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Copyright of Environmental & Social Management Journal / Revista de Gestão Social e Ambiental is the property of Environmental & Social Management Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article introduces Islamic apocalyptic jurisprudence (theories of final law that will govern humanity in the End Times) to academic study. Section 1 considers why the topic has remained unexamined and suggests a basic taxonomy. Section 2 exposes the apocalyptic jurisprudence of two case studies, representing the "reversionist" and "progressivist" poles of Sunni discourses: the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ("ISIS"), and Dāwūd and his "Awaited Mahdī" movement in Egypt. Section 3 considers two further case studies, representing the "revanchist" and "idealist" orientations in Shi'i discourses: the Islamic Republic of Iran, and al-Ṣadr, a theorist of the Iraqi Ṣadrist movement. Throughout, the following aspects of the final legal system are considered: sources of law; conflicts between Islamic, Jewish, Christian, and international laws; the jurist's role; changes to classical Islamic legal theory, including qiyas and ijtihad; the legitimacy of legal schools; and new positive laws, policies, and rules of evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This intricate analysis delves into the discernible inconsistencies characterizing the European Court of Human Rights' (ECtHR) application of the margin of appreciation (MoA) doctrine concerning Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The evident absence of explicit guidelines delineating the parameters of the margin, exemplified by the Kokkinakis case, results in a perplexing and contradictory implementation of this legal tool. The Court's vacillation in standards of review, notably illustrated in Sahin's and Lautsi's cases, underscores a jurisprudential ambivalence in matters of religious expression. Moreover, the Court's oscillation in calibrating the margin, as observed in S.A.S v. France and Eweida and Others v. UK, raises valid concerns about judicial impartiality and potential predilections. The reliance on the absence of European consensus, as seen in cases like Dahlab v. Switzerland and Lautsi v. Italy, introduces an element of interpretive subjectivity that may undermine the robustness of human rights imperatives. In light of these complexities, this analysis calls for a more lucid, principled and judicious application of the MoA doctrine by the ECtHR to ensure the consistent protection of fundamental human rights within the European legal framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our study undertakes to explore the Old and New Testament roots of the rule of law. It shows that the roots go back to the Mosaic laws and the organization of the ancient Jewish state based on them, an ancient state based primarily on laws. It points out that from the aspect of state and legal theory, the uniqueness of the Mosaic laws lay in the presentation of the supremacy and primacy of the law. This principle was reflected in the fact that no one, neither the king nor any leaders, could set themselves above the law. In addition, according to the specific laws concerning Israel's kings, the exercise of royal power was even more confined within the framework of the law. We argue that the principle of governance bound by law is part of the social teaching of both the Old and the New Testaments. All of this - in interaction with the related elements of ancient Greek-Roman political philosophy - played a prominent role in the fact that it was the Judeo-Christian culture where the idea of the rule of law spread and became the basic principle of the political and legal system of the states belonging to this circle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on reconsidering Islamic law through the perspectives from the Sahara in Africa. Topics include refocusing attention on the longer tradition of Islamic jurisprudence in Africa, challenging the influence of colonialism on the study of Islam in Africa, and reexamining the Sahara as a center rather than a periphery in the development of Islamic law.

