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This article offers an analogy between the Roman wars against Mediterranean piracy in the 70s and 60s BCE, especially on Crete and in Cilicia, and the United States' long wars against terror, which now span more than two decades (2002–), especially in Afghanistan, until recently, and Iraq. The article hopes to show that there are fruitful points of convergence, especially useful for drawing ethical and political lessons from history. Wars against piracy are waged against non-state actors and nearly impossible to prosecute to a negotiated settlement. Such wars quite naturally result in "mission creep," particularly when situated in a region with broader strategic interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In her latest book Spying Through a Glass Darkly: The Ethics of Espionage and Counter-Intelligence, Cécile Fabre suggests that the deception of third parties during an infiltration operation can be justified as a foreseen but unintended side effect. In this essay, I criticize this view. Such deception, I argue, is better justified paternalistically as a means of preventing third parties from becoming wrongful threats. In the second part of the article, I show that Fabre ignores an important moral complication in deception operations where agents intentionally allow others to be harmed as a means of protecting a secret. I argue that intentionally allowing harm to others as a means is a particularly problematic mode of agency which must be addressed in a normative account of espionage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been argued that the criterion of right intention adds nothing in just war theory – that it is subsumed by other conditions on just war. It has also been argued that there is no tenable reading of the criterion at all, and in particular that taking it as a positive requirement on the state's motives is after all incoherent in a way that would make it impossible to satisfy. This article gives an action-theoretic analysis of (one central understanding of) the criterion and uses it to examine arguments that have been offered for the strong negative claims above. It is shown that none of these arguments succeed. Our endeavor brings welcome clarity and understanding to our own ideas about the criterion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reinhold Niebuhr stands alone among many 20th century theorists of religion and politics for at once rejecting both the natural law tradition of just war, as well as the secular-rationalist tradition of his progressive contemporaries. Nowhere is his dual criticism more evident than in his critical stance on technology in war. For Niebuhr, technological advancements were not only inevitable, but sometimes necessary to develop in the face of advances from nefarious actors in world affairs. But using technologically advanced weapons risked destroying the moral authority of a nation by engaging in utilitarian calculus. Religious and military ethicists concerned with the integration of technological advancement in contemporary war would do well to consider Niebuhr's thought and how it might be developed further in order to address the new concerns raised not only by modern tools such as drones, hypersonic weapons, and AI, but also by whatever yet to be developed technologies remain past the temporal horizons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine, numerous articles have been written about the reasons why the Moscow Patriarchate supports it and how the church is legitimising the aggression. The usual ideational suspects were named, i.e. russkiy mir, 'Holy Rus' and 'Moscow, the Third Rome'. In this paper I draw attention to an important yet overlooked concept which allows the church's leadership to present their support for the war as a noble act. I analyse how the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church understands justice in relation to politics, especially the international order and foreign relations. The goal of the paper is to reconstruct the justice narrative of the Moscow Patriarchate – its content, the context in which it appears and its role. The findings are based on interpretative discourse analysis of a sample of 403 documents retrieved from the official websites of the Moscow Patriarchate (2000–2023). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine, numerous articles have been written about the reasons why the Moscow Patriarchate supports it and how the church is legitimising the aggression. The usual ideational suspects were named, i.e. russkiy mir, 'Holy Rus' and 'Moscow, the Third Rome'. In this paper I draw attention to an important yet overlooked concept which allows the church's leadership to present their support for the war as a noble act. I analyse how the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church understands justice in relation to politics, especially the international order and foreign relations. The goal of the paper is to reconstruct the justice narrative of the Moscow Patriarchate – its content, the context in which it appears and its role. The findings are based on interpretative discourse analysis of a sample of 403 documents retrieved from the official websites of the Moscow Patriarchate (2000–2023). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the moral responsibility for the deaths of Palestinian non-combatants in the 2023–24 Gaza War rests with Hamas. Its argument is philosophical rather than legal, based on an analysis and discussion of the rules of just war theory and what these rules imply for the moral assessment of the use of human shields. One main conclusion will be that the moral responsibility for the killing of human shields in the context of morally legitimate attacks on military targets should be assigned to the side that tried to benefit from the presence of the shields in the first place. Questions concerning proportionality are still relevant, but have to be understood and resolved in relation to what is at stake in a particular war. The more extreme the war aims of an unjust attacker are, the greater is the need to prevent it from winning the war. Hence, whether or not the number of non-combatant deaths in Gaza is proportionate should not be determined by the significance of individual military targets alone but also by the prospects of allowing a genocidal enemy such as Hamas to remain in control of Gaza. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an overview of the contributions to this special issue. It organizes the contributions through three conceptual lenses: the person, the state, and the church. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been argued that Elizabeth Anscombe's writings on killing and just war in the 1950s and early 1960s were highly influential, not only on just war theorists (such as Michael Walzer and Thomas Nagel), but also on the recovery of just war thinking among the US and British military. In researching the sources for Anscombe's thought, it became clear that Donald MacKinnon's unknown early writings on social ethics and war inspired and influenced Anscombe's earliest thought on justice in war. In this article, I focus on MacKinnon's and Anscombe's prophetic analysis of the role of the Church and the lay faithful under the spectre of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pope Francis both grants the right to use armed force in self-defense and regards all war as 'a defeat for humanity'. This seeming paradox can be explained by the fact that what is a theoretically just use of force (according to the criteria of just war theory) inevitably results in unjust violence when carried out in practice. The undertaking, processes and practices of war are highly susceptible to what Augustine called the libido dominandi. The theory of just war is carried forward in institutions of actual war-making that foster escalation, discourage restraint, and adapt the theory itself to accommodate increasing violence. 'Just war' fails to embody the social and institutional virtue of justice. Thus, as Pope Francis exhorts, the Christian ethics of war and peace should prioritize the theory of just peace and the cultivation of peacebuilding dispositions, practices, and institutions. These strategies favor justice, but success is not guaranteed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1983 the US bishops issued a deeply influential pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, which addressed moral questions of warfare, particularly in the context of the Cold War. Four decades later, it is clear that the challenge to build just and peaceful societies is still with us in the US and throughout the world. This article supports the development of new documents—whether episcopal or papal—to center nonviolence in Catholic teaching, to demonstrate the value and efficacy of active nonviolence in working toward a just peace, and to clarify the relationship between nonviolence and the just war tradition. It makes suggestions as to how such a document might be rooted in the Christian tradition and discipleship, and what issues must urgently be addressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the doctrinal status of just war in the contemporary teaching of the Catholic magisterium. Some passages from Pope Francis's 2020 encyclical Fratelli tutti, On Fraternity and Social Friendship appear to exclude the just war idea from the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. To gauge whether this is so, the article establishes a baseline comparison to the seminal teaching of Thomas Aquinas on peace and just war. Both St. Thomas and Pope Francis proceed from the assumption that "war" designates a sinful violation of peace. They appear to differ, however, on the question whether a positive meaning should be ascribed to the Roman term bellum justum. To understand if this divergence is purely verbal or involves a substantive disagreement, I consider why Pope Francis's predecessors have (since the mid-twentieth century) abstained from employing the expression "just war" in their official documents. Finally, Pope Francis's emphatic statement that St. Augustine 'forged a concept of "just war" that we no longer uphold in our own day' is interpreted in light of the passage from his Epistle 229 to Darius that Francis references in Fratelli tutti. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eastern Churches in Russia and Ukraine are facing the fratricidal war caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These Churches maintain closeness in faith and liturgy. The similarities of these Churches' teachings on war are juxtaposed with actual manifestations of their hierarchs' hostility. The analysis will be carried out from the perspective of the Roman Catholic Church, which is in close unity with the Eastern Churches and understands the context of faith but is not a party to the conflict, which makes it easier to remain objective in examining the phenomenon of fratricide. The first part of the article analyses the doctrinal and historical context. It helps to isolate the factors influencing the existence of enmity between doctrinally close Churches. The second part presents the biblical inspiration of Cain and Abel's story in a search for new ways to counteract this phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article revisits some of the main tenets and problems of the Just Peace concept as developed in the German Protestant Church, showing how it is beset by incoherences, ironical returns of expanded violence, as well as the problem of abstraction: once the Just Peace concept is applied to concrete problems, it runs dry. The article then examines some recent contributions made under the wider umbrella