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In 2021, Congress passed and President Biden signed a major, but temporary, reform to the Child Tax Credit (CTC). Among other reforms to the credit, the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) made it available to non-workers on the same basis as workers. Attempts to make this reform permanent foundered, in part, due to opposition from policymakers who worried that the new credit would lead workers to withdraw from the labor force and otherwise discourage work. These concerns drew strength from a working paper by a team of economists at the University of Chicago, published that fall, that predicted that making the ARPA CTC permanent would lead nearly 1.5 million parents to leave employment, most of them lower-income single mothers. (Corinth et al., 2021/22) Critics of the paper have focused on the assumptions its authors made about the sensitivity of single mothers' employment decisions to changes in work incentives. Debate has revolved around the magnitude of a labor supply elasticity specifying the percentage change in employment for a given percentage change in the return to work. Supporters of the ARPA CTC have charged that the elasticity assumed by Corinth et al. for low-income single mothers, 0.75, is too large and stands in contrast to the available evidence. No critic has been more dogged than Jacob Bastian, who, in a series of working papers has used multiple research strategies to arrive at the conclusion that the true elasticity for low-income single mothers is around 0.40. If true, the implication is that several hundred thousand fewer low-income single mothers than predicted by Corinth et al. would leave employment, and therefore child poverty would fall by more than Corinth et al. estimated. This paper critiques four distinct Bastian critiques of Corinth et al. (Bastian 2022, 2023, 2024, and forthcoming) I find selective citation of the literature, unjustified assumptions, mismeasured concepts, and, most importantly, analytic errors. Strikingly, while Bastian concludes in each case that the Corinth et al. elasticity of 0.75 is much too high, after correcting his problems, all four of the papers reinforce the Corinth et al. elasticity. At the time of this writing, the evidence we have is entirely consistent with Corinth et al.'s assumption about the sensitivity of single mothers' work decisions to work incentives. I estimate that their paper implies that about 650,000 low-income single mothers would leave employment if the ARPA CTC were made permanent. That does not include other single mothers, single fathers, and married parents that would leave employment. Policymakers must beware of the unintended consequences of reforms to the CTC. In fall of 2021, near the climax of the debate over President Biden's Build Back Better agenda and its expanded child tax credit (CTC) proposal, Kevin Corinth, Bruce Meyer, Matthew Stadnicki, and Derek Wu released a working paper arguing that the expanded CTC would cause nearly 1.5 million parents to exit the workforce (Corinth et al., 2021, revised 2022). The paper proved highly influential and contributed to the defeat of Build Back Better. As the debate over an expanded CTC has continued since that fall, economist Jacob Bastian has emerged as the biggest critic of the Corinth et al. paper. In no fewer than four distinct papers, Bastian has argued that the Corinth et al. study is flawed because it assumes that parents' employment decisions are too sensitive to changes in the pay-off to working. But a careful review of the methods in each paper reveals that after correcting a number of computational errors and faulty assumptions, all four papers reinforce the conclusions of Corinth et al. The CTC expansion that inspired this empirical debate was a temporary policy change in 2021 that made the same CTC available for all but upper-income families, regardless of whether they incurred any income tax liability or had earnings. Since this reform removed features of the CTC that encouraged work--including an earnings requirement and a phase-in that, up to a point, increased the size of the credit as a parent received more earnings--the expected result would be that some parents would choose to work less or not to work at all. There are two reasons for this prediction. First, as parents receive more income, they 'spend' some of it on additional leisure. If you can earn the same amount by working fewer hours, you might decide to hold constant your income and work less. Second, the payoff to working more--or working at all--changes when the work-promoting features of the CTC are removed, and so some people will choose to work less or not at all. It is the increased incentive to not work at all due to the lower payoff to working that has been the focus of the debate--the so-called 'substitution effect on the extensive margin.' At the heart of the matter is a deceptively simple equation. When a policy changes that affects work decisions, it alters the 'return to work'--the payoff to working instead of not working. If workers are sensitive enough to changes in the return to work, they may choose to leave the workforce. Estimating the size of this group involves multiplying three numbers together: the average across workers of the percentage change in their returns to work, the percentage change in employment for a given percentage change in the return to work (the labor supply 'elasticity'), and the number of workers in the group. The first and third numbers may be estimated directly from data. The elasticity is also based on empirical analyses of data, but typically, researchers assume an elasticity based on their read of the labor economics literature. Bastian's work has suffered from issues with all three components of the equation. In this paper, I focus on the estimates for EITC-eligible single mothers. I do so for three reasons. First, they constitute a large fraction of the population that might be affected by the expansion of the CTC in question. Second, comparing the methods in the Corinth et al. paper and Bastian's papers is more feasible for this group given what the authors provide for methodological detail and evidence. Third, no one has yet determined a satisfactory way to model the effects of a CTC expansion on married parents, given that they make work decisions jointly., Paper One: 'How Would a Permanent 2021 Child Tax Credit Expansion Affect Poverty and Employment?' Forthcoming, National Tax Journal. Previous drafts include earlier versions with that title from 2022 and [...]