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From disinformation to cyberattacks, Chinese and Russian military units’ digital operations have gained increasing international attention over roughly the past decade. Less studied are some of these units’ historical antecedents, the military-political directorates of the Soviet military and Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the 20th century. The political officers, or commissars, who staffed these directorates played a large role in shaping the development of psychological warfare beyond the Cold War and into the information age. This article summarizes this history and demonstrates its relevance to modern PLA and Russian military psychological warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Operation Observant Compass, the United States 2011–2017 military intervention in Central Africa to defeat Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army, offers several lessons for students and practitioners of military geography. As opposed to previous humanitarian interventions, Operation Observant Compass featured a notably small force of roughly 100 special operations forces and support personnel. This special operations forces element, deployed to the tri-border region between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, confronted an elusive enemy force in an operational area roughly 200 000 square kilometres in size. Using a mixedmethods approach, the study, on which this this article is based, argued that Operation Observant Compass resulted in a net positive humanitarian outcome despite failing to kill or capture Kony. First, using datasets on Lord’s Resistance Army attacks and Operation Observant Compass troop positions, this article presents a geospatial analysis of potential deterrence effects created by the deployment of special operations forces, such as the United States Special Forces or “Green Berets”. Second, using primary research conducted by the former psychological operations commander of Operation Observant Compass and the Ugandan People’s Defence Force counterpart, analysis is presented on the efficacy of psychological operations campaigns that sought to weaken the Lord’s Resistance Army through defections to regional security forces. The study also considered ancillary effects received through United States military medical personnel deployed in support of special operations forces, as well as a counterfactual argument in which United States forces were not directly deployed into the tri-border region. This article contributes to the existing literature by expanding understanding of a littlestudied chapter in foreign military deployments in sub-Saharan Africa, considering the nexus between use of special operations forces and humanitarian interventions. Methodologically, the use of a geographic information system argues for a consideration of geographical proximity between forces in creating a deterrent effect in “low-intensity” or irregular conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the way and motivation of the Russian Federation to carry out psychological operations in the war of aggression that it has unleashed in Ukraine from the perspective of the information environment. These operations are specific to the cognitive layer of the information environment and are aimed at influencing the perceptions, behavior, and decisions of both the Ukrainian population and the international community by using disinformation, propaganda, and manipulation. By analyzing these operations, it highlights how Russia has exploited the lack of robust regulation of social networks. The analysis underlines the importance of developing effective strategies to counter these operations by increasing information resilience and strengthening protection mechanisms against harmful external influences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Security: Theory & Practice / Bezpieczeństwo.Teoria i Praktyka is the property of Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University, AFM Publishing Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

