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This study investigates the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on customer loyalty and explores the role of customer engagement. The moderating role of gender is also examined. A total of 348 valid responses collected via the intercept approach from life insurance customers in Ghana were analyzed using structural equation modeling. The results suggest that CSR dimensions (economic, environmental, and social responsibility) positively impact customer loyalty. Also, the results indicate a partial mediating influence of customer engagement between CSR dimensions and customer loyalty. Further, the results establish the moderating effect of gender between economic and environmental dimensions of CSR and customer engagement. However, the study finds no moderating effect of gender between the social dimension of CSR and customer engagement. The study provides an empirical basis for CSR strategies that can drive customer engagement and customer loyalty in the insurance sector in many economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The work is devoted to the study of the impact of external control on the strategies of pollutant discharge enterprises and government regulators in the field of environmental protection. The authors construct a model of the relationship between these entities. It is an evolutionary game in which the players are entities that generate pollutants and the government departments that implement pollution supervision. The choice of strategies of both of these entities and the evolutionary stability of the system controlled by different regulatory efforts, i.e., a third party, are analyzed. The authors then verify the evolutionary paths and evolutionary results of the model under different conditions using simulation analysis based on this model. The conducted research shows that the weak power of third-party supervision is not enough to promote the evolution of the behavioral decisions of the government and enterprises. An appropriate increase in the power of third-party supervision will change the choice of the government and enterprises strategies in the short term; however, due to the mutual influence of the strategies between both sides of the game, in this situation, the evolutionary system does not pursue a stable state. The strong power of third-party supervision will push enterprises to choose a pollution control strategy, change the intensity of government supervision, and replace government supervision to a certain extent. It is an interesting example of modeling the relationship of this system on the basis of evolutionary game theory. The findings can be regarded as a theoretical reference for environmental pollution control of enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]