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Purpose: Scholars have been debating the geopolitical importance of the strengthening China-Russia relationship for some time, noting that the relationship does not constitute a full alliance, but still might have great significance for world politics. This paper aims to improve on this scholarship by examining the evolution of China-Russia cooperation as it relates to the future of North Korea, especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Design, Methodology, Approach: This scholarship represents a methodological advance over most previous discussions of the China-Russia relationship. It embraces the historical development of this relationship, probes structural arrangements in relationship to regional stability, and also draws upon extensive Russian and Chinese language data sets which constitute the material for a “discourse analysis,” to achieve a deeper understanding of this relationship as it pertains to the Korean Peninsula. Findings: Overall, this study documents substantial cooperation between Beijing and Moscow with respect to Korean affairs. While some disagreements between China and Russia do exist in this sphere, the main implication of these developments is the trend toward a hardening of the bipolar structure in Northeast Asia, informed by the growing influence of patriotic and nationalistic elite groups within both China and Russia. However, the study points out a paradox in that this hardening of bipolarity could actually help to stabilize the spiraling tensions that have surrounded North Korea in recent decades. Practical Implications: This paper may help students and policymakers alike in Northeast Asia evaluate the significance of the China-Russia quasi-alliance. Overall, this paper supports the conclusion that the dangers of the China-Russia quasi-alliance need not be exaggerated. Originality Value: This paper is innovative insofar as it gives balanced attention to both China’s and Russia’s discourses and policies toward North Korea and evaluates the influence of Moscow-Beijing’s growing cooperation in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, as it may impact the future of North Korea and the wider region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study posits that the ineffective and futile efforts of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to contain North Korean nuclear ambition are a result of the United States (U.S.) consistently and strategically developing its sanctions regimes, rather than the limited implementation of the UNSC’s measures or by the non-compliance of China and Russia, the two North Korean-leaning permanent UNSC members. The U.S/ has endeavoured to maximise its strategic leverage against North Korea by consolidating bilateral channels to increase its foreign policy capacity and flexibility, instead of reinforcing multilateral pressures through the UNSC. Although both the U.S. and the UNSC share the goal of nuclear non-proliferation in Northeast Asia, the former deliberately exploited the deficient decision-making process of the latter to maximise its foreign policy flexibility. Consequently, the U.S. has flexibly pursued both engagement and containment of North Korea while maintaining its hard-line stance against it at the UNSC, whereas the UNSC’s sanctions on North Korea have gradually become rigid and inflexible, without achieving tangible outcomes. We argue that the U.S.’s unilateral use of sanctions against North Korea is building on its instrumental use of the UNSC’s multilateral framework, which has significantly lost its legitimacy and effectiveness amid the looming U.S.-China rivalry over hegemony in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]