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The article focuses on the concept of Intentionalism, a thesis stating that the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences depends on the content of perceptual representations. It explores the ambiguity in Intentionalism; addressing the implicit assumption of One-to-One Intentionalism; where the dependence relation links the phenomenal character of one perceptual experience to its representational content; and aim to formulate and defend Many-to-One Intentionalism.

This paper combines the personalized and diversified features of modern aesthetic vision, highlighting the static and dynamic performance of pattern visuals. The visual communication of brand pattern is based on computer graphic image design to interpret the information in a visual medium, and the image processing method is used to sample the visual image of brand modeling, extract the edge contour feature amount of the visual image of brand modeling, construct the 3D visual reconstruction model, and carry out 3D feature analysis and sparse surface feature reconstruction. The visual communication art cognition of the brand pattern is analyzed from the analysis of the visual perceptual, psychological evaluation of the pattern and the analysis of the effect of the pattern diameter and spacing. If the pattern's brightness and background brightness are higher, the livelier the space feels. However, the relationship between the lively and solemn sense of space and the patterns' graph diameter and spacing was not obvious, with correlation coefficients of -0.618 and -0.345, respectively, p

In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience , David Papineau offers some metaphysical reasons for rejecting representationalism. This paper overviews these reasons, arguing that while some of his arguments against some versions of representationalism succeed, there are versions of phenomenal intentionalism that escape his criticisms. Still, once we consider some of the contents of perceptual experiences, such as their perspectival contents, it is clear that perceptual experience does not present us with the world as we take it to be. This leads to a rather attenuated form of representationalism, perhaps one that even Papineau could come close to agreeing with. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy is the property of Society for the Advancement of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Recent evidence shows that people have the meta-metacognitive ability to evaluate their metacognitive judgments of confidence. However, it is unclear whether meta-metacognitive judgments are made by a different system and rely on a separate set of computations compared to metacognitive judgments. To address this question, we asked participants (N  = 36) to perform a perceptual decision-making task and provide (i) an object-level, Type-1 response about the identity of the stimulus; (ii) a metacognitive, Type-2 response (low/high) regarding their confidence in their Type-1 decision; and (iii) a meta-metacognitive, Type-3 response (low/high) regarding the quality of their Type-2 rating. We found strong evidence for the existence of Type-3, meta-metacognitive ability. In a separate condition, participants performed an identical task with only a Type-1 response followed by a Type-2 response given on a 4-point scale. We found that the two conditions produced equivalent results such that the combination of binary Type-2 and binary Type-3 responses acts similar to a 4-point Type-2 response. Critically, while Type-2 evaluations were subject to metacognitive noise, Type-3 judgments were made at no additional cost. These results suggest that it is unlikely that there is a distinction between Type-2 and Type-3 systems (metacognition and meta-metacognition) in perceptual decision-making and, instead, a single system can be flexibly adapted to produce both Type-2 and Type-3 evaluations recursively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is it about our current digital technologies that seemingly makes it difficult for users to attend to what matters to them? According to the dominant narrative in the literature on the "attention economy," a user's lack of attention is due to the large amounts of information available in their everyday environments. I will argue that information-abundance fails to account for some of the central manifestations of distraction, such as sudden urges to check a particular information-source in the absence of perceptual information. I will use active inference, and in particular models of action selection based on the minimization of expected free energy, to develop an alternative answer to the question about what makes it difficult to attend. Besides obvious adversarial forms of inference, in which algorithms build up models of users in order to keep them scrolling, I will show that active inference provides the tools to identify a number of problematic structural features of current digital technologies: they contain limitless sources of novelty, they can be navigated by very simple and effortless motor movements, and they offer their action possibilities everywhere and anytime independent of place or context. Moreover, recent models of motivated control show an intricate interplay between motivation and control that can explain sudden transitions in motivational state and the consequent alteration of the salience of actions. I conclude, therefore, that the challenges users encounter when engaging with digital technologies are less about information overload or inviting content, but more about the continuous availability of easily available possibilities for action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perceptual decision-making is often conceptualized as the process of comparing an internal decision variable to a categorical boundary or criterion. How the mind sets such a criterion has been studied from at least two perspectives. One idea is that the criterion is a fixed quantity. In work on subjective phenomenology, the notion of a fixed criterion has been proposed to explain a phenomenon called "subjective inflation"—a form of metacognitive mismatch in which observers overestimate the quality of their sensory representation in the periphery or at unattended locations. A contrasting view emerging from studies of perceptual decision-making is that the criterion adjusts to the level sensory uncertainty and is thus sensitive to variations in attention. Here, we mathematically demonstrate that previous empirical findings supporting subjective inflation are consistent with either a fixed or a flexible decision criterion. We further lay out specific task properties that are necessary to make inferences about the flexibility of the criterion: (i) a clear mapping from decision variable space to stimulus feature space and (ii) an incentive for observers to adjust their decision criterion as uncertainty changes. Recent work satisfying these requirements has demonstrated that decision criteria flexibly adjust according to uncertainty. We conclude that the fixed-criterion model of subjective inflation is poorly tenable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amodal completion is usually characterized as the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. In the case of the visual sense modality, for example, amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of objects we see. I argue that relationalism about perception, the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the relation to the perceived object, cannot give a coherent account of amodal completion. The relationalist has two options: construe the perceptual relation as the relation to the entire perceived object or as the relation to the unoccluded parts of the perceived object. I argue that neither of these options are viable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study investigated perceptual simulation and its relationship with literacy ability in Chinese children. Ninety-three third-grade Hong Kong Chinese children completed a sentence-picture verification task for perceptual simulation. In this task, a sentence mentioning an object was presented first, followed by a picture involving the object. The picture was either a perceptual match with the preceding sentence or a mismatch. The participants were asked to judge whether the object in the picture was mentioned in the preceding sentence. Literacy ability was measured by a Chinese character reading task. Model analysis revealed a significant mismatch effect: the children gave faster correct responses to the perceptually matched pictures than to the mismatched ones. Furthermore, the children with lower literacy abilities displayed larger mismatch effects than those with higher literacy abilities. The results suggest that children with lower literacy abilities may rely more heavily on reactivated perceptual representations in language comprehension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Theoretical Studies of Literature & Art / Wenyi Lilun Yanjiu is the property of Editorial Board of Theoretical Studies in Literature & Art and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Invitational Theory is rooted in three theoretical foundations, the perceptual tradition, self-concept theory, and a democratic ethos (Purkey, Novak, and Fretz, 2020). This essay focuses in on the first of these foundations, which the author intentionally describes as perceptual theory. Perceptual theory provides a theoretical foundation for understanding and explaining human behaviour, and could provide very important insights into the offering and receiving of invitations. In this essay the author seeks to re-introduce the Invitational community to this important theoretical foundation, which could profoundly and positively impact the enacting and application of invitational theory. The author begins by providing an overview of perceptual theory, exploring some of the central tenets and implications. The author then reviews the history of the development of the theory, which the author believes has been overlooked and by-passed: not enough people know about perceptual theory. The author introduces a number of perceptual theory basics, which can be a helpful way of introducing the theory. The essay concludes with an exploration of a number of potential implications and applications for the Invitational community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perceptual psychology has provided a number of revealing insights into the phenomenon of palaeoart. The value of the discipline is underlined by the fact that it has provided new ways of exploring how Upper Palaeolithic cave art first arose, both on a theoretical and a practical level. Despite this, the approach has been accused of overstating the importance of perceptual factors to the detriment of cultural criteria. In this paper, I demonstrate how perceptual psychology can be exploited to provide useful hypotheses regarding the cultural issues associated with early parietal art. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]