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Foraging is a crucial activity, yet the extent to which humans employ flexible versus rigid strategies remains unclear. This study investigates how individuals adapt their foraging strategies in response to resource distribution and foraging time constraints. For this, we designed a video-game-like foraging task that requires participants to navigate a four-areas environment to collect coins from treasure boxes within a limited time. This task engages multiple cognitive abilities, such as navigation, learning, and memorization of treasure box locations. Findings indicate that participants adjust their foraging strategies -- encompassing both stay-or-leave decisions, such as the number of boxes opened in initial areas and behavioral aspects, such as the time to navigate from box to box -- depending on both resource distribution and foraging time. Additionally, they improved their performance over time as an effect of both enhanced navigation skills and adaptation of foraging strategies. Finally, participants' performance was initially distant from the reward-maximizing performance of optimal agents due to the learning process humans undergo; however, it approximated the optimal agent's performance towards the end of the task, without fully reaching it. These results highlight the flexibility of human foraging behavior and underscore the importance of employing optimality models and ecologically rich scenarios to study foraging.

Living organisms rely on internal models of the world to act adaptively. These models cannot encode every detail and hence need to compress information. From a cognitive standpoint, information compression can manifest as a distortion of latent representations, resulting in the emergence of representations that may not accurately reflect the external world or its geometry. Rate-distortion theory formalizes the optimal way to compress information, by considering factors such as capacity limitations, the frequency and the utility of stimuli. However, while this theory explains why the above factors distort latent representations, it does not specify which specific distortions they produce. To address this question, here we systematically explore the geometry of the latent representations that emerge in generative models that operate under the principles of rate-distortion theory ($\beta$-VAEs). Our results highlight that three main classes of distortions of internal representations -- prototypization, specialization, orthogonalization -- emerge as signatures of information compression, under constraints on capacity, data distributions and tasks. These distortions can coexist, giving rise to a rich landscape of latent spaces, whose geometry could differ significantly across generative models subject to different constraints. Our findings contribute to explain how the normative constraints of rate-distortion theory distort the geometry of latent representations of generative models of artificial systems and living organisms.

Transitive Inference (TI) is a cognitive task that assesses an organism's ability to infer novel relations between items based on previously acquired knowledge. TI is known for exhibiting various behavioral and neural signatures, such as the Serial Position Effect (SPE), Symbolic Distance Effect (SDE), and the brain's capacity to maintain and merge separate ranking models. We propose a novel framework that casts TI as a probabilistic preference learning task, using one-parameter Mallows models. We present a series of simulations that highlight the effectiveness of our novel approach. We show that the Mallows ranking model natively reproduces SDE and SPE. Furthermore, extending the model using Bayesian selection showcases its capacity to generate and merge ranking hypotheses as pairs with connecting symbols are encountered. Finally, we employ neural networks to replicate Mallows models, demonstrating how this framework aligns with observed prefrontal neural activity during TI. Our innovative approach sheds new light on the nature of TI, emphasizing the potential of probabilistic preference learning for unraveling its underlying neural mechanisms.

This paper considers neural representation through the lens of active inference, a normative framework for understanding brain function. It delves into how living organisms employ generative models to minimize the discrepancy between predictions and observations (as scored with variational free energy). The ensuing analysis suggests that the brain learns generative models to navigate the world adaptively, not (or not solely) to understand it. Different living organisms may possess an array of generative models, spanning from those that support action-perception cycles to those that underwrite planning and imagination; namely, from "explicit" models that entail variables for predicting concurrent sensations, like objects, faces, or people - to "action-oriented models" that predict action outcomes. It then elucidates how generative models and belief dynamics might link to neural representation and the implications of different types of generative models for understanding an agent's cognitive capabilities in relation to its ecological niche. The paper concludes with open questions regarding the evolution of generative models and the development of advanced cognitive abilities - and the gradual transition from "pragmatic" to "detached" neural representations. The analysis on offer foregrounds the diverse roles that generative models play in cognitive processes and the evolution of neural representation.

The way the brain selects and controls actions is still widely debated. Mainstream approaches based on Optimal Control focus on stimulus-response mappings that optimize cost functions. Ideomotor theory and cybernetics propose a different perspective: they suggest that actions are selected and controlled by activating action effects and by continuously matching internal predictions with sensations. Active Inference offers a modern formulation of these ideas, in terms of inferential mechanisms and prediction-error-based control, which can be linked to neural mechanisms of living organisms. This article provides a technical illustration of Active Inference models in continuous time and a brief survey of Active Inference models that solve four kinds of control problems; namely, the control of goal-directed reaching movements, active sensing, the resolution of multisensory conflict during movement and the integration of decision-making and motor control. Crucially, in Active Inference, all these different facets of motor control emerge from the same optimization process - namely, the minimization of Free Energy - and do not require designing separate cost functions. Therefore, Active Inference provides a unitary perspective on various aspects of motor control that can inform both the study of biological control mechanisms and the design of artificial and robotic systems.

