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By providing financial resources, conditional to the implementation of the (social) recommendations in the Semester and the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) has opened new political and institutional opportunity windows for the multi‐level co‐production of social policies. The article first dives into how the RRF has been translated into national social policies choices, by assessing the alignment of reforms and investments with the Semester social recommendations and their capacity to address the social vulnerabilities identified in the Pillar's Social Scoreboard. Second, it sheds light on the interaction between the European Commission, in charge of assessing and monitoring the RRF, and the national governments, the key actors in setting‐up and implementing the plans. Comparing six case studies (Italy, Germany, Spain, Croatia, Belgium and Austria), the article shows that the RRF has only partially contributed to reinforcing member states' compliance with social Country Specific Recommendations and the role of the Social Pillar in the drafting of National Recovery and Resilience Plans has been very limited. This notwithstanding, the RRF has contributed to fasten‐forward the implementation of welfare reforms and initiatives which would have been remained on the paper, especially for whose countries with limited fiscal capacity. Furthermore, it provides empirical evidence of the collaborative approach between the Commission and the national government, substantiating the claim of the emergence of a new mode of coordinative Europeanization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines institutional change in father‐specific leave ‐ a centre‐piece of the EU's work‐life balance directive (WLBD) ‐ from the perspective of gradual institutional change. The WLBD, a highly contentious directive, represents a litmus test for the possible impact of the European pillar of social rights (EPSR), on welfare state institutions, which are responsible for the organisation, financing and delivery of social rights in member states. The analysis comprises in‐depth case studies in Denmark, Germany, France and Poland, with different combinations of family and parental leave policies prior to the WLBD. The findings reveal that the EU's directive is leading to convergence in paternity leave, but to divergence in parental leave. Our study is important because it shows that even if EU directives in social policy in principle can lead to upwards social convergence across the EU, when they are relatively weak in terms of precise constraint, for instance, for the level of remuneration for leave, this leads to differentiated integration. This could undermine the very purpose of the EPSR, which seeks to improve social rights for all citizens across the EU. Similar dynamics are likely to be present in other areas at the welfare state‐labor market nexus, such as minimum wages or platform work, where the EU is also developing regulation under the auspices of the EPSR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), the European Union (EU) acts as a 'material supporter' of national welfare states. Remarkably, the European Social Fund Plus, integrating ESF and FEAD, is presented as the main financial instrument to implement the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR). This raises the question of what these levers can do in terms of financial support, especially for Member States with greater social needs. By using the Social Scoreboard indicators that monitor the implementation of the EPSR, we analyse the size and distribution of ESF and FEAD according to Member States' economic capacity, social needs and efforts required to meet the European social goals. We find that the funds benefit relatively more the poorer Member States who also tend to have greater social needs. However, especially for ESF, there are significant deviations from this general pattern. Some countries consistently receive less funding than others with similar levels of social needs, and vice versa. Moreover, if, from the perspective of upward convergence, the budgets are expressed as a percentage of the efforts required to lift all income‐poor citizens to the EU‐wide at‐risk‐of‐poverty threshold, countries who need to make the greatest efforts receive less funding. These outcomes are partly driven by the funds' allocation rules, which give only little importance to the great social discrepancies between countries. This raises the question whether social needs should be taken more into account in the distribution of the funds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]