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Futures consciousness (FC) refers to the capacity to understand, anticipate and prepare for the future. As a form of future orientation, it encompasses five interrelated dimensions of time perspective, agency beliefs, openness to alternatives, systems perception and concern for others. We present here cross-sectional evidence that FC is related to greater environmental engagement, above and beyond other future orientation constructs. In two pre-registered studies (one convenience student sample and one representative sample; N = 1041), we found that respondents with higher futures consciousness reported greater proenvironmental behaviour (consumption behaviour, land stewardship, social environmentalism and environmental citizenship). FC proved a better predictor of proenvironmental behaviour than the Zimbardo Inventory's Future Time Perspective and the Consideration for Future Consequences Scale (Study 1). FC was also related to stronger biospheric values (Study 2). However, it was not significantly related to personal environmental footprint (derived from a 16-item calculator). Strikingly, the environmental footprint was also unrelated to the Proenvironmental Behaviour Scale, which could point to a lack of correspondence between measures of proenvironmental propensity and impact. We discuss implications for future-thinking research and interventions aiming to improve futures consciousness., (© 2024 The Author(s). British Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Psychological Society.)

The phenomenon of animalistic dehumanisation has been extensively studied in social psychology, but mostly as an intergroup relations tool used to justify the mistreatment of an outgroup. Surprisingly, however, dehumanisation has not been approached as an influence strategy to convince the ingroup to mistreat an outgroup. In the present article, we investigate these possible influence effects. We propose that a message depicting an outgroup in negative animalised terms would lead to lasting unfavourable outgroup attitudes because the animal essence conveyed through the message would immunise ingroup members against subsequent counterinfluence attempts. In one experimental study we compared the effect of three influence messages depicting a despised outgroup (Roma beggars) in negative animalised vs. negative humanised vs. positive humanised terms, followed by a counterpropaganda message advocating for Roma beggars' rights. Results show that the animalisation message leads to a lasting animalised perception of the outgroup (eliciting disgust and repugnancy) that resists exposure to the counterpropaganda positive message. In contrast, the negative humanisation message provokes a brief negative perception of the group (pre-counterpropaganda) that disappears after exposure to the counterpropaganda. The animalisation message also leads to more negative attitudes and discriminatory behavioural intentions towards Roma beggars expressed after the counterpropaganda message (i.e., discrimination in the workplace, hiring intentions, and social proximity), whilst the negative humanisation message does not, showing no difference with the positive humanisation message. These results suggest that animalistic dehumanisation indeed acts as an influence strategy, immunising targets against subsequent counterpropaganda attempts. We discuss implications in the light of essentialisation, forms of dehumanisation and group status, and current non-discriminatory norms., Competing Interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2023 Quiamzade and Lalot.)

We test the hypothesis that COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is attributable to distrustful complacency -an interactive combination of low concern and low trust. Across two studies, 9,695 respondents from different parts of Britain reported their level of concern about COVID-19, trust in the UK government, and intention to accept or refuse the vaccine. Multilevel regression analysis, controlling for geographic area and relevant demographics, confirmed the predicted interactive effect of concern and trust. Across studies, respondents with both low trust and low concern were 10%-22% more vaccine hesitant than respondents with either high trust or high concern, and 26%-29% more hesitant than respondents with both high trust and high concern. Results hold equally among White, Black, and Muslim respondents, consistent with the view that regardless of mean-level differences, a common process underlies vaccine hesitancy, underlining the importance of tackling distrustful complacency both generally and specifically among unvaccinated individuals and populations., (© 2022 The Authors. Political Psychology published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of International Society of Political Psychology.)

The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives (that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements (that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clusters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters, suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/individualism and moral dilemma judgements., (© 2022. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited.)

Social cohesion can rise in the aftermath of natural disasters or mass tragedies, but this 'coming together' is often short-lived. The early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic witnessed marked increases in kindness and social connection, but as months passed social tensions re-emerged or grew anew. Thus local authorities faced persistent and evolving challenges. A cross-sectional survey ( N  = 2,924) examined perceptions of social cohesion while Britain was slowly emerging from its first national lockdown in June 2020 in six English local authorities that have prioritised investment in social cohesion over the last two years (including five 'integration areas') compared with three other areas that have not. We expected that social cohesion programmes would better equip people to tackle the various challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. We found a greater sense of social cohesion in the six local authorities (at the micro , meso and macro levels) than in other areas. This was manifested as higher levels of reported social activism, interpersonal trust and closer personal relationships, greater political trust and more positive attitudes towards immigrants. Findings are consistent with the proposition that investing in social cohesion underpins stronger and more connected and open communities, better able to cope with crisis situations., (© 2021 The Authors. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)