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Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs) are a type of VMbased Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) designed to enhance the security of cloud-based VMs, safeguarding them even from malicious hypervisors. Although CVMs have been widely adopted by major cloud service providers, current CVM designs face significant challenges in runtime resource management due to their fixed capacities and lack of transparency. These limitations hamper efficient cloud resource management, leading to increased operational costs and reduced agility in responding to fluctuating workloads. This paper introduces a dynamic CPU resource management approach, featuring the novel concept of "Elastic CVM. This approach allows for hypervisor-assisted runtime adjustment of CPU resources using a specialized vCPU type, termed Worker vCPU. This new approach enhances CPU resource adaptability and operational efficiency without compromising security. Additionally, we introduce a Worker vCPU Abstraction Layer to simplify Worker vCPU deployment and management. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we have designed and implemented a serverless computing prototype platform, called Ditto. We show that Ditto significantly improves performance and efficiency through finergrain resource management. The concept of "Elastic CVM" and the Worker vCPU design not only optimize cloud resource utilization but also pave the way for more flexible and cost-effective confidential computing environments.

In modern mobile devices, baseband is an integral component running on top of cellular processors to handle crucial radio communications. However, recent research reveals significant vulnerabilities in these basebands, posing serious security risks like remote code execution. Yet, effectively scrutinizing basebands remains a daunting task, as they run closed-source and proprietary software on vendor-specific chipsets. Existing analysis methods are limited by their dependence on manual processes and heuristic approaches, reducing their scalability. This paper introduces a novel approach to unveil security issues in basebands from a unique perspective: to uncover vendor-specific baseband commands from the Radio Interface Layer (RIL), a hardware abstraction layer interfacing with basebands. To demonstrate this concept, we have designed and developed BaseMirror, a static binary analysis tool to automatically reverse engineer baseband commands from vendor-specific RIL binaries. It utilizes a bidirectional taint analysis algorithm to adeptly identify baseband commands from an enhanced control flow graph enriched with reconstructed virtual function calls. Our methodology has been applied to 28 vendor RIL libraries, encompassing a wide range of Samsung Exynos smartphone models on the market. Remarkably, BaseMirror has uncovered 873 unique baseband commands undisclosed to the public. Based on these results, we develop an automated attack discovery framework to successfully derive and validate 8 zero-day vulnerabilities that trigger denial of cellular service and arbitrary file access on a Samsung Galaxy A53 device. These findings have been reported and confirmed by Samsung and a bug bounty was awarded to us., Comment: This is the extended version of the CCS 2024 paper with the same title

Maximal extractable value (MEV) in which block proposers unethically gain profits by manipulating the order in which transactions are included within a block, is a key challenge facing blockchains such as Ethereum today. Left unchecked, MEV can lead to a centralization of stake distribution thereby ultimately compromising the security of blockchain consensus. To preserve proposer decentralization (and hence security) of the blockchain, Ethereum has advocated for a proposer-builder separation (PBS) in which the functionality of transaction ordering is separated from proposers and assigned to separate entities called builders. Builders accept transaction bundles from searchers, who compete to find the most profitable bundles. Builders then bid completed blocks to proposers, who accept the most profitable blocks for publication. The auction mechanisms used between searchers, builders and proposers are crucial to the overall health of the blockchain. In this paper, we consider PBS design in Ethereum as a game between searchers, builders and proposers. A key novelty in our design is the inclusion of future block proposers, as all proposers of an epoch are decided ahead of time in proof-of-stake (PoS) Ethereum within the game model. Our analysis shows the existence of alternative auction mechanisms that result in a better (more profitable) equilibrium to players compared to state-of-the-art. Experimental evaluations based on synthetic and real-world data traces corroborate the analysis. Our results highlight that a rethinking of auction mechanism designs is necessary in PoS Ethereum to prevent disruption.

