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This article proposes a framework for classifying ethnic minority organisations based on a broad combination of discursive and non-discursive criteria rooted in their political opportunities profile. One diasporic and one non-diasporic organisation were chosen for Russia and Poland, respectively. Diasporicity is understood according to William Safran’s criteria and Rogers Brubaker’s triadic configuration. The Russian study cases are Komi Voityr and the Russian Polish Congress; the Polish, the Silesian Autonomy Movement and the Belarussian House. The analysis of their status, activities, domestic and external political impact, localisation and role in the ‘triadic configuration’ has shown that the four cases are ethnic minority associations, and their legal status and scope of activities differ significantly. Their domestic political opportunities are rather scarce. Out of the four cases, just one organisation is an active part in Brubaker’s classical triadic configuration; its role is not traditional, ascribed to the respective ‘angle’. Although both Russian associations enjoy an official status, their activities are limited to the cultural, memorial and linguistic domains, primarily at the national level. In Poland, both associations act internationally as advocacy groups, and their activities are not confined to culture and language. Far from being universally applicable, the proposed classification framework can still add to the comparative ethnic politics toolkit.

With contributions by Gülcan Akkaya, Eveline Ammann Dula, Yann Bochsler, Lisa Marie Borrelli, Matthias Drilling, Carolin Fischer, Daniela Gossweiler, Gül Garabet, Heidi Hirschfeld, Sylvie Johner-Kobi, Selin Kilic, Sinan Kilic, Alex Knoll, Stefanie Kurt, Roberto Lopez, Eva Mey, Semhar Negash, Esteban Piñeiro, Luca Preite, Swetha Dhananka Rao , Marina Richter, Sarah Schilliger, Rebekka Sieber, Peter Streckeisen, Margot Vogel, Berihun Wagaw, Anna Wyss., Fachpersonen der Sozialen Arbeit gehören zu den wichtigsten Akteur:innen in der Integrationsarbeit mit Zugewanderten. In diesem Feld sind vielfältige neue Aufgabenbereiche entstanden, die von ausländer- und asylrechtlichen Vorgaben stark überformt werden. Integrationsarbeit ist dadurch äusserst anforderungsreich geworden. In diesem politisch sensiblen, zuweilen auch widersprüchlichen Handlungsfeld muss sich Soziale Arbeit unter Wahrung ihres professionellen Ethos und ihrer fachlichen Maximen positionieren. Wie verhält sie sich gegenüber gesellschaftlichen Diskursen über Migration, Integration, Mobilität und Flucht? Welche Rolle spielt die Soziale Arbeit bei der Umsetzung der Integrationspolitik? Welche Stossrichtung verfolgt sie im Spannungsfeld zwischen Menschenrechten und zunehmend restriktiven Integrations- und Migrationsgesetzen? Der Sammelband bietet eine fundierte Orientierung zu rechtlich-politischen Zusammenhängen und leuchtet zentrale Begriffe aus, er unterzieht Theorien und Konzepte einer kritischen Diskussion und vertieft verschiedene Praxisfelder der migrations- und flüchtlingsbezogenen sozialarbeiterischen Integrationsarbeit.

Roma people are likely Europe’s most discriminated and marginalized minority. In the past years, increasing attention has been paid to their migration to Western Europe and their limited social mobility in their countries of destination. Our article focuses on the "post‐return" experiences of Roma and the changes generated by return migration in their communities of origin, a topic largely neglected so far. We build on recent debates around post‐return positionality, asking how adult and old Roma returnees experience return. We thus contribute to the growing literature on return migration and lifecourse that distinguishes between the return migration of children and youth, that of adults, and that of older migrants. Focusing on Roma returnees, we employ an understanding of migration not just as a means of generating resources, but also as a learning process where the Roma population acquires new ideas and a sense of agency and dignity. Informed by long‐term fieldwork in ethnically mixed localities in Romania (including participant observation and 76 semi‐structured interviews), we inquire into the ethnic relations and negotiations between Roma and non‐Roma populations. Migration results in a weakening of the economic dependency of the Roma on the non‐Roma. In this new context, which is still marred by ethnic prejudice and inequality, we analysed how local interethnic relations were reshaped by the returned Roma’s new consumption practices, new modes of communication, and new claims for equality. While adult Roma tend to demand equality and decent treatment, setting in motion a process of ethnic change, older returned Roma tend to maintain more submissive practices.

