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Governments often use curfews as counterinsurgency measures. Do such state actions affect citizens' political preferences? We argue that citizens' responses depend on their group alignment. Citizens who are aligned with the government are more likely to interpret state actions as serving their interests and reward the governing parties as a result. Citizens who are aligned with the insurgent movement, however, are likely to interpret these same actions as targeted and disengage from politics: they have no reason to reward the governing parties and may also be fearful of expressing support for the parties affiliated with the insurgent movement. We find support for this argument with survey data from Turkey, fielded before and during curfews. When exposed to curfews, Turks generally increase their support for the governing party. However Kurds do not increase their support for the governing party or the opposition; instead, we present strong evidence that they withdraw their support from the Kurdish opposition and become more hesitant to express any political preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Militant groups that are in armed conflict with a government often coexist with political parties that have ethnic or ideological connections to them. In this article, we explore the extent to which electoral support received by militant associated opposition parties and nationally incumbent political parties influences subnational variation in militant attacks. We argue, and empirically demonstrate, that militants strategically target localities where the levels of electoral support for the opposition party and the nationally incumbent party are close in an effort to negatively influence the electoral performance of the incumbent party. To illustrate this dynamic we examine subnational data from 1995 to 2015 Turkish legislative elections and attacks organized by the Kurdish militants within the same time period. We also examine the impact of June 2015 legislative elections on militant attacks until the snap elections in November 2015. Our empirical examination shows that militants target localities where electoral support for the governing party and Kurdish opposition party is close. Moreover, increase in violence negatively influences the electoral performance of the governing party. However, it does not consistently have a significant influence on the opposition. The findings illustrate that militants strategically choose the location of their attacks based on electoral dynamics, and attacks can pose an electoral challenge to the governing party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does anti-Muslim rhetoric by Western politicians breed radical attitudes among European Muslims? This article explores this question by conducting an experimental study in Bosnia – a European democracy, where, unlike the rest of Europe, Muslims are neither immigrants nor socio-economically disadvantaged. This helps clearly identify the radicalization potential of Western rhetoric alone, absent contextual factors such as social inferiority. Experimental evidence with Bosnian Muslims from five surveys (with a total of 2,608 participants) suggests that rhetorical attacks on Islam by Western politicians do not strengthen individuals' Muslim identity, cause higher levels of animosity toward the West or lead to condoning the use of violence. The study also finds that pro-Muslim rhetoric, while increasing positive views of the West, does not affect individuals' strength of Muslim identity or their radical sympathies. These results have important implications for the sources of radicalization and efforts to curb radical tendencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]