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Abstract. When is a design just a design, and when is it a trademark? Over the last several decades, courts have developed a clear framework for evaluating the distinctiveness of [...]

In design patent law, we have created a monster—a chimera, a hybrid that sometimes looks and acts like a patent regime and then, unexpectedly, doesn’t. Courts in design patent cases sometimes apply the rules as they would in utility patent cases, sometimes modify those rules for the design context, and sometimes ignore the utility patent rules altogether. The consequences of that incomplete adoption of utility patent rules are grossly underappreciated. Among other things, it has wreaked havoc on the law of novelty and nonobviouness—doctrines that are supposed to ensure that we grant design patent protection only to new and meaningfully different designs. And it has too often resulted in rules that ignore how designers actually work. In this Article, we suggest that the problem stems from trying to fit design into a framework that was intended for the very different context of inventions. There are good reasons not to use the utility patent infringement rules for design, even if we are skeptical of the particular design patent infringement rule the Federal Circuit has settled on. And there are good reasons not to allow a design patent to have a different scope when it comes to infringement than for validity; doing so allows patent owners (and infringers) to game the system in litigation. The Federal Circuit has recognized some—but not all—of these necessary differences. But if there are good reasons to depart from utility patent rules in some cases, why insist on symmetry with utility patent in other respects? We think design patent law’s strange hybridity is largely a historical accident. In 1842, when design patents were first created, the utility patent system looked fundamentally different than it does today—and a lot more like an ideal design patent system would. Most significant, it used central rather than peripheral claiming. But as utility patent law changed, design patent law tagged along to its detriment. Courts (and ultimately Congress) should recognize the fundamental divergence between utility and design patents. Perhaps we should get rid of design patents altogether and adopt a sui generis regime for design, as virtually every other country has done. But if we are stuck with design patents, courts should apply design patent law with sensitivity to the differences between design and invention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trademark law exists to promote competition. If consumers know which companies make which products, they can more easily find the products they actually want to purchase. Trademark law has long treated "source significance"--the fact that a particular trademark is identified with a particular producer--as both necessary and sufficient for establishing a valid trademark. That is, trademark law has traditionally viewed source significance as the only necessary precondition for a trademark being pro-competitive. In this Article, we argue that this equation of source significance and pro-competitiveness is misguided. Some marks use words that are so closely connected with the product being branded that giving just one firm a monopoly over those words provides that firm with a meaningful competitive advantage--an artificial advantage granted by the state. This problem becomes worse as the number of firms producing (and branding) a type of product increases. The more words cordoned off by trademark law, the more trouble a new entrant will have in describing or attracting attention to its product. Trademark law is thus being hijacked by strategic firms for anticompetitive purposes. Traditional doctrinal tools are inadequate to address this problem because the goal should be to limit the number of such trademarks rather than eliminate them completely. However, costly screens could be used to impose a form of congestion pricing on trademarks, eliminating them in all but the most worthwhile cases. In this Article, we develop a theory of the anticompetitive nature of certain trademark rules. We then propose a series of overlapping doctrinal rules and costly screens to address the problem of rampant anticompetitive trademarks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]