This article studies citizenship beyond its manifestation as a formal legal status, by exploring citizenship as a process shaped by people’s everyday practices and experiences of belonging. Through investigating the daily struggles over belonging and membership of young people with migrant background in the autonomous province of South Tyrol in Northern Italy, this study pays particular attention to the ways in which belonging on the macro scale (the nation, the state) and the micro scale (the village, the city, the region) clash, intersect and interact with each other. By highlighting practices of belonging at the margins of a state by actors considered to be at the margins of the state, this article contributes to scholarly debates that “decentre” citizenship by studying it at, from and for the margins.

Die bis zu ihrer Ausweisung im Jahr 1658 in Polen-Litauen beheimateten Sozinianer stellten eine transnational zusammengesetzte religiöse Minderheit protestantischer Herkunft dar, der es trotz der geringen Zahl ihrer Mitglieder gelang, eine bedeutende ideengeschichtliche Wirkung in Europa zu entfalten. Obwohl sie nur ca. ein Prozent der polnisch-litaui­schen Bevölkerung ausmachten, verfügten die Sozinianer in der Zeit von 1602 bis 1638 über ein akademisches Gymnasium und eine Druckerei in Raków, die für die Kultivierung und Verbreitung eines neuartigen Religionsmodells sorgten: Sozinianer gingen von der geschichtlichen Wandlung der religiös-sittlichen Normen im Sinne eines Perfektibilitätsprozesses aus, wobei sie, im Unterschied zu den etablierten Konfessionen, die subjektive Vernunft des Einzelnen zur letztgültigen Entscheidungsinstanz in religiösen Fragen erhoben. Dieses die Pluralität des Christentums prinzipiell bejahende, mit historisierend-philologischer Bibelexegese unterfütterte historisch-ethische Religionsmodell wurde zum Gegenstand zahlreicher Vorlesungen und Disputationen und wirkte vorbereitend auf das Aufkommen der europäischen Aufklärungstheologie. Die vorliegende Studie verfolgt jene Prozesse von ihren Ursprüngen im Denken Fausto Sozzinis an. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit gilt der Ausgestaltung des historisch-ethischen Religionsmodells durch die Vertreter des Frühsozinianismus und seiner diskursiven Verarbeitung an den protestantischen Universitäten im Alten Reich und in den Niederlanden.

This article tracks how relations between two neighbouring states of the Baltic region, Po­land and Lithuania, developed over the last decades. These relations cannot be described in unambiguous terms. On the one hand, common aspirations for European integration created conditions for rapprochement and cooperation. On the other, the partnership has been complicated by disagreements and mutual claims. The main problem is the situa­tion of the correspondent ethnic minorities in the two countries: Poles in Lithuania and Lithuanians in Poland. According to the Polish authorities, the interests of Lithuania's Polish residents are not safeguarded, and their rights are infringed. Similar complaints are voiced by Vilnius regarding the situation of ethnic Lithuanians in Poland. These contradictions are partly smoothed by common political interests: cooperation within the North Atlantic Alliance, defiance of the notorious 'threat from the East' and joint support for the pro-­Western opposition in the neighbouring Belarus.

The subject of marriage and sexuality among the Baptists of the 16th and early 17th century lies at the center of this study. The explosive nature of this subject stems from its potential for innovation: Within this fragmented religious minority there were a number of secret marriages as well as divorces and even cases of bigamy and polygamy. These events not only shaped the image of the Baptists in the eyes of their contemporaries, they also heavily influenced the development of the Baptists from radical outsiders at the beginning of the Reformation to an established religious minority in the 17th century. The historical reception of the Baptists was also long overshadowed by the so-called "libertarian" tendencies of the era. This new study on the concept of marriage among the Baptists is also relevant to understanding the role of marriage in the context of the Reformation. The Baptist idea of marriage may also be seen as a conscious counterpart to Luther's concept of marriage as a "worldly thing." Between the poles of the old (Catholic) and the new (Protestant) understanding of marriage lay the Baptist position as an independent answer to the question of a new balance between the religious and the worldly aspects of this institution. The marked parallels to the more radical ideas that later emerged suggest that the Baptist position toward marriage was indeed a genuinely reformatory phenomenon and not, as long thought, a belated result of the heretic movements of the Late Middle Ages.

