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Complexity is not 'the same as simply complicated'. This is because its advocates present it as a theoretical approach to explaining major aspects of the social order, usually at the macro level, whereas many social phenomena, at any level, can be full of complications (such as the incidence of road accidents) without a unifying theoretical key. Thus, the latter have a strong tendency to remain at the level of events and their study to be confined to a 'variables' approach, statistically combining the most variable of potentially contributory factors, without being troubled by the absence, in particular cases of one or more common contributors to accidents (such as drivers' alcohol consumption). But 'the Complexity Turn' does much more than leaving empiricism behind, like Critical Realism from its earliest beginnings, and in some hands is seen as the senior partner of these two approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay identifies and explores three dominant intellectual traditions that critique and theorize about ideology: Marxist, prudentialist, and social scientific. For these traditions, the word 'ideology' names interest-serving rationalizations, pseudoscientific totalitarian zealotry, or political outlooks. The blending of these three specialized meanings has generated a colloquial sense of ideology that is philosophically untenable and damaging to political discourse. According to this colloquial sense, all thinking is ideological and we are all ideologues. In response, I instead offer in this essay an adverbial account of ideology. In this account, "ideology" names a kind of epistemic vice. Admitting that this is something we all may do sometimes, I describe how we think when we think ideologically. Finally, I conclude with some suggestions about how education might help us avoid the epistemic vice of ideological thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Caste is a multidimensional reality in history and society, and it has manifested itself through varieties of structures of domination which are simultaneously cultural, economic, political and ideological as caste has also been related in complex ways with structures of class and gender domination. These structures of domination have led to the annihilation of self and society. This led Ambedkar to challenge us for annihilating caste. For Ambedkar, annihilation of caste calls for the realization of each person as an individual and not just a caste person. It also calls for the destruction of caste privileges, discrimination and their scriptural legitimation. However, this call for annihilation mainly has been a structural project without enough attention to the project of transformation of consciousness—self and social. There is a hint of this in Ambedkar's Annihilation of Caste when he urges us to realize each one of us as unique individuals beyond the holes of caste which is further deepened in his Buddha and His Dhamma. Transformation of consciousness is also suggested in Adi Shankara's treatise on self, Atmastakam. The essay engages itself with Ambedkar, Shankara, Gandhi and Sri Aurobindo, among others, as they help us in the transformation of caste domination and present a new hermeneutics of self-realization and social liberation. It deals with the simultaneous challenges of structural transformation of caste as well as consciousness of caste at the levels of both self and society which can draw on multiple sources of critique, creativity and transformations in India and the world. Brahminism is the poison which has spoiled Hinduism. You will succeed in saving Hinduism if you will kill Brahminism. There should be no opposition to this reform from any quarter. It should be welcomed even by the Arya Samajists, because this is merely an application of their own doctrine of guna-karma. Whether you do that or you do not, you must give a new doctrinal basis to your religion—a basis that will be in consonance with liberty, equality and fraternity; in short, with democracy. I am no authority on the subject. But I am told that for such religious principles as will be in consonance with liberty, equality and fraternity, it may not be necessary for you to borrow from foreign sources, and that you could draw for such principles in the Upanishads. Whether you could do so without a complete remoulding, a considerable scraping and chipping off from the ore they contain, is more than I can say. (Ambedkar, 2002[1936], p. 303) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Macroeconomic traditions disagree on the policies needed for the economy to properly function and how to assess them. In this paper, we contend that these disagreements originate from the social ontological commitments of a theory. The ontology of money underlines these disagreements between Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and mainstream economics. First, we assess MMT's ontology of money. Next, we identify MMT's normative commitments and classify MMT's ontology as a taxonomic definition with thick concepts. Finally, we offer reasons why MMT's ontology of money leads to rivalries with other economic traditions. We argue disagreements on policy are expected, given the ontological differences elaborated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, philosophers have developed an extensive literature on social ontology that applies methods and concepts from analytic metaphysics. Much of this is entirely abstracted from, and unconcerned with, social science. However, Epstein (2015) argues explicitly that analytic social metaphysics, provided its account of ontological ‘grounding’ is repaired in specific ways, can rescue social science from explanatory impasses into which he thinks it has fallen. This version of analytic social ontology thus directly competes with radically naturalistic alternatives, in a way that helps to clarify what makes some metaphysics genuinely scientific (that is, part of the scientific enterprise and worldview). I consider this competition, marshal considerations against the value to social science of analytic metaphysics, and sketch a contrasting scientific metaphysics for understanding the implications of revisionist social ontology in unified scientific ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neoclassical economics is sometimes said to overlook the institutional character of markets, treating them as 'natural.' I address whether this criticism applies to Léon Walras. Walras's position is complex. Walras