of 'peace ethics', showing that attempts to combine the Just Peace and bellum iustum are bound to fail. It then retraces the present shift to Just War thinking that reorders the basic terms, whilst also retaining some of the tenets of the Just Peace approach. Some refinements of these developments are indicated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the question of the possibility of moral and ethical grounds for the justification of the use of violence in modern times international conflicts. And specifically, how does the tradition of just war fit into this discussion? For this, a closer look at what just war thinking means is necessary. In this respect we would describe just war thinking more as a just war tradition than a just war theory, as there is no encompassing theory on just war. In history you see a development from the justification of war to a more problematic relation to the possibility of the use of military force. This can be illustrated by the more recent shift from just war thinking towards just peace thinking. This leads to the question: what kind of peace? We argue in this article that peace and justice are connected, and that you cannot have true peace without true justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article grapples with the justifiability of nuclear deterrence in the aftermath of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Disillusioned about the failed promise of nuclear disarmament, as well as other ethical issues inherent to nuclear weapons, Pope Francis has attached the immorality label not just to the use of the Bomb but also to its very possession. This step, which his predecessors hesitated to take during the Cold War and the quarter of a century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, has received considerable attention. However, these assessments precede the war against Ukraine. Given that the regime of Vladimir Putin has repeatedly made nuclear threats in the context of this war, and a Cold War 2.0 of sorts has returned, there is reason to reappraise Francis's argument on nuclear weapons for a post-2022 era. I argue with regret that in light of the contemporary security environment it would be a sign of irresponsible statecraft to abandon the nuclear deterrent unilaterally. At the same time, I hold that a renewed and genuine effort needs to be made not just to avoid nuclear war but to create a culture that one day will lead to complete nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have often focused on the doctrinal and canonical reasons for the lack of a just war tradition in the Eastern Orthodox Church. The consensus seems to be that the Eastern Orthodox Church, for historical as well as theological reasons, has never developed a doctrine for the justification or the containment of war but was rather orientated to the question of peace (albeit without being pacifist) and the theological imperative of deification. There is, however, another reason why just war concerns never found fertile ground in Eastern Orthodoxy. Byzantine political theology carried an anarchistic theocratic dynamic that remained in tension with any effort to sanctify the Empire or its martyrs. Such a perspective has more in common (without being identical) with conceptualisations of just peace or just war as a tradition of ethical restraint on war rather than as a doctrine for the moral justification or legitimation of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades the papal tradition has renounced the term 'war' as something around which to build an ethical approach. One can sympathize with this: resort to war seems the consequence of ethical failure and brings in its train a host of brutalities including rape, torture, and murder that harm both victims and perpetrators. But that view of 'war' is an incomplete representation of the possibilities of the uses of force to secure legitimate political goods. Thus the popes have struggled to maintain a clear voice in the face of abject tragedies like the Russian invasion of Ukraine: on the one hand, Pope Francis condemns war in an almost absolute manner; on the other, he recognizes the legitimacy of Ukrainian defensive uses of force. In so doing, of course, he merely abides the so-called 'just war theory' he seems to have discarded. My contribution will focus on the current state of the just war in Catholic teaching. I will maintain the state remains where it has been since at least the middle of the twentieth century: skeptical about the capacity of states to judge in terms of international law, but cognizant of their right to defend themselves against ongoing aggression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine how the proportionality principle shapes state responses to a cyberattack. I do so by investigating variation in the effects of the principle of proportionality on the state response. The variation accounts for four types of state response. First, if states respond to a first strike in a proportionate manner, they are in compliance with the principle, and attackers are likely to take it as an indication of willingness to honor the principle. Second, states may react to attackers with an excessive response in violation of the principle, which would force attackers to react as or more harshly. Third, states may accidentally make a proportionate response when they in fact seek to impose excessive harm on attackers. Finally, states may generate an excessive response by error when they in fact seek to comply with the principle. Related Articles: Glen, Carol. 2021. "Norm Entrepreneurship in Global Cybersecurity." Politics & Policy 49(5): 1121–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12430. Glen, Carol M. 2014. "Internet Governance: Territorializing Cyberspace?" Politics & Policy 42(5): 635–57. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12093/full. Zeng, Jinghan, Tim Stevens, and Yaru Chen. 2017. "China's Solution to Global Cyber Governance: Unpacking the Domestic Discourse of 'Internet Sovereignty.'" Politics & Policy 45(3): 432–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12202. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The escalation of ecclesial and religio-political conflicts since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has further complicated the convoluted ecclesial situation in Ukraine and has been addressed in a series of sermons, formal statements and documents issued by senior Russian and Ukrainian ecclesiastical figures. Their ideological and theological rhetoric demonstrates the active participation of senior Russian Orthodox clerics in the justification of the Russian military effort which represents some radical ruptures in Eastern Orthodox ecclesial involvement in war-making and mobilisation. The Moscow Patriarchate's war-legitimisation stances and policies have major repercussions for the current debates on and reconceptions of the Christian just-war tradition in the frameworks of just peace, peacebuilding and reconciliation, as well as the potential key role of Christian religious actors in these processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars look to early modern canonical texts to understand the philosophical underpinnings of R2P. Meanwhile, critiques argue these origins couch Western imperial intentions. This article complicates the story by returning to a pivotal historical moment – the Spanish encounter with the Aztecs – to explore protective war from an overlooked angle: that of Spain's indigenous allies, the Tlaxcaltecas. Despite being oppressed by the imperialistic Aztecs, canonical Western texts related to R2P and post-colonial critiques both elide the Tlaxcaltecas' precarious agency – the rights and duties moulded by endemic structures of violence before, during, and after protective intervention – by problematically embracing simple binaries of European oppressor and indigenous oppressed. Restoring the Tlaxcaltecas to the story complicates tropes about imperial projections of force and the pervasive assumption in R2P discussions of the 'innocent oppressed'. Our conclusions provide new perspective from which to view future Pillar 3 dilemmas by recognising that the protected sometimes have a bellicose role to play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text discusses the theory of the just war, which was formed in the tradition of Western political thought and reflected in the institutional structure of international relations that emerged after the Second World War. The six principles of jus ad bellum, which are generally held to be the key principles of just war theory, are discussed first. It transpires that these principles were formulated on the basis of the experience of classic military conflicts between sovereign states. The possibility of their revision is then discussed in connection with the new types of military conflicts that have emerged in the meantime, whether this is the wars that occurred in the last century during decolonization, the more recent war on terrorism, or the various hybrid conflicts of the present-day.

This essay addresses the likelihood of "success" in two dimensions: (1) success in war and (2) success on the battlefield. The terms "war" and "battle" are often used interchangeably and the men and women who won the battles are often told that the war was lost. As a polity discusses the Just War Tradition (JWT) in relationship to a forthcoming war, the term "success" is squishy, malleable, quantifiable only in comparative terms, and politically charged. The definition of battles is the win and loss of men, material, and moral. These can be measured. The two terms should not be used carelessly, and the relationship between the two needs to be more carefully considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The criterion of "reasonable likelihood of success" clearly depends on a reasonable definition of success. This article suggests three such definitions and discusses these in light of the great uncertainty that accompanies any use of this forward-looking just war criterion. The importance of thorough understanding and knowledge, both military and cultural, in order for the application of the reasonable likelihood criterion to be meaningful is also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that it may be time to abandon the likelihood of success principle, a relative newcomer to the just war tradition. First, I am unconvinced of the normative value of the concept, especially when applied to states participating in defensive wars. Second, and more pragmatically, our lack of knowledge about what determines the outcomes and durations of wars, the application of a scientific-sounding concept to what is essentially a judgment of art may distort our moral reasoning. Estimating the chance that a particular war (or use of force) will generate the outcomes one hopes for is fiendishly difficult, and to be accurate, requires a knowledge of military and political science that few theorists possess. In its current form, the likelihood of success principle serves to reify existing power disparities and to render defensive wars apparently illegitimate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The trouble with Likelihood of Success is that it appears to be little more than a rehash of what seems obvious: do not go to war if you do not have much of a chance to win. Is this a distinctive or helpful contribution to contemporary just war thinking? I argue in this essay that while it might be better to simply jettison the term, some considerations of success are not just prudential in that narrow sense of the term. How we think of "success" and the likelihood of achieving it matters significantly to how we think about other elements of jus ad bellum. Success is not just about winning. It is about winning in the right way for the right end. Still, I suggest that it is not clear what "Likelihood of Success" does for those in political authority already inclined to think about war in any sort of rational and even moral way. I suggest we consider discarding Likelihood of Success and instead consider what I am calling "Likely Consequences." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Offense dominance in cyberspace is taken by many as a given. However, this is not a consensus position, with several scholars arguing that cyberattacks that produce meaningful kinetic effects on their prescribed targets are enormously costly and painstakingly slow. This poses an issue at the nexus of Just War Theory's likelihood of success and discrimination doctrines. Initiating (or escalating) a conflict should only occur if the initiator has a reasonable likelihood of success. That success may be made more likely by overlooking the requirement that weapons be able to discriminate between targets and non-targets, especially under circumstances in which time is of the essence. Furthermore, even if non-target systems are not destroyed, their infection can facilitate the discovery of a cyberweapon, inspiring copycat weapons and attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Did the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II meet the military necessity and likelihood of success criteria of the Just War Theory? Many scholars and ethicists have argued that they did not. We examine the decision through the rationalist models of war preferred by international relations theorists. We introduce a simple version of the bargaining model of war and tease out its essential differences with the models of war (and, therefore, military necessity) used by most Just War Theorists. Then, we reconstruct the decision to drop the bomb on Japan, focusing especially on information states, preference sets, and operational realities, to show that, if the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki does not meet military necessity and likelihood of success criteria, no other kind of military activity can. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article makes an argument about the right place of the likelihood of success principle in just war thinking. Its analysis is grounded in a neoclassical reading of just war that is applied to the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. The article starts with an exploration of the status of the likelihood of success principle in contemporary just war thinking. Noting that the difficulty of applying this principle has been pointed out by various thinkers, the chapter adapts the distinction between the so-called deontological and prudential just war principles found in neoclassical just war thinking. This distinction holds that the deontological principles hold primary importance within the logic of just war, and the prudential principles, including likelihood of success, are of secondary importance only. The article continues with an assessment of the practical implications of this distinction by applying it to two different types of warfare, namely so-called "wars of necessity" and "wars of choice." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the special themed issue on likelihood of success in the just war tradition introduces the problems associated with this prudential jus ad bellum principle, and summarizes the key findings and arguments of the articles in the issue. It concludes that the likelihood of success must be understood organically and cohesively, within the larger tradition, with a special emphasis on the practical applications for justice to which the just war is dedicated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are some provisions on the vassal's obligation to respond to the king's call to arms in the 13th century Hungarian legislation. In this paper we aim to compare the Hungarian legislation with the European ius commune on this subject, and we try to elucidate which were the sources of the Hungarian legislation in this regard. However, since these provisions are closely linked to the concept of just war, we look at what was considered a just war in the Middle Ages and what the implications of this classification were for the obligations of the vassals. After thorough analysis of the sources, the author made the cautious assumption that the Summa iuris feudorum of Jacobus de Ardizone was presumably the most important source of the Hungarian legislation on this issue of the feudal law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Saint Augustine stands as a towering figure within the history of Western philosophical thought, having crafted a unique and influential religious-philosophical paradigm that integrates diverse intellectual currents including Manichaeism, Neo-Platonism, ancient moral philosophies, and Christian theology. Through this syncretic approach, Augustine offers a comprehensive framework for understanding the human condition and the pursuit of spiritual fulfillment. Central to Augustine's philosophical edifice are a series of interwoven metaphysical concepts that form the backbone of his thought. These include the nature of divinity, the origins of the cosmos, the essence of the human soul, the problem of evil, and the nature of free will, etc. Augustine synthesizes these notions into a coherent vision of human existence, wherein individuals are guided towards a life of moral integrity and spiritual ascent. One of Augustine's distinctive insights is his conception of governance and rulership as divine mandates imbued with metaphysical significance. According to Augustine, earthly authorities are entrusted by God with the responsibility of protecting the faithful and upholding moral order within society. Consequently, he argues for the