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I respond to comments from Branden Fitelson, Chad Gonnerman and John Waterman, and Mark Walker. My response to Fitelson concerns how we should understand the notion of "sensitivity" which is central to my account of why we find skeptical premises intuitive. I argue against his recommendation except for a specific type of "loose" skeptical hypothesis. Gonnerman and Waterman push me to say more about the conditions under which we feel or not feel the skeptical pull. I clarify and expand on the theory presented in the book. Finally, Walker presents a new type of skeptical challenge. To deal with this challenge, I distinguish between two types of skeptical hypotheses, a mild and more substantial one. Walker's skeptical argument concerns mild skepticism. My account is aimed at more substantial accounts. However, I speculate about how we may respond to this challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I selectively summarize some of the main ideas in my book Why We Doubt , focusing on the elements that are discussed in the replies from commentators. In the book, I investigated our skeptical intuitions which form the basis of the skeptic's arguments. I argue that these intuitive judgments or inclinations to judge are produced by the deployment of a subconscious heuristic, PBS, which serves us well most of the time but misfires in esoteric cases like those associated with global skepticism. I do this by identifying the rational function of PBS and arguing that when we apply this rational function to global skepticism, it doesn't yield a skeptical result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]