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In this paper I am arguing for the recognition of the implicit structural and emotional links between the development of mind and psyche and the more-than-human world. I suggest that it is because of this interpenetration that the uncanny experience of displacement anxiety and its effects on our capacities to think and make links is an under-appreciated aspect of our constant 'forgetting' of the building syndrome of our Earth's symptomatology. I make use of my own theory of the 'organizing gestalt' and the thinking of Maturana, Ingold and Colman to offer a framework for the consideration of the uncanny links between what we know about vanishing biodiversity, broken ecosystems and the breaking down of previously integrated Earth systems and the breaking down of our ways of thinking about our relationships with the more-than-human-world. I suggest that, taken together, such a framework feels remarkably akin to Australian indigenous ways of being in the world. Finally, I ask the question, what might it mean to think ecologically in our psychoanalytic work? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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L'article présente une étude clinique du syndrome de dépersonnalisation. Nous présentons un cas typique de cet état pour interroger les destins du sens interne dans la psychopathologie et les modes de la subjectivation de la vie dans la psychose. L'étude détaillée du cas d'Aurèlie permet de comprendre que le syndrome de dépersonnalisation confronte la patiente avec une expérience de désubjectivation où l'ex-sistence même du sujet psychologique est mise en cause. Ceci nous amène à questionner l'abord clinique de ce phénomène. Car les descriptions qui se satisfont du simple constat du désordre de certaines fonctions psychiques (telles que la sensibilité ou la perception) semblent rater l'essentiel: le fait que ce syndrome décrit un défaut majeur du rapport à la vie. Nous essayons de le démontrer. Il nous paraît nécessaire d'ouvrir une interrogation clinique, qui, en deçà de la sémiologie traditionnelle, pose la question des variations psychopathologiques non plus comme des écarts de la norme, mais comme des modes de la subjectivation de la vie. The article presents a clinical study of depersonalization syndrome. We present a typical case of this state in order to investigate the destinys of the internal sense in psychopathology, as well as the modes of subjectivation of life in psychosis. The detailed study of Aurélie's case allows us to understand that depersonalization syndrome confronts the patient with an experience of desubjectivation where the very existence of the psychological subject is put into question. This leads us to question the clinical aspect of this phenomenon. Indeed, descriptions that do not go beyond a simple observation of the disorder of certain psychic functions (such as sensitivity or perception) seem to miss the point: the fact that this syndrome describes a major defect in the subject's relationship with life. It seems necessary to develop a clinical questioning, which, beyond traditional semiology, would pose the question of psychopathological variations no longer as deviations from the norm, but as modes of the subjectivation of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]