The question whether ethnic diversity is associated with declining social cohesion has produced much controversy. We maintain that more attention must be paid to cognitive mechanisms to move the debate ahead. Using survey data from 938 localities in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, we explore a crucial individual-level mechanism: perceptions of diversity. We not only consider perceptions of the amount, but also of the qualitative nature of diversity. By asking about various qualitative aspects of diversity, we test the cognitive salience of three explanations that have been proposed in the literature for negative diversity effects: out-group biases, asymmetric preferences and coordination problems. We show that all three mechanisms matter. Perceptions both mediate statistical diversity effects, and have important explanatory power of their own. Moreover, we are able to address the question to what extend the relationship of perceived diversity and neighborhood social cohesion varies across policy contexts. Based on assumptions in the literature about positive impacts of inclusive and culturally pluralist immigrant integration policy approaches, we hypothesize that ethno-cultural diversity is less negatively related to neighborhood social cohesion in more inclusive policy contexts. Our results provide partial support for this hypothesis as perceived diversity has a significantly stronger negative impact on neighborhood cohesion in Germany.

Multilingual or linguistically heterogeneous societies are increasing around the globe. Socio-political processes, like Europeanization and globalization, are responsible for this expansion. Universal norms and standards for language use and identity are spreading, mediated by international organizations and charters. In this view, multilingualism can be seen as a challenge to national social cohesion, though it remained undisputed before the development of global multi level governance. In many places, languages of traditional territorial minorities have been recognized and given official status, leading in some cases to new forms of local, regional, and national governance. Furthermore, the proliferation of multilingualism is boosted by a variety of forms of mobility, where mobility is understood as physical migration or new forms of virtual mobility connected to digital networks. Mobility in this sense underpins the linguistic and transnational identity of the migrants who bring new languages with them. One of the questions in need of analysis is the circumstances and conditions that lead to the inclusion/exclusion from society of specific linguistic groups with shared linguistic features. This thematic issue wants to address the apparent schism between multilingualism and social inclusion as well as the language policy and planning pursued by supranational institutions, states, and societal organizations in their efforts tackle it. In this issue, the focus of study of linguistically diverse societies will be on the closely interrelated dependencies which impact language policy and planning.

The past 20 years have witnessed major shifts in language and education policy in Malaysia. This reflects a range of social, economic, and political forces that influence and shape the policymaking in this multi-ethnic and multicultural country. Past research has suggested that language and education policies in Malaysia tend to have two main stances and are generally related to Malay (the national language), English, Mandarin, and Tamil. One stance is related to issues of globalization and employability, and the other is related to national and ethnic identities. In view of these stances, this paper seeks to contribute to the discussion and debates on these issues by empirically investigating inherent ideological positions in official statements published in two newspapers in the past 20 years. Specifically, it adopts concepts from critical discourse studies, and uses methods from computational linguistics to examine official statements from a total of 30,508 Malaysian newspaper articles published between 2000 and 2020. The findings indicate that the role of Malay and national ideology, and the global positioning of English continue to be central concerns in the discussion of language and education in Malaysia. In addition, the importance of learning Mandarin is also emphasized. However, indigenous and minority languages are largely absent in the discourses on education policies in the country. The effects of this exclusion are already apparent in the shift to languages like Malay, Mandarin, and English as a first language, and the increasing number of languages considered to be under threat in Malaysia.