Arm Cortex-M processors are the most widely used 32-bit microcontrollers among embedded and Internet-of-Things devices. Despite the widespread usage, there has been little effort in summarizing their hardware security features, characterizing the limitations and vulnerabilities of their hardware and software stack, and systematizing the research on securing these systems. The goals and contributions of this paper are multi-fold. First, we analyze the hardware security limitations and issues of Cortex-M systems. Second, we conducted a deep study of the software stack designed for Cortex-M and revealed its limitations, which is accompanied by an empirical analysis of 1,797 real-world firmware. Third, we categorize the reported bugs in Cortex-M software systems. Finally, we systematize the efforts that aim at securing Cortex-M systems and evaluate them in terms of the protections they offer, runtime performance, required hardware features, etc. Based on the insights, we develop a set of recommendations for the research community and MCU software developers., Comment: To Appear in the 18th USENIX WOOT Conference on Offensive Technologies, August 12-13, 2024

Cross-chain bridges are used to facilitate token and data exchanges across blockchains. Although bridges are becoming increasingly popular, they are still in their infancy and have been attacked multiple times recently, causing significant financial loss. Although there are numerous reports online explaining each of the incidents on cross-chain bridges, they are scattered over the Internet, and there is no work that analyzes the security landscape of cross-chain bridges in a holistic manner. To fill the gap, in this paper, we performed a systematic study of cross-chain bridge security issues. First, we summarize the characteristics of existing cross-chain bridges, including their usages, verification mechanisms, communication models, and three categorizations. Based on these characteristics, we identify 12 potential attack vectors that attackers may exploit. Next, we introduce a taxonomy that categorizes cross-chain attacks in the past two years into 10 distinct types, and then provide explanations for each vulnerability type, accompanied by Solidity code examples. We also discuss existing and potential defenses, as well as open questions and future research directions on cross-chain bridges. We believe that this systematization can shed light on designing and implementing cross-chain bridges with higher security and, more importantly, facilitating future research on building a better cross-chain bridge ecosystem.

Binary code summarization, while invaluable for understanding code semantics, is challenging due to its labor-intensive nature. This study delves into the potential of large language models (LLMs) for binary code comprehension. To this end, we present BinSum, a comprehensive benchmark and dataset of over 557K binary functions and introduce a novel method for prompt synthesis and optimization. To more accurately gauge LLM performance, we also propose a new semantic similarity metric that surpasses traditional exact-match approaches. Our extensive evaluation of prominent LLMs, including ChatGPT, GPT-4, Llama 2, and Code Llama, reveals 10 pivotal insights. This evaluation generates 4 billion inference tokens, incurred a total expense of 11,418 US dollars and 873 NVIDIA A100 GPU hours. Our findings highlight both the transformative potential of LLMs in this field and the challenges yet to be overcome.

Information flow control (IFC) provides confidentiality by enforcing noninterference, which ensures that high-secrecy values cannot affect low-secrecy values. Prior work introduces fine-grained IFC approaches that modify the programming language and use nonstandard compilation tools, impose run-time overhead, or report false secrecy leaks -- all of which hinder adoption. This paper presents Cocoon, a Rust library for static type-based IFC that uses the unmodified Rust language and compiler. The key insight of Cocoon lies in leveraging Rust's type system and procedural macros to establish an effect system that enforces noninterference. A performance evaluation shows that using Cocoon increases compile time but has no impact on application performance. To demonstrate Cocoon's utility, we retrofitted two popular Rust programs, the Spotify TUI client and Mozilla's Servo browser engine, to use Cocoon to enforce limited confidentiality policies., Comment: Will be published in PACMPL(OOPSLA) in October 2024

Mobile mini-programs in WeChat have gained significant popularity since their debut in 2017, reaching a scale similar to that of Android apps in the Play Store. Like Google, Tencent, the provider of WeChat, offers APIs to support the development of mini-programs and also maintains a mini-program market within the WeChat app. However, mini-program APIs often manage sensitive user data within the social network platform, both on the WeChat client app and in the cloud. As a result, cryptographic protocols have been implemented to secure data access. In this paper, we demonstrate that WeChat should have required the use of the "appsecret" master key, which is used to authenticate a mini-program, to be used only in the mini-program back-end. If this key is leaked in the front-end of the mini-programs, it can lead to catastrophic attacks on both mini-program developers and users. Using a mini-program crawler and a master key leakage inspector, we measured 3,450,586 crawled mini-programs and found that 40,880 of them had leaked their master keys, allowing attackers to carry out various attacks such as account hijacking, promotion abuse, and service theft. Similar issues were confirmed through testing and measuring of Baidu mini-programs too. We have reported these vulnerabilities and the list of vulnerable mini-programs to Tencent and Baidu, which awarded us with bug bounties, and also Tencent recently released a new API to defend against these attacks based on our findings., Comment: This is the preprint of our CCS 2023 paper