National security influence professionals have always struggled with influence measures of effectiveness and operational assessments. This paper includes fictional examples that illustrate how experimental methods from psychological science can address this problem. Three fictional use cases are examined. A scientific approach to national security influence is essential to accumulating knowledge in this domain. Without it, the information operations community will continue to struggle to identify what works and why. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States' national security strategy is an influence strategy--the effectiveness of which cannot be measured. The strategy's effectiveness is unmeasurable because influence operations still have not solved the assessment problem. The Department of Defense influence doctrine relies on unreliable practices from advertising and has never taken up a program of research to apply the very advanced psychological science of influence to the national security domain. Robust methods of operational design, variable control, and measurement are absent from national security influence, and there is no organization or mechanism to coordinate and deconflict operations across the whole of government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After South Africa had left the Commonwealth in 1961, the South African Defence Force had to develop its own intelligence capacity, as the British intelligence services ceased intelligence provision to South Africa. The Defence Force had limited experience in the field of intelligence as far as personnel, training and structures were concerned. It had no mandate, an insubordinate position in the higher military hierarchy, and no national legislation or departmental prescripts existed to direct its functions. Certain of its functions continuously migrated to other structures in the Defence Force, which hampered its development. Towards the end of the decade, the organisation was temporarily disbanded, and its functions taken over by a newly created Bureau of State Security. Despite these limitations, the Directorate Military Intelligence evolved into a comprehensive autonomous intelligence organisation over a period of ten years, directed by national legislation, and legitimised as one of the three principal intelligence organisations in South Africa. It performed the main intelligence functions as is globally accepted from the role of an intelligence organisation, viz. collection, analyses, counter-intelligence, and covert action. This article will provide a narrative, based mainly on primary archival sources, of the evolution of Directorate Military Intelligence between 1961 and 1971 despite the developmental challenges it faced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the era of digital media, states have resorted to social media to pursue several agendas. In this regard, this paper sheds light on the evolving strategies of intelligence, surveillance and Information Operations (IO) conducted through social media sites. The paper examines various strategies of IO mentioned in U.S. military documents encompassing Military Deception (MILDEC), Computer Network Operations (CNO), Operations Security (OPSSEC), and Psychological Operations (PsyOps). The paper specifically evaluated the role of social media in PsyOps and coined the term Social Media PsyOps (SMPsyOps). It analyses how the Indian government employed these tactics to conduct IO against Pakistan unveiled in the Indian Chronicles by EU DisinfoLab. The paper argues that social media has become an open source of intelligence for conducting of IO by India and influencing opinions and perceptions of Pakistan in Western capitals. This has impacted Pakistan and therefore the paper recommends measures for the government of Pakistan on how to counter the growing Indian network of IO.

Psychological and propaganda operations are inseparable part of hybrid warfare. The rapid complication of overall relations in the international community, especially since the beginning of 2022, has led to tectonic upheavals in the world order, which have caused numerous changes in front of our eyes. The world is changing today, perhaps faster than ever. In such complex political and security, economic and social circumstances, models of hybrid warfare gained additional importance and in a certain way, conditionally speaking, became an inseparable part of the foreign policy of the leading powers. In addition, hybrid actions of a psychological and propaganda nature have become an inseparable part of international relations. This paper first analyses the conceptual definition of the terms hybrid war, psychological and propaganda operations, and then explains the cause-and-effect relationships and examines their consequences on the offensive and defensive actors of international relations. Among the conclusions is the assertion that defensive actors may be completely unaware that a hybrid war is actually being waged against them by undertaking psychological and propaganda operations.

The research is dedicated to “Strategic Communication” and its elements. Either core element of strategic communication is enlightened through study of literature. As a showcase the Second Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia is reviewed and studied. The outcomes achieved in the conclusion of the research prove the essence and importance of strategic communication in victory.

