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(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 121-129 | European Forum Insight of 18 June 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Signature of international agreements: the (in)consistent practice. - III. Solving the indeterminacy of art. 218 TFEU. - iii.1. Scope, institutional balance and sincere cooperation. - iii.2 Signature of non-binding agreements. - IV. Case C-551-21: insights and commentaries. - iv.1. Understanding the arguments. - iv.2. The Court’s Findings. - V. Conclusions | (Abstract) The current Insight analyses the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-551/21, which up-held the Commission's claim regarding its right to exercise the external act of treaty signature. The deci-sion sheds light on the signature procedure outlined in art. 218 TFEU and adds to previous cases, clari-fying the proper contours and roles of each institution in relation to the procedure set in the article. An initial observation of the practice appears to indicate the Permanent Representative of the country holding the Council's presidency as the responsible party to sign international agreements with third parties representing the Union. However, a more in-depth analysis reveals a lack of consistent and standardised practice. The judgment correctly recalibrates the institutional balance and is coherent with the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty, which sought to bring about an evolution of the principles of the Treaties without a formal amendment process.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 145-152 | European Forum Insight of 25 June 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The signature of international agreements into EU law and the emergence of a practice. - III. Breaking a taboo. - IV. Conclusion. | (Abstract) The European Union has always concluded international agreements with third countries and international organisations as an integral component of its external action. In contrast to its predecessors, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a uniform procedural framework for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in art. 218 TFEU with the aim of simplification and coherence between all EU external policies, including the CFSP. However, the act of signing international agreements has remained a grey area, shared between the Commission and the Council as a result of a well-established practice within EU institutional governance. On 9 April 2024, the European Court of Justice brought the Council back to a literal interpretation of the EU Treaties, removing any doubt about the role of the Commission in representing the EU externally and crystallising the legal authority of the sole Commission to sign agreements on behalf of the EU.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(1), 333-343 | European Forum Insight of 22 June 2022 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The scope of art. 218 TFEU. - III. The internal procedure for the conclusion of international agreements by the CJEU. - IV. The different role of the institutions involved. - V. The peculiarity of some Hague Conventions on private international law. - VI. Council's internal voting rules. - VII. Conclusions. | (Abstract) Setting the general procedure to be followed for the conclusion of international agreements, art. 218 TFEU allocates the powers of the different institutions involved and - compared to the pre-Lisbon legal framework - strengthens the role of the European Parliament. It is therefore with respect to this provision that the status and prerogatives of the EU vis-à-vis third States must be analysed, as it frames the lifecycle of the international agreements and the rules the EU institutions are bound to follow in this regard. However, while its pattern seems suitable whenever the EU must conclude an international agreement which entails a positive expression of position, doubts arise as regards those conventions which foresee an accession, based on a non-objection mechanism. This Insight explores, in the light of the duty to practice mutual sincere cooperation stemming from art. 13 TEU, some practical disadvantages of its application and the controversial issue of the Council's internal voting rules.