In Law as a Moral Practice, Scott Hershovitz defends the pluralist view that there are many sets of legal norms which we can validly employ for different purposes, none of which qualifies as uniquely legal. He claims, further, that there is no set of moral rights and duties that is distinctly legal either, because the domain of morality is unified. I argue, against Hershovitz, that the existence of different sets of norms within legal practice does not mean that no set is basic, or fundamental. There is arguably one set (the actual moral rights and duties that law re-arranges) which is fundamental, and from which all the other sets are derivative. I argue, moreover, that we have strong deontological reasons to doubt that the domain of morality is unified. If political morality comprises distinct domains, not collapsible to a single moral concern, then the possibility of a distinctively legal domain of morality remains open. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we consider the 'eliminativist' character of Hershovitz's non-positivist theory. Focusing on chapter 5 of Law Is A Moral Practice, we ask whether Hershovitz's theory takes full advantage of the explanatory advantages of viewing non-positivism in explicitly eliminativist terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Here I distinguish two things jurisprudence might take itself to explain. A theory of law can be either concept-first or practice-first. Concept-first theories investigate the concept we implicitly deploy to label some things as law and not others. Practice-first theories investigate directly, and uncover interesting features of, a particular social practice. That practice could be, for instance, the practice of lawyers and officials which prevails in the United States. I identify Hershovitz's Law Is a Moral Practice with a practice-first approach. Then I elaborate on the distinction and show that a practice-first approach is more defensible than many assume. Finally, I argue a practice-first approach rules out predictive theories of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Anbar University for Law & Political Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Language & Law / Revista de Llengua i Dret is the property of Revista de Llengua i Dret and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Language & Law / Revista de Llengua i Dret is the property of Revista de Llengua i Dret and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Language & Law / Revista de Llengua i Dret is the property of Revista de Llengua i Dret and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Derecho del Estado is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How does time feature and function in juridical understandings of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment? With a view to international human rights adjudication, this article offers a kaleidoscopic reading of temporal logics (registers and reasoning) operating in the contemporary anti-torture cause and jurisprudence. Time, it is found, plays an important albeit at times implicit role in how judges imagine and evidence torturous harms brought before them. This article explicates and singles out time as a factor. It finds that, whilst indeterminacies and ambiguities persist, singular (and spectacular) or plural (and prolonged) harmful acts and impacts operate to serve adjudicators' reasoning, variably (and intuitively) to find violations or to divert from doing so. Time thus works as a device of inclusion and exclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Estudios de la Administración Local y Autonómica is the property of Instituto Nacional de Administracion Publica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Under criminal jurisprudence, a crime is generally different from an offence, however, in Pakistan, both of them are seen as the same thing. There are different categories of crimes under Anglo-American jurisprudence, however, Pakistan does not follow this model and has categorized offences into three types on the touchstone of the presence of mens rea as the significance of mens rea is such that its presence or lack thereof changes the whole category of crime altogether. There are three essential elements of a crime: mens rea, actus reus, and concurrence, and the Pakistani Courts with a handful of exceptions mention the first two as the only elements while forgetting concurrence. While there is a presumption of mens rea for every offence, the same can be ruled out by the statute itself. The onus to prove the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution through reliable and admissible evidence as a person is deemed innocent until proven guilty. The methodology used in this paper is doctrinal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Romanian Case Law Review / Revista Română de Jurisprudenţă is the property of Universul Juridic Publishing House and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of European Review of Public Law is the property of European Public Law Organization and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this study was to explore effective ways of determining the duration of political disenfranchisement of corruption convicts in Indonesia, with the aim that this punishment serves as an effective deterrent effect without violating human rights. The study also aims to analyze the long-term impact of political disenfranchisement of corruption convicts on democratic processes and their reintegration into post-detention society. This research is categorized as normative legal research and uses a philosophical and analytical approach that focuses on rational, critical analytical, and philosophical views on applicable legislation and legal theory. The research utilizes analytical descriptive methods to examine positive law enforcement practices related to these issues. Based on the severity of corruption cases and the rehabilitation potential of convicts, determining the duration of political disenfranchisement is crucial. Fair review and appeal mechanisms should be in place to support the social and political reintegration of exconvicts. The study also emphasizes the importance of political disenfranchisement as part of a broader legal system to support healthy democracy, transparent governance, and inclusive societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Joseph Raz's Argument from Authority is one of the most famous defences of exclusive positivism in jurisprudence, the position that the existence and content of the law in a society is a wholly social fact, which can be established without the need to engage in moral analysis. According to Raz's argument, legal systems are de facto practical authorities that, like all de facto authorities, must claim legitimate authority, which itself entails that they must be capable of being an authority. Further, once we properly understand what constitutes practical authority, as captured by Raz's service conception, we realise that the directives of any authority (including the law) must be wholly identifiable without recourse to moral analysis. While the argument has previously been criticised on the grounds that the law does not claim legitimate authority, and further that the service conception of authority itself is inadequate, we argue here that the argument is actually in a worse position than these concerns recognise, for it