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Notwithstanding announcements of progress, “international original sin” (the denomination of external debt in foreign currency) remains a persistent phenomenon in emerging markets. Although some middle-income countries have succeeded in developing markets in local-currency sovereign debt and attracting foreign investors, they continue to hedge their currency exposures through transactions with local pension funds and other resident investors. The result is to shift the locus of currency mismatches within emerging economies but not to eliminate them. Other countries have limited original sin by limiting external borrowing, passing up valuable investment opportunities in pursuit of stability. We document these trends, analyzing regional and global aggregates and national case studies. Our conclusion is that there remains a case for an international initiative to address currency risk in low- and middle-income economies so they can more fully exploit economic development opportunities.

This article introduces the Haitian Independence Debt of 1825 to the odious debt and sovereign debt literatures. We argue that the legal doctrine of odious debt is surprisingly and perhaps indefensibly narrow, possibly because of historical contingency rather than any underlying logic or principle. The story of the Haitian Independence Debt of 1825 serves as an illustrative case study. In the context of telling that story, we provide estimates of the evolution of Haiti’s external debt-to-GDP ratio over 1825–2020, and discuss the implications of the independence debt for the economy of Haiti. We conclude by discussing the implications of Haiti’s Independence Debt for the doctrine of odious debt and the possibilities for Haiti to recover compensation.

This article reviews recent economic and legal literature on sovereign debt in light of the COVID-19 shock. Most of the core theoretical contributions across the two disciplines hinge on immunity, and the sovereign borrower's consequent inability to commit to repay foreign creditors, as the distinguishing attribute of sovereignty. We highlight a persistent gap between sovereign debt theories grounded in immunity and empirical evidence that the governments of low- and middle-income countries borrow far more than theory would predict. On the other hand, the governments of advanced economies, generally viewed as outside the scope of this literature before the euro area debt crisis, have shown themselves to be far more commitment challenged than previously supposed. We conclude that the traditional split between a literature concerned with developing economy sovereigns that repudiate debt and one concerned with advanced economies that do not is no longer appropriate (if ever it was). We argue that shifting some attention away from immunity to a different attribute of sovereignty—authority—could help bridge the gap between the two literatures.

We use firm-level data from six Central and Eastern European economies to examine whether political connections ease financial constraints faced by firms. We show that politically connected firms are characterized by higher leverage, lower profitability, and lower productivity of capital than unconnected firms. However, we do not find any significant difference in investment rates between them. Politically connected firms, though less productive than unconnected firms, borrow more because they have easier access to credit. Our results are consistent with the idea that political connections distort capital allocation and may have welfare costs.