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We conduct a global, large- N analysis of proportionality in the partisan distribution of cabinet portfolios. Formulated in the context of postwar Western European parliamentary democracy, Gamson's Law predicts that parties joining a coalition government will receive cabinet ministries in direct proportion to the seats they are contributing to the coalition on the floor of the legislature. Using a sample of 1551 country-years of coalitional government in 97 countries from 1966 to 2019, and comparing all main constitutional formats (parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential), we find that Gamson's Law does not travel well outside its context of origin. Among the constitutional predictors of cabinet proportionality, we find that pure presidentialism is a major outlier, with an exaggerated form of formateur advantage. Introducing party-system and assembly-level predictors to the debate, we find that party institutionalization tends to increase fairness in portfolio allocation within parliamentary systems only. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special collection is devoted to cabinet reshuffles, which are understood as personnel-related changes within the lifetime of a cabinet. Scholars agree that cabinet reshuffles matter in many respects. To begin, they may shape intra-governmental relations, by either intensifying or helping solve cabinet conflicts. Further, they are important instruments for party leaders to promote or demote party representatives, with far-reaching possible consequences for the party and beyond. Last but not least, reshuffles may be used to increase governmental efficiency and often trigger policy change. The ever-increasing personalization of politics has fuelled the public interest in any ministerial personnel-related issues, and turned cabinet reshuffles into events of undisputed political and scholarly relevance. Despite the apparent importance and ubiquity of reshuffles, the international literature displays at least two major flaws: first, a lack of systematic comparison across countries and regimes and second, a strong notional and empirical bias towards Westminster democracies. This collection seeks to overcome these weaknesses and their limiting effects on the knowledge and understanding of key aspects of executive politics and executive–legislative relations. With that aim, it gathers novel comparative research on the different types, causes and effects of cabinet reshuffles in a variety of democratic and authoritarian systems. The theoretical approaches and empirical findings of the six articles featured mark a major contribution to the scholarship on political executives and executive elites in the contemporary world. This introductory piece offers a succinct historical overview of cabinet reshuffles in different contexts, and the study thereof. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/context: Party recruitment is a crucial governance tool in contemporary democracies. Presidential and parliamentary heads of government distribute ministerial portfolios to party members in exchange for essential political resources, such as legislative support. This article explores the relationship between government formation and political parties, with parties that are not very institutionalized. In particular, it examines the extent to which arguments about presidential cabinet formation hold up when the hierarchical level of party ministers is considered. Methodology: This statistical study uses a generalized linear model (GLM) with a binomial distribution and a logit link function with robust standard errors. It aims to carry out causality exploration to test the original indicators of the proposed dependent variables. Conclusions: Hierarchy and partisan powers are relevant factors to complement existing explanations of ministerial recruitment strategies. Originality: Comparative research on government formation and its connection to political parties has made significant progress, focusing on the distinction between ministers affiliated and not affiliated with a party. However, this dichotomous approach neglects consideration of the hierarchical position within the party structure, a fundamental aspect of the governing party model underlying parliamentary democracies. This article presents a trichotomous measure that considers the hierarchical level of ministers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/context: Party recruitment is a crucial governance tool in contemporary democracies. Presidential and parliamentary heads of government distribute ministerial portfolios to party members in exchange for essential political resources, such as legislative support. This article explores the relationship between government formation and political parties, with parties that are not very institutionalized. In particular, it examines the extent to which arguments about presidential cabinet formation hold up when the hierarchical level of party ministers is considered. Methodology: This statistical study uses a generalized linear model (GLM) with a binomial distribution and a logit link function with robust standard errors. It aims to carry out causality exploration to test the original indicators of the proposed dependent variables. Conclusions: Hierarchy and partisan powers are relevant factors to complement existing explanations of ministerial recruitment strategies. Originality: Comparative research on government formation and its connection to political parties has made significant progress, focusing on the distinction between ministers affiliated and not affiliated with a party. However, this dichotomous approach neglects consideration of the hierarchical position within the party structure, a fundamental aspect of the governing party model underlying parliamentary democracies. This article presents a trichotomous measure that considers the hierarchical level of ministers.