relies upon the mistaken principle that a sincere belief or claim that p guarantees p's conceptual possibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the uses in legal language of the terms allegality or allegal. Recently these terms have been incorporated into the Dictionary of The Royal Academic Spanish Academy of Language, however, there is a use of them in doctrinal, jurisprudential and even legal language. Firstly, the very definition provided by the Dictionary and its confusing or contradictory nature is studied. Next, the relationship of legality with the principle of permission is raised, that is, if in any case the absence of express regulation of a matter implies that there are a series of behaviors that are allowed by the legal system. On the other hand, it is evaluated if the allegality, the lack of a legal norm that regulates an area of social life, means that we are facing a legal gap or before spaces that cannot and should not be regulated by law. That is to say, if the behaviors not regulated by the law necessarily have to be resolved through the integration of the law or if they are aspects that do not belong to the legal sphere. We also study the fact that the allegal may represent a problem not so much of integration of legal norms but of interpretation of law, in which the attribution of meaning to normative statements may imply a lack of legal response. An analysis is made, below, of the use of terms «allegal» and «allegality» in the legal, jurisprudential and doctrinal discourse. From the legislative point of view, there are few cases in which the normative statements contain the terms allegal or allegality. Very exceptionally, in norms with a lower rank, and in general in the Statement of Reasons, these expressions are used. These terms are used in this speech as a synonymous with illegal. In the jurisprudential discourse we find that our courts make more frequent use of the terms allegal or allegality, even long before its incorporation into the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy of Language. In this language, a plurality of meanings is given to the these statements, perhaps predominating their identification with the assumptions of illegality, the allegal is illegal. However, in other cases these expressions are used to refer to a legal situation with legal significance and the judge integrates the law to provide a legal response. The gaps in the law are resolved through the self-integration mechanisms provided by the legal system itself. But there are also cases in which legality is understood to be those cases that have no legal significance and therefore are unrelated to the judicial decision. The judicial discourse refers to these cases as cases that do not have to be regulated by the legal norm. As for the doctrinal language, it is necessary to point out that terms allegality o allegal also have a plurivocal character, probably having a greater weight than that in which the regulation of a matter is requested, de lege ferenda, citing reasons that would improve insufficient regulation. In most cases, the regulation and prohibition of certain behaviors is postulated. In this sense, the authors allude to the allegal as a pathology of the legal system that must be remedied by the legislator. Notwithstanding this, there are also cases in which conducts contrary to law and, therefore, punishable are indentified with illegality. This plurality of meanings and their redundant nature in some cases mean that we must reconsider the incorporation of these terms into legal language. From our point o view, they do not provide security and create confusion in different legal discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The historical moment we are living through is characterized, among other issues, by a surprising acceleration of dynamics that are self-destructive to peaceful coexistence. Humanity is called upon to face great challenges that, probably and naively, were considered to have been overcome. In this context, it becomes once again urgent to reflect on the crucial function of the legal system and, in more general terms, on the basis and requirement of law. Starting from the conceptions of two illustrious thinkers -Arthur Kaufmann and Hans Jonas-we shall propose a practical and concrete philosophical itinerary which aims to restore the due importance of certain characteristics of human rights for a humanity in crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the major questions doctrine, the Supreme Court looks to the "economic and political significance" of an agency's rule to help determine whether Congress intended to delegate the authority to issue that rule. While the Court has largely settled on a "billions of dollars" threshold for finding economic significance, the test for political significance remains unclear. Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that the major questions doctrine should be guided by judicial common sense rather than a searching evidentiary inquiry. The growing role of the major questions doctrine in American jurisprudence, however, requires courts to forewarn legislators and legal actors as to what is "major" and what is merely "interstitial." To achieve that, this Comment will argue that courts should readily accept objective evidence of political significance. Specifically, courts should welcome surveys of congressional and state legislative activity, the number of public comments a proposed rule receives, estimates of the number of people directly affected by a rule, search engine trends data, and the results of public opinion surveys as evidence of political significance. Metrics like these provide a more reliable foundation for major questions analysis and enhance the major questions doctrine's goals of congressional and presidential accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Derecho UNED is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Verba Iuris is the property of Universidad Libre Bogota, Centre de Investigaciones Socio Juridicas de la Facultad de Derecho and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Opuntia Brava is the property of Universidad de Ciencias Pedagogicas de Las Tunas, Centro de Documentacion e Informacion Pedagogica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Opuntia Brava is the property of Universidad de Ciencias Pedagogicas de Las Tunas, Centro de Documentacion e Informacion Pedagogica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Foro Revista de Derecho is the property of Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar, Sede Ecuador and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Teoría & Derecho. Revista de Pensamiento Jurídico is the property of Editorial Tirant Lo Blanch SL and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of IgualdadES is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Foco (Interdisciplinary Studies Journal) is the property of Revista Foco and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article examines the limitations of relying on randomized control trials (RCTs) in understanding causal relationships within the criminal legal system. It questions the efficacy of well-identified policy levers and explores the feasibility of "light-touch" policies within existing research constraints. It emphasizes the importance of recognizing constraints in knowledge generation within the criminal legal context.