Cognitive problem-solving benefits from cognitive maps aiding navigation and planning. Previous studies revealed that cognitive maps for physical space navigation involve hippocampal (HC) allocentric codes, while cognitive maps for abstract task space engage medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) task-specific codes. Solving challenging cognitive tasks requires integrating these two types of maps. This is exemplified by spatial alternation tasks in multi-corridor settings, where animals like rodents are rewarded upon executing an alternation pattern in maze corridors. Existing studies demonstrated the HC - mPFC circuit's engagement in spatial alternation tasks and that its disruption impairs task performance. Yet, a comprehensive theory explaining how this circuit integrates task-related and spatial information is lacking. We advance a novel hierarchical active inference model clarifying how the HC - mPFC circuit enables the resolution of spatial alternation tasks, by merging physical and task-space cognitive maps. Through a series of simulations, we demonstrate that the model's dual layers acquire effective cognitive maps for navigation within physical (HC map) and task (mPFC map) spaces, using a biologically-inspired approach: a clone-structured cognitive graph. The model solves spatial alternation tasks through reciprocal interactions between the two layers. Importantly, disrupting inter-layer communication impairs difficult decisions, consistent with empirical findings. The same model showcases the ability to switch between multiple alternation rules. However, inhibiting message transmission between the two layers results in perseverative behavior, consistent with empirical findings. In summary, our model provides a mechanistic account of how the HC - mPFC circuit supports spatial alternation tasks and how its disruption impairs task performance.

Living organisms need to acquire both cognitive maps for learning the structure of the world and planning mechanisms able to deal with the challenges of navigating ambiguous environments. Although significant progress has been made in each of these areas independently, the best way to integrate them is an open research question. In this paper, we propose the integration of a statistical model of cognitive map formation within an active inference agent that supports planning under uncertainty. Specifically, we examine the clone-structured cognitive graph (CSCG) model of cognitive map formation and compare a naive clone graph agent with an active inference-driven clone graph agent, in three spatial navigation scenarios. Our findings demonstrate that while both agents are effective in simple scenarios, the active inference agent is more effective when planning in challenging scenarios, in which sensory observations provide ambiguous information about location., Comment: Accepted at IWAI 2023 (International Workshop on Active Inference)

We present a novel computational model employing hierarchical active inference to simulate reading and eye movements. The model characterizes linguistic processing as inference over a hierarchical generative model, facilitating predictions and inferences at various levels of granularity, from syllables to sentences. Our approach combines the strengths of large language models for realistic textual predictions and active inference for guiding eye movements to informative textual information, enabling the testing of predictions. The model exhibits proficiency in reading both known and unknown words and sentences, adhering to the distinction between lexical and nonlexical routes in dual-route theories of reading. Notably, our model permits the exploration of maladaptive inference effects on eye movements during reading, such as in dyslexia. To simulate this condition, we attenuate the contribution of priors during the reading process, leading to incorrect inferences and a more fragmented reading style, characterized by a greater number of shorter saccades. This alignment with empirical findings regarding eye movements in dyslexic individuals highlights the model's potential to aid in understanding the cognitive processes underlying reading and eye movements, as well as how reading deficits associated with dyslexia may emerge from maladaptive predictive processing. In summary, our model represents a significant advancement in comprehending the intricate cognitive processes involved in reading and eye movements, with potential implications for understanding and addressing dyslexia through the simulation of maladaptive inference. It may offer valuable insights into this condition and contribute to the development of more effective interventions for treatment., Comment: 23 pages, 1 Appendix, 11 Tables, 9 Figures

