This paper is theoretical. It advances ideas for integrating neurophenomenology and affective neuroscience, and explains how this integration would allow progress on the above questions. Results · An integrated "affective neuro-physio-phenomenology" may help scientists understand whether discrete emotion categories come in different experiential varieties, which would in turn help interpret concomitant brain and bodily activity. It may also help investigate the bodily nature of emotion experience, including how experience relates to actual brain and bodily activity. Implications · If put into practice, the ideas advanced here would enrich the scientific study of emotion experience and more generally further our understanding of the relationship of consciousness and physical activity. The paper is speculative and its ideas need to be implemented to bear fruit. Constructivist content · This paper argues in favor of the neurophenomenological method, which is an offshoot of enactivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context ·Although Josef Mitterer's non-dualism has received increasing attention in recent years, it is still underrated by philosophers. It is an ambitious and unusual treatment of epistemological problems concerning truth and reality. Problem · Is non-dualism tenable? Is conceptual relativism tenable? Method · On the basis of a pragmatic semantics, Mitterer's arguments against conceptual relativism are shown to be unjustified. Results · Non-dualism lacks a clear conception of semantics. Given the similarities to Robert Brandom's account of truth, as well as Mitterer's preoccupation with Wittgenstein, pragmatic semantics suggests itself for filling this gap. But then conceptual relativism seems to be the more attractive position. Implications · This paper is a critical survey of non-dualism and a defense of conceptual relativism, but it might also be a worthwhile reading for those interested in semantic issues such as the difference between Ludwig Wittgenstein's and Robert Brandom's approaches to "meaning as use." Constructivist content · Non-dualism is sometimes regarded as an alternative to realistic and constructivist positions in epistemology. This paper, however, defends conceptual relativism, which is a kind of realism that can also be seen as a kind of (non-radical) constructivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ontext · The relation between language and reality, the problem of truth, and ontological questions in general belong to the perennial problems of philosophy. Although non-dualism deals with these problems and their presuppositions, it still remains at the periphery of philosophical discourse. Problem · How to deal with ontological questions within the non-dualizing mode of discourse. Method · The paper tries to reconstruct the origin of, and the interest in, ontological questions addressed to non-dualists; it discusses the possible types of answers to these questions and proposes an alternative way of dealing with them. Results · Ontological questions cannot be formulated within a non-dualist conceptual framework and hence they cannot be answered. Implications · This paper tries to pave the way for leaving ontological questions behind and moving on to a different range of philosophical queries ensuing from a non-dualizing perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · Non-dualism suggests a new way of utilizing language without the assumption of categorically extralinguistic objects denoted by language. Problem · What is the innovative potential, what is the special value of nondualism for science? Is non-dualism a fruitful conceptual revision or just a philosophical thought experiment with no or little significance for science? Method · We provide a concise introduction to non-dualism's central new proposals and an overview of the papers. Results · Fourteen contributors show how this way of thinking and speaking can be operationalized creatively, but also address some of its boundaries. Implications · Since not all of the aspects and problems highlighted for discussion in the original Call for Papers were answered satisfactorily, further research is necessary. For example, research is needed on the relationship between dualism's distinction between object language and metalanguage on the one hand and non-dualism's distinction between descriptions so far and descriptions from now on on the other; or on the infinite regress allegations by non-dualism against dualism. Constructivist content · Some authors show that non-dualist thinking is anti-essentialist, in a similar way as constructivist thinking. Some also show that comparable questions arise; for example, the question of whether non-dualism denies the material world (containing extralinguistic objects). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: Ernst von Glasersfeld's radical constructivism has been very influential in education, particularly in mathematics and science education. Problem: There is limited guidance available for educational researchers who wish to design research that is consistent with constructivist thinking. Von Glasersfeld's radical constructivism, together with the theoretical perspectives outlined by constructivist educational researchers such as Guba and Lincoln, can be considered as a source of guidance. Method: The paper outlines a constructivist knowledge framework that could be adopted for educational research. The discussion considers how judgement of what counts as knowledge could be made, and how the set of procedures chosen could enable the researcher to represent the findings of the inquiry as knowledge. Results: An argument is made for researchers to explicate the criteria for judging an inquiry. Each criterion can then be linked to the standards to be reached and the techniques for generating data. The joint satisfaction of criteria and techniques for a constructivist inquiry creates conditions that indicate the "trustworthiness" or "authenticity" of an educational research study. Implications: The illustration of how a constructivist inquiry could be judged recognises how the contribution of von Glasersfeld's radical constructivism can be used to inform the practice of educational research. Constructivist content: The argument