Copyright of Journal of Language & Law / Revista de Llengua i Dret is the property of Revista de Llengua i Dret and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Language & Law / Revista de Llengua i Dret is the property of Revista de Llengua i Dret and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Language & Law / Revista de Llengua i Dret is the property of Revista de Llengua i Dret and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper reviews international and domestic normative and jurisprudential sources of the last twenty years on the Human Right to Water (HRW), focusing the study on Latin American countries that do not have this right expressly enshrined in their constitutional texts, especially Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. It analyzes the arguments used in its recognition, the elements of its structure, and the ways of addressing the problem of entitlement and enforceable duties. The conclusion shows a stage of jurisprudential progress in the first two countries (Colombia and Argentina), with a recognition of various contents of the DHA in accordance with international standards, while in the case of Brazil and Chile there is evidence, with nuances, of a limited recognition. In this regard, the internal normative structures differ in terms of the role of the State and individuals in water management, and the judicial tools for the protection of fundamental rights as a way of processing conflicts over access to water. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revue Electronique Internationale Pour la Publication de Recherches Juridiques is the property of Revue Electronique Internationale Pour la Publication de Recherches Juridiques and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What we ought to do, according to law, isn't always what we ought to do, given the existence of law. Sometimes we need to know what a legal system says we should do, under rules prevailing in a certain time and place. And sometimes we need to know what we should actually do, in the moral circumstances this legal system presents. Many fights between positivists and natural lawyers result from muddying these two inquiries. But we have good reasons, intellectual and moral, to keep them distinct. Even if prevailing social rules have no moral force of their own, those who make claims about them still owe their audiences a moral duty of candor. And the stronger our moral commitments, the more we ought to approach existing legal systems warily. Insisting that the law already reflects good morals can blind us to some very real flaws in our prevailing rules--and to the need for some very hard work in reforming them. To this extent, common-good-constitutionalist claims too often have all "the advantages of theft over honest toil": they can lead us to wish away precisely those disagreements and failings that make social and political institutions so necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The insolvency procedure is a special procedure, derogating from common law regarding the method by which commercial companies identify means of recovery of the activity in delicate moments of their existence. Under this aspect, we will analyze how the civil capacity is affected, the possibility of companies to conclude certain categories of property transfer deeds, both from the perspective of acquiring and from the perspective of alienating these rights. Our analysis will focus on answering to what extent the role of the receiver and the syndic judge represents a limitation of the civil capacity and especially if it can be discussed about a lack of it in the insolvency procedure. We will go through the legislation, jurisprudence, and doctrine at the national level, and where the answers will not be sufficient, we will tangentially analyze, through comparative law, the legislative solutions promoted at the level of European legislation and of other states that share a legal system like the national one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Administración Pública is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In his political thought, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Italy's premier jurist, Gian Vincenzo Gravina, adopted a Hobbesian state of nature, a Hobbesian social contract, and a Hobbesian idea of law as collective will; he fused these ideas with the Roman legal tradition, a tradition that he trained in and later ordered when he wrote his masterpiece, the Three Books on the Origins of the Civil Law. But Gravina was more than a Roman Hobbesian. While he held a Hobbesian view of political legitimacy, he also held an anti-Hobbesian view of human life's true ends. Gravina set out to restore these true ends – reason, virtue, and internal tranquility – and to do that he turned to Plato. In synthesizing Hobbes's legal innovations with prior understandings of law, Gravina demonstrates just how far those innovations reached in eighteenth-century Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The human rights justice system is a politically and legally complex area to navigate with legislative changes and judicial