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We investigated the effects of differential and nondifferential reinforcers on divided control by compound‐stimulus dimensions. Six pigeons responded in a delayed matching‐to‐sample procedure in which a blue or yellow sample stimulus flashed on/off at a fast or slow rate, and subjects reported its color or alternation frequency. The dimension to report was unsignaled (Phase 1) or signaled (Phase 2). Correct responses were reinforced with a probability of.70, and the probability of reinforcers for errors varied across conditions. Comparison choice depended on reinforcer ratios for correct and incorrect responding; as the frequency of error reinforcers according to a dimension increased, control (measured by log d) by that dimension decreased and control by the other dimension increased. Davison and Nevin's (1999) model described data when the dimension to report was unsignaled, whereas model fits were poorer when it was signaled, perhaps due to carryover between conditions. We are the first to test this quantitative model of divided control with reinforcers for errors and when the dimension to report is signaled; hence, further research is needed to establish the model's generality. We question whether divided stimulus control is dimensional and suggest it may instead reflect joint control by compound stimuli and reinforcer ratios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organisms may sometimes behave as if a contingency exists between behavior and consequences, even if this is not actually the case. Killeen (1978) suggested that such superstition occurs because of factors that bias subjects to behave "superstitiously" rather than because of failures of discrimination. We systematically replicated Killeen's experiment and compared contingency discrimination between different consequences. Six pigeons responded in a matching‐to‐sample procedure in which a response‐independent or response‐dependent stimulus change, food delivery, or blackout occurred. The pigeons reported whether the consequence was response dependent or response independent by choosing between two side keys. Discrimination was strongest after stimulus changes, weaker after blackouts, and weakest after food deliveries. These differences persisted even after additional training, suggesting asymmetries that may reflect differences in the disruptive effects of different consequences on remembering and/or behavioral mnemonics. Importantly, the pigeons were not biased to report response‐dependent consequences unless that response was consistent with locational biases; that is, they behaved "superstitiously" when there was a reason to be biased to do so. These findings corroborate Killeen's and demonstrate that behavior may deviate from contingencies not necessarily because subjects cannot discriminate those contingencies but because they are biased to behave otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]