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In this Paper, I address the question of whether and under what circumstances the deployment of pro-government militias (PGMs) can reduce violence against civilians, specifically in the Sahel. My analysis - based on a literature review and case studies on Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria - suggests that rather than representing a solution, PGMs tend to become part of the problem. In most cases, PGMs actively carry out acts of violence against civilians or passively contribute to an increase in violence. According to my analysis, PGMs most tend to contribute to violence against civilians when: \ they are aligned with a government that shows little respect for human rights and makes little effort to curb violence against civilians by its own security forces; \ they take on offensive roles and cooperate with state security forces; \ they are a group of ethnically homogenous members that are armed by the state. Only when PGMs are socially embedded in the communities they aim to protect and are at least normatively controlled by local authorities, as well as defensively oriented and predominantly unarmed, do they - for example in Cameroon - contribute to a decrease in violence against civilians. The findings presented in this Paper have implications for German development policy. As outlined, PGMs can - under very specific circumstances - help to strengthen the resilience of the local population in armed conflicts. However, in view of the negative effects of most PGMs, transitional development assistance programmes must be tailored according to the risk arising from the presence of PGMs. Furthermore, since many of these groups prevail past the end of the armed conflict in question, they need to be considered in post-conflict reconstruction processes, especially in demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programmes and security sector reforms (SSR) to allow sustainable peace and development.Finally, the findings also have implications for Germ

The Juba Peace Agreement of October 2020 has not pacified conflicts in Sudan, and has instead actually created new alliances between armed groups and security forces. After decades of marginalisation, conflict entrepreneurs from the periphery are now shaping Sudan’s national politics and undermining the country’s potential to return to democratic transition. Insecurity in Darfur could escalate and contribute to fur­ther destabilisation of the country. International donors should pressure these con­flict entrepreneurs to relinquish power. They should also prudently promote projects to foster peace in Darfur at the same time. (author's abstract)

How do wartime legacies affect repression after the conflict ends? Irregular forces support the government in many civil wars. We argue that if this link continues after the war, respect for human rights declines. As "tried and tested" agents they are less likely to shirk when given the order to repress. Governments might also keep the militias as a "fall-back option", which results in more repression. Analyzing data from 1981 to 2014 shows that pro-government militias that were inherited from the previous conflict are consistently associated with worse repression, but newly created ones are not. Wartime pro-government militias target a broader spectrum of the population and are linked to worse state violence. New militias usually supplement wartime ones and use violence primarily against political opponents. This study highlights the detrimental impact of war legacies.

Das Juba-Friedensabkommen von Oktober 2020 hat nicht zu einer Befriedung der sudanesischen Konflikte geführt. Stattdessen hat es vor allem neue Allianzen zwi­schen bewaffneten Gruppen und Sicherheitskräften geschaffen. Nach ihrer jahr­zehntelangen Marginalisierung prägen nun Gewaltunternehmer aus der Peripherie die nationale Politik Sudans und unterminieren eine mögliche Rückkehr zu einem demokratischen Übergangsprozess. Die Unsicherheit in Darfur könnte eskalieren und zu einer weiteren Destabilisierung des Landes beitragen. Internationale Geber sollten einerseits Druck auf diese Gewaltunternehmer ausüben, damit sie die Macht abgeben, und andererseits umsichtig Friedensprojekte in Darfur fördern. (Autorenreferat)

Shortly after COVID-19 was classified as a pandemic in March 2020, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called on violent actors to initiate ceasefires so that energy could be focused on fighting the pandemic. Resonance was low, however - violence even increased in several countries around the globe. Overall, patterns of violence since the spread of COVID-19 have varied significantly over time, between and within Global South regions, and in terms of the most dominant violent actors. The nexus of the external shock of COVID-19 and armed violence is multifaceted and its manifestation highly context-specific. Comparing pre-pandemic patterns of violence with those exhibited in 2020 and 2021 allows us to disentangle pandemic-related from other drivers of violence. Changes in violence dynamics vary across time and space. While the number and frequency of violent events increased in sub-Saharan Africa after the onset of COVID-19, Latin America and the Caribbean along with the Middle East and North Africa experienced decreases. State and non-state violent actors were affected differently, and changes in their activities were not always linked to the pandemic per se. The main consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on violence relate to the worsening of structural drivers of violent conflict, such as increasing inequalities and the marginalisation of large segments of the population. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation should focus on policies that reduce inequality and improve the provision of public goods, especially access to food, healthcare, and education. Additionally, "building back better" must include improving political and socio-economic opportunities for women, youth, and ethnic minorities.