Von 1950 bis 1980 vervielfachten sich Zahl und Größe religiöser Minderheitengruppen in Großbritannien aufgrund der Nachkriegszuwanderung, doch anders als bei vorangegangenen Wanderungen und im Unterschied zur Gegenwart wurden die verschiedenen Glaubensrichtungen der neuen Einwanderer während dieses Zeitraums kaum thematisiert. Dieser Zugang ist vor dem Hintergrund einer untergehenden Kolonialmacht zu sehen, die an der Illusion eines Commonwealth mit gleichberechtigten Untertanen ("subjects") festhielt, aber die eigene Dominanz nicht aufgeben wollte. Das Gruppenmerkmal "race" diente in der Endphase des Empires als allumfassendes Etikett, das weitere Differenzierungen überflüssig machen sollte. Eine neue Minderheitengeneration, die die Religion seit den 1980er-Jahren als wichtiges Element der Abgrenzung entdeckt hat, und das davon unabhängige Aufkommen des islamistischen Terrorismus haben die Phase des religiösen Desinteresses beendet., The number and size of populations belonging to minority religions in the UK multiplied between 1950 and 1980 due to immigration from the Commonwealth. Unlike previous and subsequent waves of immigration, religion did not become a public issue at this time. The new policy of multiculturalism focused predominantly on the theme of “race”. This approach emerged against the background of a declining imperial power which attempted to maintain an illusion of a Commonwealth of equal "subjects" and imperial dominance. The label "race" served to distinguish between "native" British on the one hand and colonial subjects on the other and, at the same time, brushed over existing cultural or religious differences. In the 1980s, when a new minority generation discovered religion as a means to emphasise diversity and (independently of this) Islamic terrorism began to spread, the period in which religion had been ignored came to an end.

Discrimination against the approximately 500,000 African (mostly irregular) immigrants has recently spread in China. During the corona pandemic, it degenerates into a true Afrophobia. Shortly before, five Nigerians in Guangzhou had reportedly tested positive for Covid-19. Africans are widely accused as drug traffickers and criminals. Also, they would endanger China's global competitiveness for Africa's resources through media baiting abroad. Current reports testify the displacement of African migrants from homes and hotels in Guangzhou (Canton), where most of the Africans live. They are dependent on informal, mostly illegal networks in order to be able to stay in the country. In online social networks Afrophobia as cyber racism is particularly pronounced. Thereby, racism is more deeply rooted in the mentality of many Chinese than is commonly assumed. According to a traditional Chinese proverb, the greatest evil to be avoided is 'the destroyed nation and the annihilated race'. In addition, since 2005 land-grabbing by Chinese entrepreneurs in sub-Saharan Africa arose international attention. Its main purpose is to ensure food security in China and to profit from international grain speculation. It was racially legitimized from the start, with slogans such as, only Chinese investments could save Africans from their traditional 'laziness'. This repeats deeply rooted neo-colonial European prejudices of a 'wild, ahistoric and uncivilized Africa'. The prejudices are still associated with a feeling of racial superiority. The social fabric of China has always embodied essential characteristics of the exclusion of 'foreigners', focused on ethnicity, race, religion, sexual orientation and gender. The African Union, various African governments and even the United States have sharply criticized Beijing for mistreating migrants, particularly those from Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda. Racist attacks on Africans in China have an oppressively long tradition, associated with the ex, In China breitet sich in letzter Zeit eine Diskriminierung der ca. 500.000 afrikanischen (meist irregulären) Einwanderer aus. Sie artet in der Corona-Pandemie zu einer wahren Afrophobie aus. Afrikaner werden pauschal als Drogenhändler und Kriminelle beschuldigt. Sie würden zudem über Medienhetze im Ausland Chinas globale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit um Afrikas Ressourcen gefährden. Aktuelle Meldungen berichten von der Vertreibung afrikanischer Migranten aus Wohnungen und Hotels in Guangzhou (Canton), wo die meisten Afrikaner leben. Sie sind auf informelle, meist illegale Netzwerke angewiesen, um im Land bleiben zu können. In sozialen online Netzwerken ist Afrophobie als Cyber-Rassismus besonders ausgeprägt. Rassismus ist in der Mentalität vieler Chinesen tiefer verwurzelt als gemeinhin angenommen. Nach einem traditionellen chinesischen Sprichwort gilt als größtes zu vermeidendes Übel die "zerstörte Nation und die vernichtete Rasse". Hinzu kommt seit 2005 die ‚Landnahme‘ chinesischer Unternehmer in Schwarzafrika. Sie dient hauptsächlich der Absicherung der Nahrungsmittelsicherheit Chinas und der internationalen Getreidespekulationen. Sie wurde von Anbeginn rassistisch legitimiert, mit Sprüchen, wie beispielsweise, nur chinesische Investitionen könnten die Afrikaner vor ihrer tradierten "Faulheit" retten. Damit wiederholen sich tief verwurzelte neo-koloniale europäische Vorurteile von einem "wilden und unzivilisierten Afrika". Dies ist nach wie vor verbunden mit einem Gefühl rassischer Überlegenheit. Das soziale Gefüge Chinas verkörperte schon immer wesentliche Merkmale der Ausgrenzung von "Fremden". Fokussiert auf ethnische Zugehörigkeit, Rasse, Religion, sexuelle Orientierung und Geschlecht. Die Afrikanische Union, verschiedene afrikanische Regierungen und sogar die Vereinigten Staaten haben Peking wegen der Misshandlung von Migranten, vor allem aus Nigeria, Ghana, Kenia und Uganda, scharf kritisiert. Kurz zuvor waren Berichten zufolge fünf Nigerianer in Guangzhou positiv a