Not all governments survive until the next scheduled election. Some are replaced during their term in office by executives with a different party composition and/or portfolio distribution. Others are able to be 'reborn' as the successor government, undergoing only minimal changes. Such variation has to date received scant attention in studies on government durability. By classifying non-electoral replacements according to the degree of ministerial turnover, this article shows that new cabinets are often similar to their predecessors. It hypothesises that the likelihood of this pattern occurring is greater: when members of the current cabinet face bargaining problems in forming a very different cabinet, as in the case of surplus (unnecessary) parties in oversized coalitions; when the policy distance between the parliamentary median party and the current opposition widens; and when the executive's economic performance discourages opposition parties from forming new coalitions with some incumbent parties. The risk of experiencing different types of replacement is estimated using data on Western European cabinets (1946–2021). Consistent with the hypotheses, the results indicate that governments are able to return to power almost untouched after their termination if they are oversized, if the opposition is far from the legislative median voter, and if inflation grows during a government's tenure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After leadership changes, how do new leaders recast the composition of their surrounding elites to ensure support and secure their tenure? Using original data on African cabinets, this article contributes to the debate on leaders' survival with new theoretical inputs and empirical evidence about senior level changes new leaders introduce after assuming office to ensure a longer and more stable tenure. The article concentrates primarily on leaders emerged from an under-theorized and yet frequent type of leadership change, which is neither violent nor electoral, such as after a predecessor's resignation. Because these leaders lack the authority generally granted, albeit through different means, by electoral and violent takeovers, the article builds on regime cycle frameworks to develop a sequential interpretation of elite management for such hybrid types which is distinct from both violence-born and electoral regimes. The comparative analysis of two recent such cases in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe empirically illustrates how the timing and sequencing of post-change elite management eventually affect leadership stability over time. These findings ultimately reinforce the view that the survival debate needs to dilute its focus on leaders as the organizing principles of regimes, and instead concentrate on wider senior elite coalitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To explore what we call the 'European art of governing', this article examines the Cabinets of the members of the European Commission. They function at the interface between levels and modes of governance, between the Commission and Member State governments, between national interests (of capitals) and sectoral interests (their portfolios). A new interpretation of the 'denationalization' process is given, focusing more on profiles than on practices. Cabinets have been remarkably stable since the end of the 1960s in their role as conduits of collegiality. However they also reflect a new form of 'intergovernmentalization' of the Commission. Using a historical and sociological approach, the article shows how collegiality at the Commission has been exercised since the Delors period of presidentialization and Juncker's introduction of real Vice-Presidents, generating complex forms of competition between horizontal and vertical coordination processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the effect of ministers' exposure to periods of low presidential approval in Brazil and Chile between 1990 and 2014. Approval is explored with quarterly estimates using a dyad-ratios algorithm and merged into a time-dependent cabinet data set to evaluate individual ministerial terminations (N = 4245). The empirical strategy combines time-varying exposure Cox regressions with observational data and propensity score and matching to estimate the effect of low approval on ministerial survival and perform a moderation analysis with three profiles associated with presidential strategies: (1) nonpartisan ministers to limit agency loss and moral hazard; (2) economists as ministers to optimise cabinet performance and send positive signals to the electorate; and (3) party leaders as ministers to optimise legislative support. The main findings show that risk increases by 135.1% in periods of low approval. In addition, approximately only one in five nonpartisan ministers is removed compared to party members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Retos: Nuevas Perspectivas de Educación Física, Deporte y Recreación is the property of Federacion Espanola de Asociaciones de Docentes de Educacion Fisica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Although cabinets in the European Commission have attracted considerable interest, scholarly attention has mainly focused on their composition and influence. How the status of cabinets or the relations between them have changed over time, and how cabinets have been affected by changes to the wider institutional environment, has gone largely unexamined. This article takes a step towards filling that gap. It argues that, despite apparent stability in the functions that cabinets perform, the cabinet system has undergone a quiet transformation. A new differentiation has created hierarchical relations within the cabinet system, with implications for policy coordination and output. Using historical institutionalist theory, the article shows that Commission cabinets have been affected less by reforms addressed directly at them and more by internal rule change aimed at other parts of their institutional environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estado, Gobierno, Gestión Pública is the property of Revista Estado, Gobierno, Gestion Publica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