Creating autonomous robots that can actively explore the environment, acquire knowledge and learn skills continuously is the ultimate achievement envisioned in cognitive and developmental robotics. Their learning processes should be based on interactions with their physical and social world in the manner of human learning and cognitive development. Based on this context, in this paper, we focus on the two concepts of world models and predictive coding. Recently, world models have attracted renewed attention as a topic of considerable interest in artificial intelligence. Cognitive systems learn world models to better predict future sensory observations and optimize their policies, i.e., controllers. Alternatively, in neuroscience, predictive coding proposes that the brain continuously predicts its inputs and adapts to model its own dynamics and control behavior in its environment. Both ideas may be considered as underpinning the cognitive development of robots and humans capable of continual or lifelong learning. Although many studies have been conducted on predictive coding in cognitive robotics and neurorobotics, the relationship between world model-based approaches in AI and predictive coding in robotics has rarely been discussed. Therefore, in this paper, we clarify the definitions, relationships, and status of current research on these topics, as well as missing pieces of world models and predictive coding in conjunction with crucially related concepts such as the free-energy principle and active inference in the context of cognitive and developmental robotics. Furthermore, we outline the frontiers and challenges involved in world models and predictive coding toward the further integration of AI and robotics, as well as the creation of robots with real cognitive and developmental capabilities in the future., Comment: 28 pages, 3 figures

We advance a novel computational model of multi-agent, cooperative joint actions that is grounded in the cognitive framework of active inference. The model assumes that to solve a joint task, such as pressing together a red or blue button, two (or more) agents engage in a process of interactive inference. Each agent maintains probabilistic beliefs about the goal of the joint task (e.g., should we press the red or blue button?) and updates them by observing the other agent's movements, while in turn selecting movements that make his own intentions legible and easy to infer by the other agent (i.e., sensorimotor communication). Over time, the interactive inference aligns both the beliefs and the behavioral strategies of the agents, hence ensuring the success of the joint action. We exemplify the functioning of the model in two simulations. The first simulation illustrates a ''leaderless'' joint action. It shows that when two agents lack a strong preference about their joint task goal, they jointly infer it by observing each other's movements. In turn, this helps the interactive alignment of their beliefs and behavioral strategies. The second simulation illustrates a "leader-follower" joint action. It shows that when one agent ("leader") knows the true joint goal, it uses sensorimotor communication to help the other agent ("follower") infer it, even if doing this requires selecting a more costly individual plan. These simulations illustrate that interactive inference supports successful multi-agent joint actions and reproduces key cognitive and behavioral dynamics of "leaderless" and "leader-follower" joint actions observed in human-human experiments. In sum, interactive inference provides a cognitively inspired, formal framework to realize cooperative joint actions and consensus in multi-agent systems., Comment: 32 pages, 16 figures

Processing faces accurately and efficiently is a key capability of humans and other animals that engage in sophisticated social tasks. Recent studies reported a decoupled coding for faces in the primate inferotemporal cortex, with two separate neural populations coding for the geometric position of (texture-free) facial landmarks and for the image texture at fixed landmark positions, respectively. Here, we formally assess the efficiency of this decoupled coding by appealing to the information-theoretic notion of description length, which quantifies the amount of information that is saved when encoding novel facial images, with a given precision. We show that despite decoupled coding describes the facial images in terms of two sets of principal components (of landmark shape and image texture), it is more efficient (i.e., yields more information compression) than the encoding in terms of the image principal components only, which corresponds to the widely used eigenface method. The advantage of decoupled coding over eigenface coding increases with image resolution and is especially prominent when coding variants of training set images that only differ in facial expressions. Moreover, we demonstrate that decoupled coding entails better performance in three different tasks: the representation of facial images, the (daydream) sampling of novel facial images, and the recognition of facial identities and gender. In summary, our study provides a first principle perspective on the efficiency and accuracy of the decoupled coding of facial stimuli reported in the primate inferotemporal cortex., Comment: 26 pages, 8 figures (+11 pages, 7 figures in the supporting information section). In v3: new figure 8 in section 3.2.3; further details added to the supporting information; title changed

The mastery of skills such as playing tennis or balancing an inverted pendulum implies a very accurate control of movements to achieve the task goals. Traditional accounts of skilled action control that focus on either routinization or perceptual control make opposite predictions about the ways we achieve mastery. The notion of routinization emphasizes the decrease of the variance of our actions, whereas the notion of perceptual control emphasizes the decrease of the variance of the states we visit, but not of the actions we execute. Here, we studied how participants managed control tasks of varying levels of complexity, which consisted in controlling inverted pendulums of different lengths. We used information-theoretic measures to compare the predictions of alternative theoretic accounts that focus on routinization and perceptual control, respectively. Our results indicate that the successful performance of the control task strongly correlates with the decrease of state variability and the increase of action variability. As postulated by perceptual control theory, the mastery of skills consists in achieving stable control goals by flexible means., Comment: 15 pages, 7 figures