presented in the paper links to radical constructivism and suggests ways in which it can be applied in the context of educational research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: Niklas Luhmann is considered to be a major proponent of the constructivist movement who based his highly complex sociological theory on constructivist concepts such as Maturana's autopoiesis and Spencer Brown's distinction. Problem: Despite heavily borrowing from constructivism, there are doubts as to whether his epistemological standpoint was properly constructivist. Method: In six papers and 14 Open Peer Commentaries, Luhmann's epistemological understanding, understanding of science, and use and development of constructivist concepts is examined. Results: The authors' papers and commentaries cover a broad range of topics including the concepts of the observer, meaning, environment, and structural coupling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · The question of how to understand the epistemology of set theory has been a longstanding problem in the foundations of mathematics since Cantor formulated the theory in the 19th century, and particularly since Bertrand Russell articulated his paradox in the early twentieth century. The theory of types pioneered by Russell and Whitehead was simplified by mathematicians to a single distinction between sets and classes. The question of the meaning of this distinction and its necessity still remains open. > Problem · I am concerned with the meaning of the set/class distinction and I wish to show that it arises naturally due to the nature of the sort of distinctions that sets create. Method · The method of the paper is to discuss first the Russell paradox and the arguments of Cantor that preceded it. Then we point out that the Russell set of all sets that are not members of themselves can be replaced by the Russell operator R, which is applied to a set S to form R(S), the set of all sets in S that are not members of themselves. Results · The key point about R(S) is that it is well-defined in terms of S, and R(S) cannot be a member of S. Thus any set, even the simplest one, is incomplete. This provides the solution to the problem that I have posed. It shows that the distinction between sets and classes is natural and necessary. Implications · While we have shown that the distinction between sets and classes is natural and necessary, this can only be the beginning from the point of view of epistemology. It is we who will create further distinctions. And it is up to us to maintain these distinctions, or to allow them to coalesce. Constructivist content · I argue in favor of a constructivist perspective for set theory, mathematics, and the way these structures fit into our natural language and constructed speech and worlds. That is the point of this paper. It is only in the reach for absolutes, ignoring the fact that we are the authors of these structures, that the paradoxes arise. > INSET: BOX 1: A Cantorian tale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · The infinite has long been an area of philosophical and mathematical investigation. There are many puzzles and paradoxes that involve the infinite. Problem · The goal of this paper is to answer the question: Which objects are the infinite numbers (when order is taken into account)? Though not currently considered a problem, I believe that it is of primary importance to identify properly the infinite numbers. Method · The main method that I employ is conceptual analysis. In particular, I argue that the infinite numbers should be as much like the finite numbers as possible. Results · Using finite numbers as our guide to the infinite numbers, it follows that infinite numbers are of the structure w + (&ohgr; * + &ohgr; ) &agr; + &ohgr; *. This same structure also arises when a large finite number is under investigation. Implications · A first implication of the paper is that infinite numbers may be large finite numbers that have not been investigated fully. A second implication is that there is no number of finite numbers. Third, a number of paradoxes of the infinite are resolved. One change that should occur as a result of these findings is that "infinitely many" should refer to structures of the form &ohgr; + (&ohgr; * + &ohgr; ) &agr;+ &ohgr; *; in contrast, there are "indefinitely many" natural numbers. Constructivist content · The constructivist perspective of the paper is a form of strict finitism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context * Philosophical debates in recent decades have developed new ways of dealing with old philosophical problems such as reality, truth, knowledge, language, communication, and action. These new approaches deserve serious consideration because they can improve the discourse of radical constructivism. Problem * This paper discusses the following problem: How can we overcome dualistic and ontological approaches to basic philosophical problems -- problems that are relevant to all scientific domains? Method * The method applied here can be roughly described as a transition from entities/substantives/identities to actions and processes, the actions and processes from which so-called entities result. Action-orientation -- or an actor-based process -- is necessarily combined with sense-orientation as provided by culture and society. Results * The paper demonstrates how the problems mentioned above can be reformulated in a non-dualistic and non-ontological way. Implications * Opening up constructivist thinking to insights provided by neighbouring philosophical approaches facilitates interdisciplinary cooperation and helps overcome dualistic remnants -- as well as the cognitive one-sidedness of traditional constructivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose • One of my goals in the paper is to investigate why realists reject radical constructivism (RC) as well as social constructivism (SC) out of hand. I shall do this by means of commenting on Peter Slezak's critical paper, Radical Constructivism: Epistemology, Education and Dynamite. My other goal is to explore why realists condemn the use of RC and SC in science and mathematics education for no stated reason, again by means of commenting on Slezak's paper. > M ethod • I restrict my comments to