With the further deepening of ageing in China, the ageing-in-place model is gaining more and more attention. In order to improve the quality of home life of the elderly, this paper takes age-friendly cabinets as the research object, from the perspective of material design, and takes the visual/tactile experience of the elderly as the entry point, classifies the current market cabinet materials, and selects the test samples. The physical properties of the samples were examined and analysed with the subjective emotional changes that the elderly experience with different cabinet materials. The objective physical properties of the cabinet materials were correlated with the visual/tactile subjective emotional factors, and through subjective tests and mathematical and statistical methods, an evaluation model of "visual/tactile subjective emotional factors—objective physical properties of materials" was established for the selection of materials in age-friendly cabinet design. It provides scientific guidance for the selection of materials in age-appropriate cabinet design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

All autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this assumption has never been tested in a global analysis. Furthermore, little is known about whom dictators target in such purges. This article focuses on the highest levels of the regime, namely, cabinet ministers. Using a new global data set, our analysis covers over 23,000 cabinet members in 115 autocracies from 1967 to 2016. We demonstrate that failed coups induce autocrats to increasingly purge their cabinets and that they do so selectively by targeting higher-ranking cabinet members and those who hold strategic positions, while keeping more loyal and veteran ministers in posts. The article presents the most detailed individual-level evidence to date on purges and offers key insights into power-sharing mechanisms in autocracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ruler's ability to cope with crises is critical for authoritarian durability. Yet, the coping mechanism—the actual management strategies by which rulers confront crises—is largely treated as a black box. This study takes a step in addressing this problem by examining how rulers use their appointment powers to manage the crisis that is the aftermath of failed coups. I argue that the principle challenge of this period is that rulers cannot identify the opposition and to cope, they deliberately infuse the center of the regime with officials from the periphery to dilute and ultimately weaken the invisible enemy they confront. Using a novel dataset on the appointments of mid and high level officials over the course of 34 years in Ethiopia, I find that the ruler relied considerably on outside officials following the failed coup in 1960 in ways he never did before or after the event. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corruption is sustained by powerful male networks, reinforcing women's exclusion from politics. Yet, contrary to this conventional wisdom, we theorize that corruption can sometimes increase women's access to power. Since women are often perceived as "cleaner" than men, where institutions allow heads of government to be held accountable on economic issues, chief executives may use women's inclusion in high-profile posts to signal that they are curbing the abuse of public office for private gain. Examining upward of 150 countries over 16 years, we investigate whether and where corruption is linked to the presence of women finance ministers—a high-profile post capable of quelling economic malfeasance. We show that increases in corruption bolster women's presence, particularly in countries with free and fair elections and presidential systems. That our results hold only in contexts of high accountability suggests this relationship is not endogenous but reflects chief executives' efforts to preempt punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technocratic cabinets and expert, non-political ministers appointed in otherwise partisan cabinets have become a common reality in recent decades in young and older democracies, but we know little about how citizens see this change and what values, perceptions and experiences drive their attitudes towards technocratic government. The article explores the latter topic by drawing on recent comparative survey data from nine countries, both young and consolidated democracies from Europe and Latin America. Two individual-level characteristics trigger particularly strong support for the replacement of politicians with experts: low political efficacy and authoritarian values. They are complemented by a third, somewhat weaker factor: corruption perception. At the macro level, technocracy appeals to citizens of countries where the quality of democracy is deficient and where technocratic cabinets are a part of historical legacy. Surprisingly, civic activism and, partially, satisfaction with democracy enhance technocratic orientation, indicating such attitudes are not expressions of alienation or depoliticisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important decisions coalition partners make when forming a government is the division of ministries. Ministerial portfolios provide the party in charge with considerable informational and agenda-setting advantages, which parties can use to shape policies according