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In a world where individuals interact in myriads of ways, one wonders how the benefits of one’s connections with others compare with those conferred by individual characteristics when it comes to acquisition of human capital. It is particularly interesting to be able to distinguish between connections that are the outcome of deliberate decisions by individuals and connections being given exogenously and beyond an individual’s control. The paper explores the consequences of the joint evolution of social connections and human capital investments. It thus allows one to study a broad range of possibilities in which social connections may influence inequality in consumption, human capital investment and welfare across the members of the economy, cross-sectionally and intertemporally. It embeds inequality analysis in models of endogenous social network formation. The novelty of the model lies in its joint treatment of human capital investment and social network formation in intergenerational settings, while distinguishing between the case of impact on human capital from endogenous as opposed to exogenous social networking. Among several results in the case of exogenous connections, we demonstrate conditions under which the limit distribution of human capital has a Pareto upper tail. One of the dynamic models we develop allow for intergenerational transfers in a dynastic version of the infinite horizon Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model. The models share the property that human capital accumulation, transfers and social connections, when all are optimized, are, along steady states, proportional to cognitive skills. Thus, intergenerational transfers of both human capital endowments and social networking endowments are jointly determined. Interestingly, the consequences for inequality of the endogeneity of social connections are underscored by examining the models when they are assumed to be exogenous. When social connections are not optimized, individuals’ human capital reflects a much more general dependence on social connections. The dependence does not reduce to aggregate statistics of social connections. We show that the dynamics of demographically increasingly complex models, as expressed by a sequence of models with increasing number of overlapping generations, depend on the product of the adjacency matrices associated with each of the overlapping generations.

Strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty that players face with respect to the purposeful behavior of other players in an interactive decision situation. Our paper develops a new method for measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes and distinguishing them from risk and ambiguity attitudes. We vary the source of uncertainty (whether strategic or not) across conditions in a ceteris paribus manner. We elicit certainty equivalents of participating in two strategic 2x2 games (a stag-hunt and a market-entry game) as well as certainty equivalents of related lotteries that yield the same possible payoffs with exogenously given probabilities (risk) and lotteries with unknown probabilities (ambiguity). We provide a structural model of uncertainty attitudes that allows us to measure a preference for or an aversion against the source of uncertainty, as well as optimism or pessimism regarding the desired outcome. We document systematic attitudes towards strategic uncertainty that vary across contexts. Under strategic complementarity [substitutability], the majority of participants tend to be pessimistic [optimistic] regarding the desired outcome. However, preferences for the source of uncertainty are distributed around zero., CEPA Discussion Papers; 54

We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where ideologically motivated citizen groups form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties’ seat shares, the size of the rents from holding office and their ideologies. We show that governments may be minimal winning, minority or surplus. Moreover, coalitions may be ‘disconnected’. We then look at how the coalition formation game affects the incentives for party formation. In particular, we show that when the rents from office are low, the median citizen stands unopposed, and when rents are high, there is more political entry. For intermediate rents, we show that strategic dropouts can happen to influence the final policy. We show that the incentives for strategic dropout can be higher under proportional representation than plurality voting, contrary to Duverger’s law. Our model explains the diverse electoral outcomes seen under proportional representation and integrates models of political entry with models of coalitional bargaining.