Slezak's paper and leave it to the reader to judge which, if any, of the reasons that I advance for these two states of affairs are not specific to Slezak's paper. Other readers might not agree with my interpretations of Slezak's paper, including Slezak himself, but I offer them after having worked with von Glasersfeld in interdisciplinary research in mathematics education for over 25 years. > Findings • My findings are that Slezak: (1) rejects RC and SC on the basis of unjustified criticisms, (2) does not explore basic tenets of RC nor of SC beyond the unjustified criticisms, (3) rejects how SC and RC have been used in science and mathematics education, based at least in part on the unjustified criticisms, (3) dislikes how SC has been used in science and mathematics education, a dislike that fuels his rejection of any constructivism, and (4) doesn't explore how RC has been used in scientific investigations in mathematics education. On the basis of these findings, I conclude that how epistemological models of knowing might be used in science or mathematics education would be better left to the educators who use them in interdisciplinary work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • The current situation in philosophy of science includes central, ongoing debates about realism and antirealism. The same question has been central to the theorising of radical constructivism and, in particular, to its implications for educational theory. However the constructivist literature does not make significant contact with the most important, mainstream philosophical discussions. > Problem • Despite its overwhelming influence among educationalists, I suggest that the "radical constructivism" of Ernst Glasersfeld is an example of fashionable but thoroughly problematic doctrines that can have little benefit for practical pedagogy or teacher education. My critique has a positive goal: it is important to understand why constructivism has generated such severe polarization and disputation. A symptom of the problem is the concern with the most abstruse and obdurate problems of philosophy that have no conceivable bearing on educational practice or anything else, for that matter. The diagnosis is confirmed by those pedagogical recommendations that are allegedly derived from radical constructivism that are touted as revolutionary but are platitudes of common sense. I suggest that, ironically, this observation itself provides some pedagogical insight. > M ethod • The approach adopted for the topic is critical, philosophical analysis of the various claims and theses of radical constructivism in the light of philosophy of science and psychology. > Results • The findings of the paper are that central theoretical claims of constructivism are couched in an unclear and unnecessary jargon that obscures the implausibility or banality of these claims. > I mplications • The value of the paper lies in providing an analysis and critique of central, influential claims of radical constructivism both in relation to issues in epistemology and also in relation to the alleged bearing of these claims on pedagogy. It is suggested that, contrary to the claims of radical constructivists, there are few if any implications for practice and applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • The discipline of knowledge management (KM) begins to understand a) that it should move towards a user-centred, socialized KM and b) which business objectives provide motivation to do so. However, it lacks ideas on how to reach the objective that it suggests and justifies. We contend in this paper that this change requires a more viable understanding of knowledge combined with a suitable model of social interaction, otherwise it will fail. > Problem • The problem to be solved is to find a way to blend a model of social interaction and a suitable understanding of knowledge so that together they can contribute to the objective of implementing a "user-centred KM." In this paper we show a solution articulated in several conceptual and experimental components and phases. > Method • We use a systemic and cybernetic approach: systemic analysis of the problem, conception of a cybernetic approach, design of a systemic solution, and its evaluation in an experiment. The main methods used are systems engineering, cybernetic modelling, and knowledge engineering. > Results • We propose seven interrelated results: 1. A defect analysis of KM; 2. The concept of knowledge as the "Logic of Experience"; 3. A set of five KM design principles; 4. The principle of "Knowledge Identity"; 5. The model of "Knowledge Cooperation"; 6. The architecture of a user-centred KM system; and 7. Insights from a KM experiment. > I mplications • Our results are useful for any stakeholder in today's knowledge economy when they need to understand, design, build, nurture and support an organization's capacity to learn and innovate for the benefit not only of the company's financial owners but also of the individuals who work in it. Future research should urgently address the issues of "knowledge identity" and the "knowledge contract" and KM practice should design its next steps for moving towards a user-centred KM in conformity with the principle of "knowledge identity." The paper links explicitly to radical constructivism and argues in favour of a radical constructivist foundation for KM in which knowledge is seen as the "Logic of Experience." It also shows how this KM foundation can be extended with a social perspective and by that allow the individual and the social to be conceived of as complementary elements in one single KM system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

