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Machine learning models trained on tabular data are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, even in realistic scenarios where attackers have access only to the model's outputs. Researchers evaluate such attacks by considering metrics like success rate, perturbation magnitude, and query count. However, unlike other data domains, the tabular domain contains complex interdependencies among features, presenting a unique aspect that should be evaluated: the need for the attack to generate coherent samples and ensure feature consistency for indistinguishability. Currently, there is no established methodology for evaluating adversarial samples based on these criteria. In this paper, we address this gap by proposing new evaluation criteria tailored for tabular attacks' quality; we defined anomaly-based framework to assess the distinguishability of adversarial samples and utilize the SHAP explainability technique to identify inconsistencies in the model's decision-making process caused by adversarial samples. These criteria could form the basis for potential detection methods and be integrated into established evaluation metrics for assessing attack's quality Additionally, we introduce a novel technique for perturbing dependent features while maintaining coherence and feature consistency within the sample. We compare different attacks' strategies, examining black-box query-based attacks and transferability-based gradient attacks across four target models. Our experiments, conducted on benchmark tabular datasets, reveal significant differences between the examined attacks' strategies in terms of the attacker's risk and effort and the attacks' quality. The findings provide valuable insights on the strengths, limitations, and trade-offs of various adversarial attacks in the tabular domain, laying a foundation for future research on attacks and defense development.

This report presents a comparative analysis of open-source vulnerability scanners for conversational large language models (LLMs). As LLMs become integral to various applications, they also present potential attack surfaces, exposed to security risks such as information leakage and jailbreak attacks. Our study evaluates prominent scanners - Garak, Giskard, PyRIT, and CyberSecEval - that adapt red-teaming practices to expose these vulnerabilities. We detail the distinctive features and practical use of these scanners, outline unifying principles of their design and perform quantitative evaluations to compare them. These evaluations uncover significant reliability issues in detecting successful attacks, highlighting a fundamental gap for future development. Additionally, we contribute a preliminary labelled dataset, which serves as an initial step to bridge this gap. Based on the above, we provide strategic recommendations to assist organizations choose the most suitable scanner for their red-teaming needs, accounting for customizability, test suite comprehensiveness, and industry-specific use cases., Comment: 15 pages, 11 figures

Object detection models, which are widely used in various domains (such as retail), have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Existing methods for detecting adversarial attacks on object detectors have had difficulty detecting new real-life attacks. We present X-Detect, a novel adversarial patch detector that can: i) detect adversarial samples in real time, allowing the defender to take preventive action; ii) provide explanations for the alerts raised to support the defender's decision-making process, and iii) handle unfamiliar threats in the form of new attacks. Given a new scene, X-Detect uses an ensemble of explainable-by-design detectors that utilize object extraction, scene manipulation, and feature transformation techniques to determine whether an alert needs to be raised. X-Detect was evaluated in both the physical and digital space using five different attack scenarios (including adaptive attacks) and the COCO dataset and our new Superstore dataset. The physical evaluation was performed using a smart shopping cart setup in real-world settings and included 17 adversarial patch attacks recorded in 1,700 adversarial videos. The results showed that X-Detect outperforms the state-of-the-art methods in distinguishing between benign and adversarial scenes for all attack scenarios while maintaining a 0% FPR (no false alarms) and providing actionable explanations for the alerts raised. A demo is available.