The present article analyzes the construction of a key foundation of the movement (or ideology) known as "Trumpism" (or "Trumpist"), which is linked to the United States' drug policy and its relationship with Mexico. Firstly, it describes the origins of an anti-narcotics and border security strategy proposed by former President Donald Trump in 2017 and amplified by sympathetic politicians and supporters who consider a possible military intervention in Mexico as an electoral strategy in 2024. This analysis highlights the elements of misinformation and propaganda of the Trumpist strategy and revisits the use of psychological operations--outlined from the perspective of the U.S. Army manuals and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)--as a tool for persuasion and electoral marketing. The text serves as an analytical framework to explain part of the political discourse of Trumpism within the context of the 2024 elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an exploration of Psychological Operations, focusing on both the role which fear plays in Psychological Operations, and how the Russian Federation employed Psychological Operations in the War in Ukraine (2014–2021). A qualitative methodology is used to explore fear as a neurological, psychological and social phenomenon, and how it may be utilised in Psychological Operations. The author finds that Russia's initial use of Psychological Operations was focused on making tactical gains against the Ukrainian military. Shock tactics, combined with strategic messaging, encouraged mass defections from the Ukrainian army and border guard, significantly degrading the combat effectiveness of Kyiv's forces, and increasing the likelihood of victory for the Donbass secessionists. The case study is limited in scope to 2014–2021. The paper can thus be read as both an analysis of one element of Russia's shaping phase prior to the 2022 invasion, and/or a framework for analysing the current stage of conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been many different approaches to implementing deceptive devices, but it is the contention of this paper that fundamentally every incarnation suffers from the same issue: it remains a deceptive device. As the use of deceptive devices has increased, attackers have become more aware of the threat they pose and have become more adept at detecting deceptive devices. This paper presents a new approach to enhancing cyber deception called Transitional Target Defence (TTD). TTD does not present a deceptive device for an attacker to reconnoitre but rather allows interaction with targets until the exploitation phase. Once the hostile traffic is detected, the attacker is redirected to a deceptive device. The authors discuss the utility of this technique in this paper and the increased complexity of the psychological theatre that comes with it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to the analysis of the cognitive aspect of information and psychological confrontation in the Eurasian space, as well as to the study of the evolution of ideas that are currently commonly referred to by the term “information and psychological and cognitive confrontation”.Aim. To identify the specifics of ensuring Eurasian security in the perspective of the concept of information-psychological and cognitive confrontation.Tasks. To identify the information and psychological component in the CSTO collective security strategy, to analyze practical steps at the CSTO level in the field of countering destructive information influence, to determine the regulatory, political and organizational prerequisites for the formation of the CSTO collective information and psychological security system.Methods. The research uses both general scientific methods: analysis, synthesis, induction, and a number of special methods and approaches: comparative analysis, methodology of critical geopolitics, content analysis, informational and historical approaches.Results. The study showed that the formation of the modern concept of information-psychological and cognitive confrontation was significantly influenced by theoretical and applied research related to the understanding of the role of psychological operations and the use of special means of influencing the human psyche in modern military conflicts, as well as scientific developments in the field of studying modern methods of manipulation and propaganda, expanding the arsenal of means of hybrid conflicts, the weaponization of digital technologies, the emergence of new dimensions of international conflicts. Its subject includes systems and tools for the formation of public opinion, the peculiarities of human perception of information, as well as the whole range of methods and means of influencing public opinion and the psyche of an individual in peacetime and in combat conditions with the use of special information and psychological operations of strategic, tactical, operational level, as well as soft power tools.Conclusions. Today, more and more countries of the world are paying increased attention to the issues of ensuring information and psychological security. The desire of the post-Soviet states to preserve the political, economic and socio-cultural ties developed during their life in a single state, within the framework of new integration formats, the CIS, the EAEU, the CSTO, is increasingly faced with the problem of choosing a vector of foreign policy. Therefore, combining national interests and collective efforts to develop and conceptualize a unified approach to ensuring information and psychological security at the level of the main Eurasian cooperation formats, such as the EAEU, the CSTO and the SCO, is a priority task in the modern conflict realities of world politics.

The research is dedicated to "Strategic Communication" and its elements. Either core element of strategic communication is enlightened through study of literatures. As a showcase the Second Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia is reviewed and studied. The outcomes achieved in the conclusion of the research proves the essence and importance of strategic communication in victory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the United States has made great power competition a central tenet of its national security strategy, the primary mission of the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) has shifted from counterterrorism to great power competition accordingly. SOF's capabilities in the information domain, and its relationships with sub-state and non-state partners are major advantages in the "gray zone." Three branches of SOF are major actors operating in the gray zone: psychological operations forces that conduct information and psychological warfare in remote regions; civil affairs soldiers who gather intelligence and carry out influence operations in remote and politically sensitive regions; Special forces that motivate and advise local forces to conduct proxy operations for the United States. SOF's pivot to great power competition can threaten China's overseas interests, destabilize its periphery, and challenge its territorial integrity. In response, some Chinese private security companies (PSCs) are developing information capabilities and cultivating relationships with sub-state and non-state actors to compete for influence with SOF. The potential rivalry between SOF and Chinese PSCs may turn countries along the Belt and Road Initiative into playgrounds for great power competition and increase the possibility of armed conflicts between the two great powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bulletin of the 'Carol I' National Defence University / Buletinul Universitatii Nationale de Aparare 'Carol I' is the property of Carol I National Defence University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article discusses the transformation of the information environment, which allows an adversary to exploit cyber-enabled psychological and information operations. It presents the options currently available to an adversary to exploit the vulnerability of the information environment, chiefly the cognitive vulnerabilities of target groups. Thus, hostile interests are often pursued through manipulation, using disinformation, propaganda, algorithms and artificial intelligence. In the light of these developments, the article defines a society-centric approach, in which societal and human resilience are emphasised.