> Problem • This paper argues for the inclusion of a cybernetic-constructivist approach to the art of painting and for an understanding of principles that coincide with constructivism that operate within the creation of paintings and other works of art. It argues that an understanding of cybernetic-constructivist principles improves creative practice rather than merely analyzes outcomes. > Method • Written from the point of view of a longtime practitioner rather than from the point of view of an academic proponent of art theory or art history, the paper draws on insights of second-order cyberneticians whose principles help to understand what a painting is and to determine its status as an object among objects which communicates itself simultaneously as not-an-object. These principles form an outlook as they become enfolded in sensibility, and through this outlook, the problem of being a painter can be addressed, the range of invention can be apprehended and broadened, and creativity can be mindfully activated. It addresses how painting and explained and how painting can co-create meaning with a viewer. > Results • It is proposed that inquiry into painting may be of value in teaching us more about constructivism, as paintings provide stable, manifest and accessible physical outcomes of constructivist praxis, and that an application of cybernetic and constructivist principles to painting can advance the understanding of painting. > Implications • Understandings of painting as well as other art forms can be better understood through including a broad cybernetic perspective in examining painting as a process and as a medium through which conversation takes place between observers. These understandings may have value in improving creative effectiveness among viewers and producers of art works. These understandings may have value for practitioners of other creative enterprises, and have potential to theory by emancipating art from being in service as a cultural emblem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

▶Purpose- In both analytic and continental philosophy, the linguistic turn jettisoned philosophical foundationalism and gave way to a new pragmatic-hermeneutic turn regarding understanding, truth, and meaning. Yet now intentional consciousness - i.e., the relation between thought and language - still poses an issue. At stake is the convincing reconstruction of consciousness based on symbolic mediation. ▶Method- In order to contribute to this discussion, the paper takes up Cassirer's argument for the necessity of "symbolic forms" for thought. It introduces an ideal-typical notion of the sign, and develops, on this basis, the relevance of Cassirer's arguments from symbolic synthesis and from symbolic articulation in order to finally assess the prospects of a theory of symbolic meaning after Cassirer. ▶Results- The paper shows that consciousness is prone to a semiotic analysis and points the way for future desiderata of a theory of meaning. ▶Implications- The results are relevant for philosophy, psychology, semiotics, as well as cultural studies. The paper projects a position of symbolic epistemic constructivism by reconstructing the mind and world, or subject-object, as emerging from the prior source of symbolic mediation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

▶Purpose- Gordon Pask has left behind a voluminous scientific oeuvre in which he frequently uses technical language and a detail of argument that makes his work difficult to access except by the most dedicated of students. His ideas have also evolved over a long period. This paper provides introductions to three of Pask's key concepts: "conversations," "individuals," and "concepts." ▶Method- Based on the author's close knowledge of Pask's work, as his collaborator for ten years and as someone who has had access to and is familiar with almost all of his published work, the paper selects three of Pask's key concepts for elucidation in order to motivate the interested reader to explore Pask's work in the original. ▶Results- Pask's key concepts, "conversations," "individuals," and "concepts," which are central in his conversation theory and his later elaborations in "interaction of actors theory," are shown to be grounded in fundamental principles from cybernetics. Furthermore, the form of Pask's theorising is that of second order (reflexive) metatheorising, developing theories of theorising that explain their own form and genesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

▶Purpose: The paper discusses the concept of a reflexive domain, an arena where the apparent objects as entities of the domain are actually processes and transformations of the domain as a whole. Human actions in the world partake of the patterns of reflexivity, and the productions of human beings, including science and mathematics, can be seen in this light. ▶Methodology- Simple mathematical models are used to make conceptual points. Context - The paper begins with a review of the author's previous work on eigenforms - objects as tokens for eigenbehaviors, the study of recursions and fixed points of recursions. The paper also studies eigenforms in the Boolean reflexive models of Vladimir Lefebvre. ▶Findings-The paper gives a mathematical definition of a reflexive domain and proves that every transformation of such a domain has a fixed point. (This point of view has been taken by William Lawvere in the context of logic and category theory.) Thus eigenforms exist in reflexive domains. We discuss a related concept called a "magma." A magma is composed entirely of its own structure-preserving transformations. Thus a magma can be regarded as a model of reflexivity and we call a magma "reflexive" if it encompasses all of its structure-preserving transformations (plus a side condition explained in the paper). We prove a fixed point theorem for reflexive magmas. We then show how magmas are related to knot theory and to an extension of set theory using knot diagrammatic topology. This work brings formalisms for self-reference into a wider arena of process algebra, combinatorics, non-standard set theory and topology. The paper then discusses how these findings are related to lambda calculus, set theory and models for self-reference. The last section of the paper is an account of a computer experiment with a variant of the Life cellular automaton of John H. Conway. In this variant, 7-Life, the recursions lead to self-sustaining processes with very long evolutionary patterns. We show how examples of novel phenomena arise in these patterns over the course of large time scales. ▶Value- The paper provides a wider context and mathematical conceptual tools for the cybernetic study of reflexivity and circularity in systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: By proposing to regard objects as "tokens for eigenbehavior," von Foerster's seminal paper