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Animal activists have continually criticized animal confinement throughout the United States. These criticisms have led to States implementing regulations relating to animal care, handling, research, and slaughter. State regulations were limited in scope and only affected in-state producers. This all changed, however, when California voters passed Proposition 12, which regulates animal confinement for any piece of pork sold within California's borders. Furthermore, Proposition 12 requires any piece of pork traveling through California to be labeled indicating whether the pork is compliant or not. By requiring out-of-state producers to comply with the California production requirements, Proposition 12 regulates beyond the state's borders. The Supreme Court in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 12, allowing its regulations to take effect. This paper analyzes the Supreme Court's decision and discusses the effects Proposition 12 will have on the United States pork industry., I. INTRODUCTION The Constitution limits states from regulating outside their borders by long-established precedent in the United States. (1) Furthermore, the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. [...]

I. INTRODUCTION Gone are the times where employers automatically chain workers to cubicles and bind them to regimented schedules motivated by corporate America. Modern jobs come with new and liberating [...]

[As the 2022 Supreme Court term waned, the press and public waited with trepidation or excitement for noteworthy cases that addressed important policy questions, including affirmative action, student loan forgiveness, and conflicts between religious freedom and gay rights. Fewer people shared the concerns of Civil Procedure scholars who anxiously awaited the Court's decision in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. For over a decade, the Court found that states violated due process in asserting personal jurisdiction over various defendants despite the lack of any meaningful burden on the defendant's ability to defend against claims in the plaintiff's choice of forum. Mallory raised concerns because of some of the Justices' questions during oral argument and because the Court did not issue its decision until the end of the term. This led to speculation that the Court was about to radically alter its due process analysis in personal jurisdiction cases based on the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. When the Court published Mallory, one could hear a collective sigh of relief. The Court found that the state court had jurisdiction based on its consent statute. But Mallory produced a good bit of head-scratching. The Court divided 5-4. The Justices did not split along the political line exposed in most of the Court's important decisions. Further, Justice Gorsuch wrote the lead opinion, but gained a majority for only part of his reasoning. This article explores what if? What if the Court adopted an originalist approach to personal jurisdiction? For example, this article explores whether an original understanding of personal jurisdiction makes sense given modern transportation, interstate commerce, and communication. It argues against incorporating the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis into personal jurisdiction and concludes that incorporation will reflect another attempt to favor defendants by closing the courthouse door to injured plaintiffs., TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT 217 TABLE OF CONTENTS 219 I. INTRODUCTION 220 II. MODERN DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS 225 III. MALLORY V. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO., DUE PROCESS AND 237 STRANGE [...]

On the subject of abortion, the so-called 'United' States of America are becoming more disunited than ever. The U.S. Supreme Court's precipitous decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization overturned the nationwide framework for abortion rights that had uneasily governed the country for fifty years. In the immediate aftermath of that decision, it is becoming increasingly clear that states governed by Republicans and those governed by Democrats are moving quickly and decisively in opposite directions. Since the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision, at least nineteen states have increased restrictions on abortion access, while at least twenty states and the District of Columbia have adopted new legal regimes focused on protecting the right to an abortion. These partisan and geographic divides create perhaps the biggest set of nationwide conflicts of law problems since the era of the Fugitive Slave Act before the Civil War. Indeed, practically every aspect of the new abortion legal landscape is now characterized by uncertainty, creating potential constitutional and federal preemption questions, state versus state conflicts of law issues, and new concerns based on various forms of private regulation related to abortion access. This Article seeks to provide a comprehensive survey of the current state of the law with regard to how such conflicts of law questions might be resolved in the abortion context. Part I surveys the widely divergent state laws being debated or enacted in the country in the wake of Dobbs. Part II discusses potential constitutional challenges to the extraterritorial application of these abortion statutes. If statutes criminalize or impose civil liability on the actual pregnant person seeking the abortion, such statutes might be challenged under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV specifically, or as a violation of the constitutional right to travel more generally. Alternatively, if statutes seek to impose criminal or civil penalties on out-of-state healthcare providers or other actors, those statutes may be vulnerable to a challenge under the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8. Part III turns to potential federal preemption of state anti-abortion laws under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act or the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act. Part IV addresses the question of whether states can impose civil liability on out-of-state acts or actors--even beyond the right to travel and Commerce Clause concerns--focusing on the classic conflicts of law doctrines of jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgment recognition. Finally, Part V considers the activities of private actors as sources of regulatory authority that create conflicts questions. We discuss the degree to which a state may prevent employers from covering abortion-related expenses as part of their health insurance plans, the privacy concerns that arise when private actors collect data that might be used in criminal prosecutions or civil suits regarding abortions, and the possibility that private religious groups might invoke the First Amendment to claim exemptions from state anti-abortion laws., INTRODUCTION 401 I. THE NEW ABORTION LEGAL LANDSCAPE 406 A. The Anti-Abortion States 407 B. The Pro-Access States 412 C. Practical Impacts 413 II. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL ABORTION 416 [...]