to their preferences. Oversight mechanisms in parliaments play a central role in mitigating ministerial policy discretion, allowing coalition partners to control each other even though power has been delegated to individual ministers. However, we know relatively little about how such mechanisms influence the agenda-setting and gatekeeping powers of ministers and how much influence minister parties have on policy output relative to the government as a whole in different institutional settings. We fill this gap by analyzing original data on over 2000 important social and economic policy reform measures adopted in nine Western European countries over 20 years, based on a coding of more than 1200 country reports issued by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). We find that parliaments with strong oversight powers constrain the agenda-setting capacity of minister parties but have limited impact on their gatekeeping capacity. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of policy-making and democratic accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not all portfolios are equally important. But despite recognizing that the relative value of portfolios is central to government formation, the criteria that determine why certain portfolios are more important than others is rarely made explicit and justified. The lack of transparency about the criteria that determines the value of portfolios is particularly important where party institutionalization is low, where single-party governments are the norm and where non-partisan groups participate in government formation. In this article we develop a framework that proposes measuring portfolio salience based on four dimensions: the opportunities the portfolio offers its occupant to influence relevant public policies, to influence the governments political agenda, to distribute discretional resources, and to intervene in the functioning of other portfolios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the most important ministries in Honduras? And why are important ministries important? To answer these questions, this study offers an analysis of the importance of the Honduran ministerial portfolios from 1982 to 2020. For this, this study follows the theoretical proposal of Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo that suggests distinguishing four key dimensions (policy management public, discretionary allocation of resources, political capacity and organizational capacity). The findings of this research showed that the ministerial relevance in this country is linked to those portfolios that, in addition to having strategic value and impact, potentially have the possibility of having discretionary funds to develop clientelistic policies that have allowed traditional parties stay in power throughout the period analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What attributes determine the importance of ministerial portfolios in Panama? Which have been the most important ministries in the Panamanian government from the transition to democracy to the present day? Based on the theoretical proposal of Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo (2022), this article analyses the relevance of Panamanian portfolios for the period between 1989 and 2020. The management, resource allocation, political and organizational capacities of each portfolio are assessed through a systematic analysis of current regulations, institutional information, and expert appraisal. The application of the measure makes it possible to rank the importance of the different ministries, distinguishing between those with high, moderate or no relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political elites tend to favor their home region when distributing resources. But what explains how political power is distributed across a country's regions to begin with? Explanations of cabinet formation focus on short-term strategic bargaining and some emphasize that ministries are allocated equitably to minimize conflict. Using new data on the cabinet members (1960–2010) of 16 former British and French African colonies, I find that some regions have been systematically much more represented than others. Combining novel historical and geospatial records, I show that this regional political inequality derives not from colonial-era development in general but from colonial-era education in particular. I argue that post-colonial ministers are partly a byproduct of civil service recruitment practices among European administrators that focused on levels of literacy. Regional political inequality is an understudied pathway through which colonial legacies impact distributive politics and unequal development in Africa today. JEL: F54, I26, N37, N47 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this research note, we focus on young adults, a group with distinct claims for political representation but a low representation in political office. Focusing on the cabinet, we analyze the marginalization of young politicians in France, Germany, and the UK using time series data. We find that adults aged 35 and below at the time of nomination have made up a mere 1% of the cabinet posts in these countries over the past 40 years. For the age group of adults aged 40 years and below, the percentage of young ministers has reached 7%. We further display that young women are even more of an anomaly than young men. More explanatory, we identify youths' lack of electoral- and party capital as major impediments for young politicians gaining a seat in the cabinet. Finally, we investigate the type of portfolios held by the ministers in our sample and find that young ministers are much more likely than older ones to be designated to portfolios with less prestige. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]