opposes the intuitive subject-object dualism of traditional philosophy, which considers objects to be instances of an external world. Problem: We argue that this proposal has two implications, one for epistemology and one for the demarcation between the natural sciences and the humanities. Method: Our arguments are based on insights gained in computational models and from reviewing the contributions to this special issue. Results: Epistemologically, von Foerster's proposal suggests that what is called "reality" could be seen as an ensemble of eigenforms generated by the eigenbehavior that arises in the interaction of multiple dynamics. Regarding science, the contributions to this special issue demonstrate that the concept of eigenbehavior can be applied to a variety of disciplines from the formal and natural sciences to the humanities. Its universal applicability provides a strong argument for transdisciplinarity, and its emphasis on the observer points in the direction of an observer-inclusive science. Implications: Thinking in eigenbehavior may not only have implications for tearing down the barriers between sciences and humanities (although a common methodology based on von Foerster's transdisciplinary approach is still to crystalize), a better understanding of eigenbehaviors may also have profound effects on our understanding of ourselves. This also opens the way to innovative behavior design/modification technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • The use of first-person micro-phenomenological interviews and their productive interaction with thirdperson physiological data is a challenging and pressing issue in order to offer an effective and fruitful application of Varela's neurophenomenological hypothesis. Problem • We aim at offering a generative method of analysis of firstperson micro-phenomenological interviews using third-person physiological data. Our challenge is to describe this generative first-person analysis with the third-person physiological framework rather than put Varela's hypothesis into practice in a generative way (as we did in another paper). Method • The present contribution is a first pioneering study as far as the exposition of such an interactive generative methodology is concerned. It is also a new issue insofar as it deals with a case study, surprise in depression, that has not been thoroughly dealt with so far, either in philosophy or in psychopathology. Results • We show that the analysis of first-person data is an intrinsic generative one, insofar as new refined categories and multifarious circular micro- and macro-processes were discovered in the very process of analyzing. They provide the initial structural generic third-person description of surprise inherited both from philosophical phenomenological a priori categories and from the experimental startle setting with a refined micro-segmentation of the dynamic of the experience. Implications • Our article could be of interest to neurophenomenologists looking for an effective application and to researchers in quest of a method of analysis of first-person data. The present limitations are due to the still preliminary data-results we need to complete. Constructivist content • The article is directly linked to Varela's neurophenomenological program and aims at extending and reforming it with a cardio-phenomenological approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • On 12 November 2010, Ernst von Glasersfeld passed away. He was one of the most important, if not the most important, proponents of constructivist philosophy. Problem • In his life Ernst influenced many other scientists and philosophers. By whom was he himself influenced; who shaped his intellectual development? By collecting contributions from those who knew him closely or have an excellent understanding of radical constructvism we aim at presenting a cartography of the past and current state of affairs of radical constructivism. These contributions should also shed light on the question of the legacy that Ernst leaves behind. Method • Some 25 authors accepted our invitation to contribute to this commemorative issue. Some texts are reminiscence essays expressing their friendship with Ernst, others are academic papers that investigate Ernst's influence in various disciplines. Two contributions Ernst von Glasersfeld authored himself. Results • Ernst von Glasersfeld is described as an intellectual mentor for many of his students. His legacy is alive in many disciplines ranging from education science to linguistics. Implications • Ernst's impact on mathematics education is described in some detail in these articles. However, his impact on science education has also been extensive. Constructivism is a foundation stone in the thinking behind the curriculum in many countries and this collection of papers should be useful to practitioners and researchers in education. We think that the work on conceptual analysis could be used more fully as a tool for modelling emerging concepts and hope that the articles here will facilitate interest in this aspect of Ernst's work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problem • Radical constructivism, although having a very successful base in research on mathematics and science education, has not become a generally accepted theory of knowledge. > Purpose • This paper discusses possible sources of aversion. > Results • The first section makes explicit the unavoidability of accepting the responsibility for one's thinking and acting, a responsibility that under stressful circumstances one would rather avoid. Another section suggests the origin of the human quest for certain knowledge. The third section introduces the notion of "stickiness of beliefs." > Implications • Constructivism has powerful implications for everyday attitudes and social relations with others. This paper, it is hoped, may induce some readers to investigate these implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses reconstruction of constructionism to make lasting impact on education. Topics discussed include idea of constructionism launched by mathematician Seymour Papert, seminal paper by Andy diSessa and Paul Cobb on importance of constructionism theory in educational design experiments and pedagogy related to same.