Russian military thinking and strategic documents attribute information warfare (and its associated concepts) to external authors only. This creates a vacuum in terms of how Russia actually implements itself information-psychological operations and how this fits into the broader Russian military thinking. This article looks at how information (-psychological) operations (IOs) are applied pragmatically through the prism of specific and well-established Russian concepts, such as Reflexive Control, Asymmetry and Initial Period of War, with a specific focus on the current conflict in Ukraine. It also looks at specific capabilities and formation in the field of IOs, as pertaining to the military field.

The Special Military Operation conducted in Ukraine showed not only the unsatisfactory state of the information support of the operation, but also revealed some new features that need to be taken into account. The article does not set the task of analyzing the reasons for the weak information support of the operation. However, attention is drawn to the fact that at the level of doctrinal documents, namely the Military Doctrines of Russia in 2010 and 2014, there is a negative trend in the objectivity of assessments of the features of modern military conflicts in terms of their information support. Among the manifested features of information support of operations, attention is drawn to a sharp reduction in the time of effectiveness of disinformation measures and the inadmissibility of substituting information operations planning with propaganda activities. The effectiveness of using the consolidation of the capabilities of space systems for various purposes in support of one of the conflicting parties and capable of having a significant impact on the success of military operations is noted. A number of recommendations aimed at bringing in line with the requirements of the time of planning and organization of information operations in Russia are formulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The psychological operations (PSYOPS) doctrines of many NATO member states, including Romania, do not allow the use of influence activities on internal audiences. While this is an ethical provision, difficulties arise when formulating an adequate counter-propaganda strategy, as domestic groups that are susceptible to influence are targeted by an effective propaganda conducted by the adversary. The 2014 edition of the NATO doctrine on PSYOPS (psychological operations) was ambiguous with regard to this limitation, while the Romanian doctrine from 2016 kept it, in accordance with the older NATO doctrine from 2007. With this limitation PSYOPS risk being ineffective in countering propaganda, their role being restricted to analysing the effects of the propaganda on the audiences and making recommendations to counter it. Without using influence activities, the recommendations would be, based on the scenario, addressing the public or not (choosing “silence”) with information activities through the responsible structures. Going further, inform and influence activities (IIA) intertwine, which leads to the need for more clarity in the doctrines that regulate their employment. The propaganda of the Russian Federation in Donbas, that victimised the separatists leading to their support for the invasion of Ukraine is a relevant example for situations when PSYOPS should be allowed to target internal audiences. The present paper does not go into detail on the case of Ukraine but problematises on the above-mentioned ethical limitation that has the advantage of giving the adversary advantages on multiple levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information warfare, including strategic communications, is becoming ever more crucial in defending national interests and competing globally. Therefore, organizations are increasingly employing strategic communications within the information environment to pursue the organization's mission and goals. Unfortunately, many organizations lack strategic, structural, and environmental alignment, resulting in reduced efficiency and effectiveness of strategic communications. This article explores the current structure of many organizations defending and competing in a turbulent information environment, proposes a different configuration that balances efficiency and effectiveness, outlines the importance of innovation, and emphasizes the strategic role of leadership throughout the organization and change process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]