Mobile applications, particularly those from social media platforms such as WeChat and TikTok, are evolving into "super apps" that offer a wide range of services such as instant messaging and media sharing, e-commerce, e-learning, and e-government. These super apps often provide APIs for developers to create "miniapps" that run within the super app. These APIs should have been thoroughly scrutinized for security. Unfortunately, we find that many of them are undocumented and unsecured, potentially allowing miniapps to bypass restrictions and gain higher privileged access. To systematically identify these hidden APIs before they are exploited by attackers, we developed a tool APIScope with both static analysis and dynamic analysis, where static analysis is used to recognize hidden undocumented APIs, and dynamic analysis is used to confirm whether the identified APIs can be invoked by an unprivileged 3rdparty miniapps. We have applied APIScope to five popular super apps (i.e., WeChat, WeCom, Baidu, QQ, and Tiktok) and found that all of them contain hidden APIs, many of which can be exploited due to missing security checks. We have also quantified the hidden APIs that may have security implications by verifying if they have access to resources protected by Android permissions. Furthermore, we demonstrate the potential security hazards by presenting various attack scenarios, including unauthorized access to any web pages, downloading and installing malicious software, and stealing sensitive information. We have reported our findings to the relevant vendors, some of whom have patched the vulnerabilities and rewarded us with bug bounties., Comment: This is a preprint of our CCS 2023

The super app paradigm, exemplified by platforms such as WeChat and AliPay, has revolutionized the mobile app landscape by enabling third-party developers to deploy add-ons within these apps. These add-ons, known as miniapps, leverage user data hosted by the super app platforms to provide a wide range of services, such as shopping and gaming. With the rise of miniapps, super apps have transformed into "operating systems", offering encapsulated APIs to miniapp developers as well as in-app miniapp stores for users to explore and download miniapps. In this paper, we provide the first systematic study to consolidate the current state of knowledge in this field from the security perspective: the security measures, threats, and trade-offs of this paradigm. Specifically, we summarize 13 security mechanisms and 10 security threats in super app platforms, followed by a root cause analysis revealing that the security assumptions still may be violated due to issues in underlying systems, implementation of isolation, and vetting. Additionally, we also systematize open problems and trade-offs that need to be addressed by future works to help enhance the security and privacy of this new paradigm.

Retroactive operation is an operation that changes a past operation in a series of committed ones (e.g., cancelling the past insertion of '5' into a queue committed at t=3). Retroactive operation has many important security applications such as attack recovery or private data removal (e.g., for GDPR compliance). While prior efforts designed retroactive algorithms for low-level data structures (e.g., queue, set), none explored retroactive operation for higher levels, such as database systems or web applications. This is challenging, because: (i) SQL semantics of database systems is complex; (ii) data records can flow through various web application components, such as HTML's DOM trees, server-side user request handlers, and client-side JavaScript code. We propose Ultraverse, the first retroactive operation framework comprised of two components: a database system and a web application framework. The former enables users to retroactively change committed SQL queries; the latter does the same for web applications with preserving correctness of application semantics. Our experimental results show that Ultraverse achieves 10.5x~693.3x speedup on retroactive database update compared to a regular DBMS's flashback and redo.

Recently, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) platforms on Ethereum are booming, and numerous traders are trying to capitalize on the opportunity for maximizing their benefits by launching front-running attacks and extracting Miner Extractable Values (MEVs) based on information in the public mempool. To protect end users from being harmed and hide transactions from the mempool, private transactions, a special type of transactions that are sent directly to miners, were invented. Private transactions have a high probability of being packed to the front positions of a block and being added to the blockchain by the target miner, without going through the public mempool, thus reducing the risk of being attacked by malicious entities. Despite the good intention of inventing private transactions, due to their stealthy nature, private transactions have also been used by attackers to launch attacks, which has a negative impact on the Ethereum ecosystem. However, existing works only touch upon private transactions as by-products when studying MEV, while a systematic study on private transactions is still missing. To fill this gap and paint a complete picture of private transactions, we take the first step towards investigating the private transactions on Ethereum. In particular, we collect large-scale private transaction datasets and perform analysis on their characteristics, transaction costs and miner profits, as well as security impacts. This work provides deep insights on different aspects of private transactions.