Context Philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy that deals with methods, foundations, and implications of science. It is a theory of how to create scientific knowledge. Presently, there is widespread agreement on how to do science, namely conjectures, ideally in the form of a mathematical model, and refutations, testing the model using empirical evidence. Problem Many social scientists are using a conception of science created for the physical sciences. Expanding philosophy of science so that it more successfully encompasses social systems would create new avenues of inquiry. Two dimensions could be added to philosophy of science: the amount of attention paid to the observer and the amount of impact of a theory on the system described. Method My approach is to illuminate underlying assumptions. I claim that there are at least three epistemologies and that they can be combined to form a more robust conception of knowledge and of how to do research. There are at least four models and four basic elements (i.e., ideas, groups, events, variables) being used by (social) scientists. Results The article identifies the logical propositions underlying second-order science. It suggests strategies for developing second-order science. And it describes several methods that can be used to practice second-order science, including how past theories have not only described but also changed the phenomenon being studied. Implications The task for members of the scientific community, particularly social scientists, is to practice second-order science and to develop further its theories and methods. A practical implication is to accept methods for acting as well as theories as a contribution to science, since methods explicitly define the role of an observer/ participant. Constructivist content The paper is an extension of the work of Heinz von Foerster and other second-order cyberneticians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • Radical constructivism (RC) is seen as a fruitful way to teach innovation, as Ernst von Glasersfeld's concepts of knowing, learning, and teaching provide an epistemological framework fostering processes of generating an autonomous conceptual understanding. Problem • Classical educational approaches do not meet the requirements for teaching and learning innovation because they mostly aim at students' competent performance, not at students' understanding and developing their creative capabilities. Method • Analysis of theoretical principles from the constructivist framework and how they can be used as a foundation for designing a course in the field of innovation. The empirical results are based on qualitative journal entries that were coded and categorized according to Charmaz's grounded theory approach. Results • It is shown that there is a close relationship between learning and innovation processes. The proposed investigated course design based on RC incorporates the following concepts: the course setting is understood as a framework to guide understanding; students work in teams and are subjective constructors of their own knowledge; instructors take on the role of coaches, guiding students through an innovation process as co creators. Such a framework facilitates dynamic processes of assimilation and accommodation, as well as perturbation through the "other," which potentially lead to novel, and viable, conceptual structures crucial for sustainable innovation. Constructivist Content • The paper argues in favor of RC principles in the context of teaching and learning. The proposed course setting is oriented at von Glasersfeld's understanding of knowing, learning, and teaching (vs. training). It outlines theoretical and practical aspects of these principles in the context of a course design for innovation. Furthermore, it shows the importance of von Glasersfeld's concept of intersubjectivity for processes of accommodation and the generation of (novel) autonomous conceptual structures. The interplay between creating coherence, perturbation, and irritation through interacting with the "other" (in the form of co-students and instructors) is assumed to be vital for such processes, as it leads to the creation of not only novel but also viable conceptual structures, therefore re-establishing a relative equilibrium critical for sustainable innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • Ernst von Glasersfeld introduced radical constructivism in 1974 as a new interpretation of Jean Piaget's constructivism to give new meanings to the notions of knowledge, communication, and reality. He also claimed that RC would affect traditional theories of education. Problem • After 40 years it has become necessary to review and evaluate von Glasersfeld's claim. Also, has RC been successful in taking the "social turn" in educational research, or is it unable to go beyond "private worlds"? Method • We provide an overview of contributed articles that were written with the aim of showing whether RC has an impact on educational research, and we discuss three core issues: Can RC account for inter-individual aspects? Is RC a theory of learning? And should Piaget be regarded as a radical constructivist? Results • We argue that the contributed papers demonstrate the efficiency of the application of RC to educational research and practice. Our argumentation also shows that in RC it would be misleading to claim a dichotomy between cognition and social interaction (rather, social constructivism is a radical constructivism), that RC does not contain a theory of mathematics learning any more or less than it contains a theory of mathematics teaching, and that Piaget should not be considered a mere trivial constructivist. Implications • Still one of the most challenging influences on educational research and practice, RC is ready to embark on many further questions, including its relationship with other constructivist paradigms, and to make progress in the social dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses individual responsibility in radical constructivism (RC). Topics discussed include the responsibility of each individual take the nature and consequences of his or her actions, the need for each individual to construct ethical standards for her/himself, and constructivist ethics. Meanwhile, the response of author Andreas Quale for the comments about her paper on ethics and RC are also discussed.

