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Experts play a crucial role in modern organizations, but evidence regarding the soundness and reliability of their decision-making is mixed and often contradictory. We develop and test a moderated-mediation model of expert decision-making linking expertise, identity threat, and overprecision to understand when and why experts offer overly precise judgments, and how they can cope with disconfirming feedback. We find support for this model in a series of lab experiments which show that (a) experts are more likely than novices to double down and produce overly precise predictions following disconfirming feedback, (b) this feedback-induced overprecision by experts is mediated by perceived level of expert identity threat, (c) the source of the feedback matters for identity threat and overprecision, and (d) self-affirmation attenuates identity threat and reduces overprecision. We supplement these experimental findings by investigating experts' response to disconfirming feedback in two real-world settings: Major League Baseball umpiring and chief financial officer predictions of stock market returns. Our model and results show that feedback can harm expert decision-making by leading experts to be overly precise in their judgment, challenging existing notions on the ability of expert decision-makers, and providing insight into when and why experts should be relied upon in organizational decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the exchange of employees between regulatory agencies and regulated firms (i.e., the firm-government revolving door) affect firm regulatory outcomes? Existing work has mostly found a positive impact of revolving door hiring on firm outcomes, but it has overlooked potential limitations of this corporate political activity (CPA) tactic. We argue that the advantages firms can gain from hiring former regulators are bound by the timing of revolving door employment relative to the regulatory process. Within the context of agribiotechnology and its main regulator, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, we study regulators who move to in-house and contract lobbying positions (i.e., exit revolving door). We find that firms receive better regulatory outcomes (i.e., faster regulatory approval for new crops) only prior to the regulators' move to in-house lobbying, consistent with the regulatory capture perspective. Moreover, this revolving door was only valuable in the time period immediately before the mobility event. Additionally, contrary to the belief that former regulators provide firms with expertise and social capital as lobbyists, we find that firms did not gain any advantage after regulators became lobbyists. Taken together, our results suggest that revolving doors can be an effective business political mobilization strategy, albeit one that has limited success in shaping firm government outcomes, much like other types of CPA. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.1669. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]