Originalism has become a dominant jurisprudential theory on the Supreme Court. But a large number of precedents are inconsistent with the Constitution's original meaning and overturning them risks creating enormous disruption to the legal order. This article defends a prospective overruling approach that would harmonize precedent with originalism's rise and reduce the disruption from overrulings. Under prospective overruling, the Court declares that an existing statute violates the original meaning but will continue to be enforced because declaring it unconstitutional would produce enormous costs; however, future statutes of this type will be voided as unconstitutional. Under our approach, the Court would employ a rule-based doctrine for gradually returning our constitutional law to the original meaning without upsetting the reliance interests that stare decisis rightly protects. While originalists, like Justice Scalia, have been extremely critical of the prospective overruling that the Warren Court used to implement its constitutional revolution, we here defend an approach to prospective overruling that would avoid these originalist criticisms. We show that prospective overruling is a legitimate form of the common law of precedent and thus encompassed by the judicial power. We also show that prospective overruling is not dictum that runs afoul of the Constitution's case-or- controversy requirement. In many cases, the substantive constitutional question is so intertwined with the question of precedent that a decision on a provision's original meaning is necessary to decide the stare decisis issue. In other cases, the resolution of the substantive question should be treated as a holding, even if not strictly necessary to the result, because the question was answered using a method that appears designed to resolve the case. We then illustrate how and when prospective overruling should be applied by reference to cases involving the Commerce Clause and the nondelegation doctrine., Introduction I. Precedent as a Common-Law Rule and the Trade-Off Between Originalism and Reliance A. The Problem of Precedent B. The Trade-Off Between Originalism and Reliance Interests C. The Scope [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE REMOVAL POWER II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE III. THE ASSAULT ON CHEVRON AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION A. The Erosion [...]

INTRODUCTION Uber and Lyft are the two largest examples of what are colloquially known as ride-share companies. (1) Put simply, these companies operate by connecting ride share drivers ('Drivers') with [...]

I. INTRODUCTION '[W]ine,' Thomas Jefferson once said, '[is] a necessary of life with me.' (1) The French Ambassador turned president spent well over $365,000 in today's currency on imported wines [...]

Despite over 200 years of deliberation and debate, the United States has not adopted a federal corporate chartering law. Instead, Delaware is the 'Federal Option' for corporate law and adjudication. The contemporary federal corporate chartering debate is, in part, a referendum on its role. Although the federal government has regulated other aspects of interstate commerce and has the power to charter corporations and preempt Delaware pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, it has not done so. Despite the rich and robust scholarly discussion of Delaware's jurisdictional dominance, its role as a de facto national regulator remains underdeveloped. This Article addresses a vexing question: Can Delaware, a haven for incorporation and adjudication, serve as an effective national regulator? Following an analysis of federal chartering alternatives, such as the Nader Plan, the Warren Plan, the Sanders Plan, and other modes of regulation, the answer is yes, but with some caveats and qualifications. Delaware's adequate, if imperfect, performance as a surrogate national regulator of corporate internal affairs argues against the upheaval of the existing corporate law framework federal chartering would bring. Even in the contemporary moment where longstanding concerns about corporate power, purpose, accountability, and the uneasy relationship between corporations and society are amplified, Delaware can continue to perform an important agency- like role in collaboration with federal regulators and regulated firms. A deeper examination comparing the merits of federal corporate chartering with Delaware's de facto agency function illuminates the potential of existing and future reforms. This Article concludes that federal chartering proposals have an important impact despite not being adopted for centuries. First, federal chartering proposals encourage policymakers to look beyond the status quo toward greater hybridization in regulatory design. Second, elements of previous federal chartering proposals have historically become successful 'a la carte' reforms or part of other successful reform measures. Third, federal chartering proposals provide value as a bargaining tool where the threat of more intrusive federal regulation makes other reform methods more palatable to diverse corporate constituencies., INTRODUCTION I. DELAWARE AS A DE FACTO AGENCY A. Corporate Lawmakers B. Delaware's Institutional Dynamics C. Federal Lawmaking D. The Agency Analogy II. THE FEDERAL CHARTERING DEBATE A. The Recurrence [...]