Context · At present, we lack a common understanding of both the process of cognition in living organisms and the construction of knowledge in embodied, embedded cognizing agents in general, including future artifactual cognitive agents under development, such as cognitive robots and softbots. > Purpose · This paper aims to show how the info-computational approach (IC) can reinforce constructivist ideas about the nature of cognition and knowledge and, conversely, how constructivist insights (such as that the process of cognition is the process of life) can inspire new models of computing. > Method · The info-computational constructive framework is presented for the modeling of cognitive processes in cognizing agents. Parallels are drawn with other constructivist approaches to cognition and knowledge generation. We describe how cognition as a process of life itself functions based on info-computation and how the process of knowledge generation proceeds through interactions with the environment and among agents. > Results · Cognition and knowledge generation in a cognizing agent is understood as interaction with the world (potential information), which by processes of natural computation becomes actual information. That actual information after integration becomes knowledge for the agent. Heinz von Foerster is identified as a precursor of natural computing, in particular bio computing. > Implications · IC provides a framework for unified study of cognition in living organisms (from the simplest ones, such as bacteria, to the most complex ones) as well as in artifactual cognitive systems. > Constructivist content · It supports the constructivist view that knowledge is actively constructed by cognizing agents and shared in a process of social cognition. IC argues that this process can be modeled as infocomputation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · In previous papers, I suggested six rules proposed by Varela, Maturana and Uribe as a validation test to assess the autopoietic nature of a complex dynamic system. Identifying possible non-biological autopoietic systems is harder than merely assessing self-organization, existence of embodied boundaries and some observable autonomous behavioural capabilities: any rigorous assessment should include a close observation of the "intra-boundaries" phenomenology in terms of components' self-production, their spatial distribution and the temporal occurrence of interaction events. > Problem · Under which physical and components' relational conditions can some social systems be properly considered as autopoietic unities compliant with the six rules? > Results · Dynamic systems can be classified according to "degrees of autonomous behaviour" that they may acquire as a result of the emergence of organizational closure (i.e., autonomy). Also, the different "degrees of attainable systemic autonomy" depend on the "degrees of autonomy" shown by a system's dynamic components. For human social systems, a necessary balance between individuals' autonomy and the heteronomous behaviour brought about on people by social norms (laws, culture, tradition or coercion) sets limits to the "degree of systemic autonomy" that human organizations may acquire. Therefore social systems, defined as dynamic systems composed of physical agents, could not attain the high "levels of systemic autonomy" ascribable to autopoietic systems without constraining the autonomy of agents to "levels" that are incompatible with spontaneous human behaviour. Also, social organizations seen as composed of physical agents interacting in physical space cannot be construed as autopoietic systems. Alternatively, if seen as composed of "process-like" entities, where agents participate as actors within processes, some social systems could be described as autopoietic wholes existing in the abstract space in which we distinguish interactions between processes, provided that we can assess compliance with the rules for some specific cases. > Implications · These conclusions contribute to the debate on the possible autopoietic nature of some human social systems and to grasping the opportunity to shift focus to the more interesting issue of the "degrees of systemic autonomy" that human organizations could acquire (if needed) without imposing unbearable limitations on the autonomy of human actors. Also, the conceptual framework of this explanatory approach could be used in practical terms to assist the development of new dynamic modelling languages capable of simulating social systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · Although there are rich descriptive accounts of skill acquisition in the literature, there are no satisfactory explanatory models of the cognitive processes involved. Problem · The aim of the paper is to explain some key phenomena frequently observed in the acquisition of motor skills: the loss of conscious access to knowledge of the structure of a skill and the awareness that an error has been made prior to the receipt of knowledge of results. Method · In the 1970s, the first author implemented a computer program model of the cognitive processes involved in learning and skill acquisition, based on a series of empirical investigations. Recently, with assistance from the second author, the model has been reviewed, updated and re-implemented. Result · The model provides a constructivist account of skill acquisition and associated phenomena. Implications · The model adds to the understanding of motor skill acquisition and will be of interest to researchers and practitioners in physical therapy and sports science. It is also provides a constructivist cognitive architecture that can be fruitfully contrasted with non-constructivist cognitive architectures well-known in cognitive science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · In earlier joint work with Varela and Vermersch, we began the elaboration of a methodological and epistemological framework for a practical experiential phenomenology. Problem · I here wish to update