legitimacy of defensive warfare as a means of safeguarding the righteous against external threats. Furthermore, Augustine develops a nuanced epistemological stance to underpin his theological assertions, thus fortifying them against potential philosophical challenges. Through a qualitative inquiry grounded in secondary sources, this study seeks to elucidate the intricate interplay between metaphysical ideals and various aspects of human well-being, governmental legitimacy, and the moral justifications for defensive warfare. By exploring Augustine's intellectual legacy in depth, this research aims to shed light on the enduring relevance of his thought in contemporary philosophical discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The principle of non-combatant immunity was codified in the Code of International Lawand developed into an important foundation for the doctrine of just war, whose origins can be traced to themoral imperative of religious support. The doctrine advocates that persons deemed innocent should be protected from the threat of war, and it is the most widely recognized and deeply rooted moral constraint on the conduct of war. However, the principle of non-combatant immunity has not really deterred the outbreak of war, leaving the international community committed to utopian ideals. In the contemporary context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the principle of non-combatant immunity has been rendered ineffective as civilians are forced to be on the frontlines of both sides of the war. The principle of "just war" seems to have taken on a new basis, with self-defense becoming the pretext for justifying war, and the international community unable to rescue civilians from the flames of war amidst the outcry. There is an urgent need for the international community to re-examine and re-evaluate the immunity of non-combatants, and to limit the use of war as a "legitimate" means of resolving international conflicts. This article calls for a critical assessment of the normativity and effectiveness of the existing law on the principle of non-combatants, and a rethinking of how to construct a more rational and high-level principle to enhance the protection of non-combatants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study emerges within the context of revitalizing theories of just war in both Arab and Western thought, focusing on the Al-Aqsa flood and the genocide inflicted on the Gaza Strip. The study concludes that Western theories regarding just war are relativistic, varying depending on the conflict's location, suitable for one group of people but not for another. What affirm this is the absence of principles upon which just war theories are based from a Western perspective, which were lacking in Gaza. This absence led these theories to be constructed on a situational basis rather than on humanitarian principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studying the military thinking and military history of the Middle Ages, one can observe several forms of warfare ideologies. Three of these ideologies are the holy war ideology, the ideology of ordeal (or iudicium Dei), and the traditional just war theory. Every such ideology has the common characteristic of a stronger or weaker link to concepts of a Christian God, religion, or church. Beyond this common characteristic, the ideologies differ from each other in some key respects. The holy war ideology applies first and foremost the concept of God, traditional just war theory applies the concept of justice, and the ideology of ordeal relies on both the concepts of God and justice. This article presents the ideology of ordeal as a form of just war thinking, and describes its features through historical examples, through its essence, and in contrast to other ideologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay investigates the change in the Catholic attitude toward nuclear weapons as articulated by Pope Francis. Francis has generally followed the position of his immediate predecessors with regard to the Catholic teaching on just war. While the resort to armed force remains a morally justifiable option if the principles of just war have been met, the pope forcefully emphasises the tools of nonviolent peacebuilding. Recently, however, Francis made an original just war argument when he broke with the Church's established position on nuclear weapons. The pope declared both the use and possession of nuclear weapons "immoral" and, thus, abandoned the Church's reluctant acceptance of nuclear deterrence that had survived the end of the Cold War. In this essay, I analyse the rationale behind Francis's decision to break with nuclear deterrence, which is mainly grounded in the disillusionment about the failed promise of nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, I assess the impact of the new position with regard to Catholic soldiers serving in nuclear armed militaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, Asia presented a limit to the territorial expansion of the Hispanic Monarchy. On the shores of the Pacific, other regional and European powers prevailed. In Manila, the cohabitation with these others, identified as the Catholic king's enemies, crashed into the perception of the Spanish Crown's estrangement. The circulation of alterity discourses permitted the royal agents to bridge cultural distances with Indigenous and foreigners in the archipelago, as well as geographical distances with Monarchy authorities. The analysis and cross-referencing of the opinions of officials, religious and the king himself on the state of the Philippines and the feasible solution for their problems allows for reflection on the diverse frames of reference of the subjects whose interoceanic mobility activated the globalizing dynamics of the Early Modern Period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article