La discrimination à l'encontre des quelque 500 000 immigrés africains (pour la plupart irréguliers) s'est récemment répandue en Chine. Pendant la pandémie de corona, cela dégénère en une véritable afrophobie. Peu de temps auparavant, cinq Nigérians de Guangzhou auraient été testés positifs pour Covid-19. Les Africains sont largement accusés d'être des trafiquants de drogue et des criminels. En outre, ils mettraient en danger la compétitivité mondiale de la Chine pour les ressources de l'Afrique par le biais du dénigrement médiatiques à l'étranger. Les rapports actuels témoignent du déplacement des migrants africains des maisons et des hôtels de Guangzhou (Canton), où vivent la plupart des Africains. Ils dépendent de réseaux informels, pour la plupart illégaux, pour pouvoir rester dans le pays. Dans les réseaux sociaux en ligne, l'afrophobie et le cyber-racisme sont particulièrement prononcés. Ainsi, le racisme est plus profondément enraciné dans la mentalité de nombreux Chinois qu'on ne le pense généralement. Selon un proverbe chinois traditionnel, le plus grand mal à éviter est "la nation détruite et la race anéantie". En outre, depuis 2005, l'accaparement des terres par des entrepreneurs chinois en Afrique subsaharienne a attiré l'attention de la communauté internationale. Son objectif principal est d'assurer la sécurité alimentaire en Chine et de profiter de la spéculation céréalière internationale. Il a été légitimé racialement dès le départ, avec des slogans tels que, seuls les investissements chinois pouvaient sauver les Africains de leur "paresse" traditionnelle., Discrimination against the approximately 500,000 African (mostly irregular) immigrants has recently spread in China. During the corona pandemic, it degenerates into a true Afrophobia. Shortly before, five Nigerians in Guangzhou had reportedly tested positive for Covid-19. Africans are widely accused as drug traffickers and criminals. Also, they would endanger China's global competitiveness for Africa's resources through media baiting abroad. Current reports testify the displacement of African migrants from homes and hotels in Guangzhou (Canton), where most of the Africans live. They are dependent on informal, mostly illegal networks in order to be able to stay in the country. In online social networks Afrophobia as cyber racism is particularly pronounced. Thereby, racism is more deeply rooted in the mentality of many Chinese than is commonly assumed. According to a traditional Chinese proverb, the greatest evil to be avoided is 'the destroyed nation and the annihilated race'. In addition, since 2005 land-grabbing by Chinese entrepreneurs in sub-Saharan Africa arose international attention. Its main purpose is to ensure food security in China and to profit from international grain speculation. It was racially legitimized from the start, with slogans such as, only Chinese investments could save Africans from their traditional 'laziness'. This repeats deeply rooted neo-colonial European prejudices of a 'wild, ahistoric and uncivilized Africa'. The prejudices are still associated with a feeling of racial superiority. The social fabric of China has always embodied essential characteristics of the exclusion of 'foreigners', focused on ethnicity, race, religion, sexual orientation and gender. The African Union, various African governments and even the United States have sharply criticized Beijing for mistreating migrants, particularly those from Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda. Racist attacks on Africans in China have an oppressively long tradition, associated with the ex

Introducing the German minority subpopulation of southern Chile and concepts of "ethnic" and "cultural" membership, the article proposes a sampling plan based on name typologies found in regional telephone directory entries. The aim is to generate a random sample of 1,000 German-Chileans with their names and addresses, its applications ranging from postal, personal or telephone surveys to qualitative inquiry and marketing or public diplomacy campaigns. Following a test run of the sampling procedure, the viability of the sampling plan is asserted, albeit with some cautious remarks about its limitations. The article argues that the sampling plan can be adapted to research in the context of other ethnic/cultural minorities as well, depending on circumstances.