and further develop that earlier work. Method · I present the framework of a practical, as distinct from a conceptual-theoretical, phenomenology. I update that framework, arguing for a shift in emphasis from consciousness to vigilant attention. I offer a still preliminary investigation of the important phenomenon of surprise. I link these results with ongoing scientific research conducted by myself and others. Results · Attention-as-vigilance is a key operator of experience. Attention has an antinomic dynamic with surprise. Implications · Attention and surprise are key participants in the generative process of the experience of novelty. Elaboration of this thesis enables the further development of practical, first-person methodologies. Constructivist content · This paper outlines certain key features of first-person, lived experience, and elaborates a method for linking these results directly to ongoing scientific research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · The enactivist tradition, out of which neurophenomenology arose, rejects various internalisms - including the representationalist and information-processing metaphors - but remains wedded to one further internalism: the claim that the structure of perceptual experience is directly, constitutively linked only to internal, brain-based dynamics. Problem · I aim to reject this internalism and defend an alternative analysis. Method · The paper presents a direct-realist, externalist, sensorimotor account of perceptual experience. It uses the concept of counterfactual meaningful action to defend this view against various objections. Results · This account of experience matches certain first-person features of experience better than an internalist account could. It is fully tractable as "normal science." Implications · The neuroscientific conception of brain function should change from that of internal representation or modelling to that of enabling meaningful, embodied action in ways that constitutively involve the world. Neurophenomenology should aim to match the structure of first-person experience with the structure of meaningful agent-world interactions, not with that of brain dynamics. Constructivist content · The sensorimotor approach shows us what external objects are, such that we may enact them, and what experience is, such that it may present us with those enacted objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · Non-dualist philosophy is no longer novel. Arguing against the distinctions between thought and action, theory and practice, language and objects has been a staple of the debate for decades, and Josef Mitterer offers another approach to the problem. Problem · Non-dualist philosophy is beset by a problem: it is trying to argue against a separation of "ideas" from the life-world while staying exclusively on the side of ideas. It offers a philosophy seminar argument against the bread and butter of philosophy seminars. Results · The paper argues that non-dualism in practice should be represented not by philosophers but by everyday life sociologists; not by those who argue against theory and idealisms but by those who simply ignore them. Non-dualism, however, is a useful tool when theorists have to be confronted practically; this, I argue, is its value, and in this debate, non-dualism is welcome. It is, however, a value that should not be overstated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · Non-dualistic thinking is an alternative to realism and constructivism. Problem · In the absence of a distinct definition of the term "description," the question comes up of what exactly can be included in non-dualistic descriptions, and in how far the definition of this term affects the relation between theory and empirical practice. Furthermore, this paper is concerned with the question of whether non-dualism and dualism differ in their implications. Method · I provide a wider semantic framework for the term "description" by means of George Spencer Brown's terminology in his calculus of indications as laid out in Laws of Form. The connection of descriptions and distinctions enables descriptions to comprise reflections and language as well as empirical observations. Results · Non-dualism can be thought of in different ways but still has essential elements in common with dualism. Implications · Non-dualism, as well as dualism, is an argumentation technique suitable for specific situations, but without significant differences in implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problem · The paper's main focus is on the question of whether Mitterer's non-dualising philosophy is able to show a way out of the antagonistic opposition of fact and fiction, realism and constructivism. In addition, since Mitterer's philosophy has hardly been discussed so far in historiography and theory of history, I also examine the question of whether his approach can provide new theoretical insights in these disciplines. Method · I follow a close reading of Mitterer's texts and relate them to the propositions of a variety of publications from the field of theory of history. Results · Mitterer's arguments show, on the one hand, how to expel the idea of creation from our historical thinking as there is no authenticity waiting behind our world of descriptions. On the other hand, they make clear that historiography no longer has to decide between realism and relativism. Rather, it is a relationist approach that shows a way to research the many entanglements and complexities between past realities and their descriptions. A different way to write history becomes visible: a history of realities. Implications · The discussion of Mitterer's non-dualism not only shows how historical research might benefit from this philosophy (in leaving behind some dualistic foundations of the discipline or the search for historical origins) but also how non-dualism might profit from the insights of history (with regard to power, processuality, and temporality). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]