raises some of the philosophical relations between Spain and Latin America from the 16th century to the 20th century. Against the narrative of current philosophical historiography, according to which Spain contributed nothing to modern philosophy, the article argues that the debates around the humanity of the American Indians and the just war contributed to expanding the idea of humankind to the time contributions were made to international law; Likewise, that the political philosophy of Francisco Suárez contributed to founding the idea of contractualism and social contract in modernity. Finally, it is argued that seen from America, the Spanish Enlightenment, Krausism and the contributions of Ortega y Gasset allowed the entry of Our America into European philosophical modernity and its tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay focuses primarily on the observations and insights of Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Ramsey, and Stanley Hauerwas regarding violence, just war, peace, and justice. Niebuhr emphasized the proximity of justice to agape ; however, due to the hindrance of sin, it is impossible for humanity to realize this moral ideal in history, and it thus requires the power to seek justice and peace. Ramsey expanded on Niebuhr's political realism and considered a "statecraft" that seeks to maintain a rightful order of justice. Hauerwas has expressed his criticism of political realism and the concept of just war, expounding on his pacifist thoughts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a religious studies methodology, this paper offers a detailed contextual mapping and a structural configuration of how collective violence is justified in Orthodox Christianity. The research design is explanatory, whereby the functional perspectives of doctrine, ethics and worship are all investigated and probed as phenomena of lived religion and orthopraxy. While predominantly initiatory and pedagogical, the paper also proposes a systematic platform for advanced research on this subject, by flagging contexts, themes and areas of inquiry that a researcher might examine in order to untangle the inner workings of the justification of violence in the mind of the Orthodox. Given the ongoing Russian War on Ukraine, relevant samples are drawn from this case. Contribution: This paper outlines the Orthodox Christian justification of violence from the perspectives of doctrine, ethics and ritual and identifies pivotal areas of ambiguity between orthodoxy and orthopraxy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article employs the LIM method, complemented by publications and interviews conducted during the ongoing war in Ukraine, to explore the shifts in attitudes toward war and peace within Ukrainian evangelical communities. This shift involves a transition from a pacifist mindset previously predominant among Ukrainian evangelicals to questions about their responsibility and involvement in Ukraine's state and society amid the war that Russia has launched against Ukraine. Interviews with leaders and active church members hint at a possible alignment with Stassen's alternative model of transformative initiatives that might provide potential guidance. While reconciliation initiatives amid the ongoing war may be premature, the article highlights the role of Christian communities in transformative peacebuilding within Ukraine. It is necessary to address tensions within Ukraine. This also entails aiding war-affected individuals, ensuring care for soldiers and civilians, and confronting power abuse and corruption. Ukraine's unity, freedom, peace, and reconciliation must include diverse political and social groups. The article recommends that Ukrainian evangelicals embrace a contextual public theology that advocates for peace, justice, and reconciliation. Ukrainian evangelicals, while supporting soldiers engaged in active combat against Russian invaders, are also contemplating strategies for active participation in peacebuilding and post-war reconstruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Friday, the 26-th of January, the International Court of Justice under the UN authority has pronounced a 15:2 verdict to accept the case of genocide introduced by South Africa against the state of Israel related to its actions in Gaza after the 7 October attack on Israel internationally recognised territory. The perspective of such a trial reopened debates about the right of self defense versus genocide, the proportionality in war, the just war theory, the thin line between combat and non-combat civilians in war time, intangibility and immunity of civilians in war zones as well as uses and abuses in war times, transforming lawfare tactics in combat strategies, the case of terrorist organisations in civilian crowded spaces, human shields and tactics of abduction, fighting an enemy with complete disrespect of war norms or conventional rules of engagement. Our case is the current Gaza war and the responsibility for choosing adequate legal, moral and legitimate objectives in war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