We examined the link between victimisation and life satisfaction for 85,301 gay and bisexual individuals across 44 European countries. We expected this negative link to be stronger when the internalised homonegativity of the victim was high (e.g. because the victim is more vulnerable) and weaker when victimisation occurs in countries that express intolerance towards homosexuality (e.g. because in such contexts victims expect victimisation more and they attribute it to their external environment). Additionally, we expected internalised homonegativity to relate negatively to life satisfaction. Multilevel analyses revealed that victimisation (i.e. verbal insults, threats of violence, minor or major physical assaults) and internalised homonegativity were negatively related to life satisfaction. Furthermore, as we expected, the negative link between victimisation and life satisfaction was stronger when high internalised homonegativity was reported (and the interaction effect occurred for verbal insults and major assaults as outcome variables), while it was weaker when there was low national tolerance of homosexuality (and the interaction effect occurred for verbal insults and for minor assaults). Future research and social policy should consider how the consequences of victimisation are dependent on personal as well as national attitudes towards homosexuality., Nous avons examiné le lien entre la victimisation et la satisfaction de vivre chez 85,301 personnes gays et bisexuelles dans 44 pays européens. Nous nous attendions à ce que ce lien négatif soit plus marqué lorsque l’homonégativité intériorisée est forte (par exemple, parce que la personne qui souffre de cette victimisation est plus vulnérable), et plus faible lorsque la victimisation se manifeste dans les pays où l’intolérance vis-à-vis de l’homosexualité est exprimée (par exemple, parce que dans ce contexte, de manière plus forte, les victimes s’attendent à la victimisation et l’attribuent à l’environnement externe). De plus, nous anticipions un impact négatif de l’homonégativité intériorisée sur la satisfaction de vivre. Nos analyses multiniveaux ont révélé que la victimisation (c’est-à-dire, les insultes verbales, les menaces de violence, les agressions physiques mineures ou sévères) et l’homonégativité intériorisée avaient un impact négatif sur la satisfaction de vivre. En outre, comme nous nous y attendions, le lien négatif entre victimisation et satisfaction de vivre était plus marqué en présence d’une forte homonégativité intériorisée rapportée (et les effets d’interaction pour les insultes verbales et les agressions sévères se sont révélés en tant que variables des résultats), tandis qu’il était moins marqué dans un contexte de faible tolérance de l’homosexualité à l’échelle nationale (et les effets d’interaction se sont révélés pour les insultes verbales et les agressions mineures). À l’avenir, la recherche et les politiques sociales doivent prendre en compte la manière dont les conséquences de la victimisation dépendent des attitudes à la fois personnelles et nationales vis-à-vis de l’homosexualité., Aquí analizamos el vínculo entre victimización y satisfacción con la vida de 85.301 homosexuales y bisexuales de 44 países europeos. Previmos que este vínculo negativo sería más fuerte cuando la víctima presenta un nivel alto de homonegatividad interiorizada (p. ej., porque la víctima es más vulnerable) y más débil cuando la victimización ocurre en países que expresan intolerancia hacia la homosexualidad (p. ej., porque en tales contextos las víctimas esperan que la victimización sea mayor y la atribuyen a su entorno externo). Además, esperábamos que la homonegatividad interiorizada estuviese relacionada negativamente con la satisfacción con la vida. En análisis de varios niveles se observó que la victimización (es decir, insultos verbales, amenazas de violencia, agresiones físicas leves o graves) y la homonegatividad interiorizada estaban negativamente relacionadas con la satisfacción con la vida. Asimismo, tal como esperábamos, el vínculo negativo entre victimización y satisfacción con la vida era más fuerte cuando se informaba una alta homonegatividad interiorizada (y el efecto de interacción ocurría en casos de insultos verbales y agresiones graves como variables de resultado), mientras que era más débil cuando había un nivel bajo nacional de tolerancia hacia la homosexualidad (y el efecto de interacción ocurría en casos de insultos verbales y agresiones leves). En los estudios futuros y las políticas sociales debería tenerse en cuenta el modo en que las consecuencias de la victimización dependen tanto de la actitud personal como de las actitudes nacionales hacia la homosexualidad.