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The literature on exceptionalism is preoccupied with its distinctive national sources and resultantly differing styles. Exceptionalism has thus become almost synonymous with culture and identity, rather than international relations (IRs). The paper instead argues that exceptionalism reveals a relational identity that both informs and is informed by a multilateral relation prior to the emergence of exceptionalism. It also argues that all relational systems seek expansion and coexistence. Based upon a comparative study of Confucian and liberal multilateral relationalities, a similar cycle of engagement, conversion, disengagement, and learning is applicable to both. Two exceptionalisms in multilateral relationality differ, however. American exceptionalism embraces a transcendent identity with which to contrast with the rest, who share the same identity and are expected to follow the same rules. Chinese exceptionalism contrarily envisions a superior, benevolent identity to ensure harmony and peace among all, who share no collective identity. The paper traces how Confucianism diverges from liberalism with regard to what accounts for multilateralism—inclusiveness versus rule-based governance, and benevolent exceptions versus universal rights—and the resulting orientations during encounters with strangers. The last section before the conclusion corresponds to the growing attention in IRs theorising to the factor of emotion. Such rational–emotional connectivity—between exceptionalism and emotion—can further attest to the promise of the relational agenda in explaining pluriversal IRs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses a lacuna in the literature concerning how a ruler's ideas shape their attitudes toward the world and others through their personality. It examines the political ideas of Chinese President Xi Jinping as his references to the self-in-relation rather than his schema to assess and treat alters-in-relation. In addition to allowing political actors to assess the world and engage in policymaking, personality may inspire them to use ideas conversely to prepare themselves for the acceptance of their perceived constituencies. In terms of Xi Jinping's evolving personality, an initial need to overcome his individual vulnerability by becoming one with the masses has grown into a quest for transcendence that is informed by the following elements: (1) Buddhism while practicing the Party self; (2) the notion of Confucian harmony for the self-cultivation of Party cadres while practicing the national self; and (3) a socialist sensitivity to the material needs of the disadvantaged while practicing the international self. This has been demonstrated through programs that include his anti-corruption campaigns, his Chinese dream of anti-poverty, and his notion of a shared future of humankind. This paper compares the Kyoto School's use of Buddhism, Mao's use of Confucianism, and Pol Pot's use of Maoism. It also discusses how an autocracy can suffer from involution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the challenge of defining Chineseness, various disciplines can contribute to the subject without a single authority having a monopoly over its scope. Post-Chineseness is an evolving movement that aims to reduce the embarrassment of China scholars at their failure to exchange the methodologies and scopes of their subjects, often rendering them strangers to one another. Recognition is particularly relevant to the study of post-Chineseness. Chineseness is mutually recognized and denied in a variety of ways among both Chinese communities and individuals and in both self-regarded and other-regarded identities. Divergent approaches have created complex behavioral implications and a massive agenda for social science research. An agenda for post-Chineseness can examine these crises in the contemporary social sciences and humanities and has the potential to offer sophistication, recombination, and reconstruction for Chineseness in different contexts. This case study of several Chinese Indonesian intellectuals who have described their identity and connection with China illustrates how an agenda of post-Chineseness can simultaneously explain and deconstruct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article tackles a conceptual topic of postcolonial feminism—self-feminization. Specifically, the article explores the femininity of Taiwanese professionals' bridging role between the head and branch offices of multinational firms in Taiwan, as well as between an allegedly universal ethos in science, market, and the globalization on the one hand and the humanist concerns for emotion, relation, and nuance on the other. The femininity of financial office as well as other local capacities demonstrates how they can improvise relationships for mutually estranging actors. Then, the article extends the discussion to allude to international relations, divided by an allegedly universal (usually conversional) and indigenous (usually resistant) force in terms of value, institution, relation, or identity. I use the local branch office qua the indigenous, the head office qua the universal, and the professionals who bridge between them as metaphors for China, the West or the global forces, and Taiwan, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on International Relations theory has yet to align relational theory with role theory, despite the fact that these two theories share so much epistemological common ground. This article uses role theory to bridge the gap between the Confucian and Western conceptions of relationality, whose practitioners regard each other as strangers. With the support of role theory, the comparative analysis of relationality in this article has mainly focused on two different types of relations: prior rule-based relations and improvised relations. The differences in the cultural preparation for these two relations partially explain the plurality of the relational universe and the perception of stranger. Role theory is one way to reconnect the seemingly irreconcilable relational universes. To illustrate the value of a composite agenda of relational theory and role theory, the article will use Kim Jong-un of North Korea as its case. Confucian relations propose that, for all nations, the necessity of having a certain role relation is a more important agenda than insisting on exactly what role to take. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Did "America First" construct America irrelevant? Answering this question has been the subject of much debate in the popular press, the policy community, and scholarly circles. That asked, it is worth remembering that scholars and policymakers have long argued that one of the most enduring and important aspects of the US role in the world is American structural power. Perhaps nowhere has the Trump administration's approach to world affairs been more notable in perhaps diminishing US structural power than in withdrawing from multilateral forums. On an individual level of analysis, however, Trump's ever-changing, whiplash style of leadership made allies and adversaries less certain about American actions, intentions, and the direction of future policy trajectories. These issues point to the possibility that such impacts were more about Trump being Trump and less about a decline in American structural power. Only time will tell whether President Biden is able to rebuild from that structural wreckage. With these ideas in mind, the forum editors asked scholars representing diverse voices and perspectives to provide varying analyses of America First, specifically in light of the emergence of multiple global challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic to racial reckoning through the climate crisis and more. As you will see, each author brings a decidedly different lens to the questions we pose below and also generates divergent analyses of the present and the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]