War is a " state of exception" that not only left an indelible mark on Levinas's life but confronts Levinas with a series of "hard questions" that pose a fundamental challenge to some of the most foundational tenets of his ethical metaphysics. Starting with the sole sustained consideration of war in Levinas's thought, the Preface of Totality and Infinity (TI), this study critically unpacks what it considers to be the three core questions or challenges posed by war: Firstly, the pivotal question raised in the Preface of TI: Does war not render ethics ineffective, as it does not just oppose but suspends this ethical relation? Secondly, the inquiry extends to the notion of a just war: If war indeed involves a suspension of morality, what normative basis can justify the idea of a just war? Thirdly, the complexity arises from the fact that the judgment required for considering a war just implies that the initial ethical relation, which exists prior to reflective thought and morality, cannot remain isolated from political considerations. How can we make sense of this seemingly impossible connection between ethics and politics in Levinas's thought or the apparent gap between ethics and justice in his philosophy? This paper concludes that a simple, either/or binary scheme cannot resolve the tension between the oxymoronic couplets (Totality/Infinity; War/Peace; Politics/Ethics) that pervade Levinas's thought. Instead, they appear to be inextricably linked in a Derridean double-bind of both/and that affirms that the ethical aspect of humanity is not an unwavering state but rather an ongoing struggle to combat the inhumanity associated with Totality, War, Politics, and even at times, "Justice." The burning issue of today of the justice/injustice of the Israel/Palestine war currently dividing the global citizenry is a testament to the fact that "Justice" constantly risks becoming unmoored from its ethical foundation in the necessary distinction between Neighbor and Enemy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an article that appeared in Volume XII (2002) of the IYIL, Benedetto Conforti discussed the quandary of "just wars" in contemporary international law, wondering whether – and on which conditions – wars conducted outside the UN framework can be considered "just". On that occasion, Conforti unearthed a thesis that he had decades prior put in writing in the first edition of his famous Manuale, according to which any use of force performed outside the UN Charter could not be evaluated legally, for it pertained to the realm of "legal indifference". He thus concluded that, when it comes to assessing the "justness" of wars, the answer can be given only by taking stock of moral considerations, that is by resorting to "natural law". The present contribution aims to appraise this provoking position expressed at the beginning of this millennium. It is argued that resort to the category of legal indifference must not be appraised from a purely philosophical standpoint, but rather in two complementary ways: first, as implying that the justness of any war cannot be decided on the basis of positive law; second, as a metalegal tool to comprehend and describe fundamental changes in the international community. Conforti's theory of legal indifference vis-à-vis the justness of wars maintains its fascinating quality and utility today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to identifying the factors that led to the formation of Western racism, neo-colonialism, embodied in global civilizational wars. The purpose of the article is to study the archetypal constructions rooted in the Abrahamic discourse, which determined the formation of the concept of “just war” and their connection with European-American racism, neo-colonialism. The relevance of this study is dictated by the state of permanent proxy war that Western civilization is waging against the rest of humanity for world domination; Russia has been at the epicenter of this war. In opposition to the West, our country lays claim to the global mission of establishing a just multipolar world order. The methodological basis of the study is a civilizational approach. Comparative, hermeneutic, exegetical, genetic, phenomenological, and logical methods were used. The study of biblical stories led to the conclusion that it was in the Old Testament era that God’s blessing took shape as a metaphysical justification for war and murder, the foundations were laid for the segregation of peoples along spiritual lines, the beginnings of racial theories and the idea of God’s chosen people with the exclusive right to a “holy” war were formed. Christianity of the first centuries reduces the militaristic intensity, however, in the Roman-Christian and later in the Byzantine Empire, the concept of a just (God-blessed) war is revived again due to the need to protect the Christian empire from the infernal anti-empire; the criteria for legitimizing this war are its justice, adherence to the spiritual idea, personal piety. European racism receives a religious justification among the Anglo-Saxons during the period of colonization of the American continent. On the basis of Protestant attitudes (civilizational, military successes as a criterion of God’s blessing), contractual theology, the status of the United States as “new Israel” is formed, usurping the right to a “holy” war. The authors come to the conclusion that the depravity of the West determines its metaphysically determined doom, despite external civilizational successes. The findings of the study open up prospects for further consideration of the spiritual foundations of the holy (just) war.

Reinhold Niebuhr stands alone among many 20th century theorists of religion and politics for at once rejecting both the natural law tradition of just war, as well as the secular-rationalist tradition of his progressive contemporaries. Nowhere is his dual criticism more evident than in his critical stance on technology in war. For Niebuhr, technological advancements were not only inevitable, but sometimes necessary to develop in the face of advances from nefarious actors in world affairs. But using technologically advanced weapons risked destroying the moral authority of a nation by engaging in utilitarian calculus. Religious and military ethicists concerned with the integration of technological advancement in contemporary war would do well to consider Niebuhr’s thought and how it might be developed further in order to address the new concerns raised not only by modern tools such as drones, hypersonic weapons, and AI, but also by whatever yet to be developed technologies remain past the temporal horizons.