insists that market institutions are 'artificial' and that a purely naturalistic view of them reduces persons to mere things. However, he simultaneously characterizes market laws as natural. Specifically, he argues that exchange value is natural because it is determined by the natural property of scarcity. This argument is wanting: scarcity as defined by Walras is not exclusively natural, and, by Walras's own logic, only accounts for exchange value given the non-natural institution of the market. I suggest that Walras's attempts to give exchange value a natural foundation can be understood as a form of commodity fetishism. I further suggest two complementary explanations for this fetishism. First, Walras infers exchange value's naturalness from its autonomy with respect to individual agents in a competitive market. Second, he assumes that the use of the natural sciences as a formal model implies that the market has some natural cause. I additionally discuss his Baconian view of economics as an example of naturalistic reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores some of the possible links between community psychology and critical realism, a relatively new approach to the philosophy of science that has received little attention from community psychologists. Critical realism is presented in relation to seven key insights that can be linked to fundamental tenets of the ecological approach in community psychology. These insights are: (1) A complex reality exists independently of our ideas about it, and this reality is knowable, although imperfectly. (2) Reality is composed of a complex and stratified hierarchy of open systems. (3) Causality is best understood in terms of causal processes that may or may not be directly observable or generalizable; these processes involve complex interactions among generative mechanisms and contextual conditions. (4) Theory and theorizing about causal processes are central to both scientific explanation and practical action. (5) Theory exists at multiple levels of abstraction, ranging from models to metatheory. (6) A diversity of methods can provide evidence in the search for causal processes operating in context. (7) As social scientists, we have an obligation to use social science knowledge to promote human flourishing. Although these insights may be familiar to many community psychologists who adopt an ecological approach to their work, we suggest that clearly articulating these principles can provide more solid foundations for inquiry in the field. We conclude the article by highlighting how critical realism may help to bridge the research-practice gap in community psychology and similar social sciences., (© 2023 The Authors. Journal of Community Psychology published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.)

This paper argues that ethical propositions can legitimately be used as evidence for and against empirical conclusions. Specifically, I argue that this thesis is entailed by several uncontroversial assumptions about ethical metaphysics and epistemology. I also outline several examples of ethical-to-empirical inferences where it is extremely plausible that one can rationally rely upon their ethical evidence in order to gain a justified belief in an empirical conclusion. The main upshot is that ethical propositions can, under perfectly standard conditions, play both direct and indirect evidential roles in (social) scientific inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a reassessment of the main import of Peter Winch's philosophy of the social sciences. Critics argue that Winch presented a flawed methodology for the social sciences, while his supporters deny that Winch's work is about methodology at all. Contrary to both, the author argues that Winch deals with fundamental questions about methodology, and that there is something substantial to learn from his account. Winch engages methodological questions without being committed to social ontology. Instead, Winch's work on methodology is best described as a descriptive metaphysics of social inquiry. This alternative reading clarifies the close link between Winch's argument for the autonomy of the social sciences and R. G. Collingwood's philosophy of history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that Robert Elgie's late political leadership duology makes a remarkable contribution to the debate on political science methodology and the philosophy of social science. It demonstrates that a wide range of methodologies are consistent with scientific realism can speak to the same research question. I draw out implications for the methodology and organisation of political science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Setting out from Okakura Kakuzō and Ernest Fenollosa's famous "discovery" of the Yumedono Kannon, this article will trace the contested construction of the categories of "religion" (shūkyō) and "fine art" (bijutsu) in Meiji Japan. In religious studies circles, it has become commonplace to think of "religion" as the only disciplinary master category with issues. However, not only was "religion" invented in Japan, but "fine art" was invented there too. Indeed, categories from "culture" to "society" to "politics" have similar issues. Attending to these will help refocus crucial debates away from an obsession with translation and onto more fundamental issues about "cultural categories" as such. This paper will advance the debate by explaining the attendant constructions of "religion" and "fine art" as process social kinds. In doing so, it will showcase the museum and the temple as central sites of materialized disputation over global categories and their local instantiation. It will show how assimilation to the world-system in the long nineteenth century was a complex multi-generational process of negotiation and contestation, producing new hybrid spaces, returns, transformations, and innovations that then reflected back on global systems, changing them in subtle but profound ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This short essay contends that sociology should devote attention to causal explanation in order to expose lies. It argues that lies about causes are common in society and social science is in a unique privileged position to offer social knowledge that can dispel such lies. Offering causal explanations is a vital task of this project., (© 2023 The Authors. The British Journal of Sociology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of London School of Economics and Political Science.)