decisions shaping the administration and governance of human rights policies. This article provides a comprehensive examination of the complexities and intricacies of this system by measuring the impact of judicial rulings on the discretionary decision‐making of the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal (HRTO). The impact of the Supreme Court of Canada's relevant jurisprudence in Figliola and Penner on the HRTO's discretionary powers to dismiss claims pursuant to section 45.1 of the Ontario Human Rights Code is measured by examining the outcomes of decisions made by the Tribunal. The article presents new empirical data on all early dismissal decisions (N = 1479) from 2008 to 2021 and demonstrates the effects of the Supreme Court's rulings in Figliola and Penner. The findings in this article reveal that both Figliola and Penner had significant impacts on the Tribunal's discretionary decision‐making powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista CIENCIA UNEMI is the property of Universidad Estatal de Milagro (UNEMI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Indonesia is yet to have a coherent legal theory or framework since its independence. In response to this, and influenced by Fred W. Riggs’s ideas in social transformation, the concept of prismatic law evolved in the Indonesian legal system. This idea needs to be tested regarding the conceptual roots and relation to the Indonesian legal system based on Pancasila. The method used is normative-conceptual, where the construction as a legal characteristic is connected with the built-in concept. Therefore, secondary data was mostly used with qualitative-prescriptive analysis techniques. Since the social legal process was adopted, the law should be viewed from social reflection instead of an ‘import’ theory that is difficult to implement. The pluralistic character of law is in line with the prismatic legal paradigm, where the spirit of pluralism appears in this idea. As a suggestion, legal education should be directed at encouraging moralists for law enforcement to realize a sense of justice based on the principle of legal pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Forensic Medicine / Fayixue Zazhi is the property of Journal of Forensic Medicine Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article argues that despite its claim to be most concerned with the nature of law in the generality of cases, legal positivism's almost exclusive focus on Anglo-American law has prevented the tradition from adequately answering the question of law's authority. This article argues that much positivist analysis either ignores, or takes for granted, the participation of the local population in the historical development of any given society's law and legal system. This failing means that positivism, and much of analytical jurisprudence, does not provide a truly general, non-circular explanation of authority that accounts as equally for post-colonial legal systems as it does for the Anglo-American systems with which positivism has been most concerned. I argue that the conceptual inadequacies in the explanations of law and legitimate authority offered by those such as H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz are most clearly exposed by post-colonial cases, such as Nigeria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Intervention research and development for youth in the juvenile legal system (JLS) has often focused on recidivism as the primary outcome of interest. Although recidivism is an important outcome, it is ultimately a downstream marker of success and is affected by changes in other domains of youths’ lives (e.g., family and peer relations, neighborhood safety, local and state-level policies). Thus, the present manuscript proposes the application of ecological systems theory to selecting outcomes to assess intervention effects in JLS intervention research to better capture proximal and distal influences on youth behavior. To that end, we first provide an overview of the strengths and limitations of using recidivism as an outcome measure. Next, the current application of social ecology theory to existing research on both risk and protective factors of JLS involvement is discussed, as well as existing work on assessing social-ecological domains within intervention studies. Then, a measurement framework is introduced for selecting pertinent domains of youths’ social ecologies to assess as intervention outcomes, moderators, and mediators. To facilitate this, we provide examples of concrete constructs and measures that researchers may select. We conclude with potential new avenues of research to which our proposed framework could lead, as well as potential limitations of implementing our framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American criminal jurisprudence relies on confidential informants: those individuals who agree to assist police in exchange for leniency. Facing little regulation by legislatures, law enforcement has raised an informant system premised on the exploitation of vulnerabilities and free from basic safeguards that would help to mitigate the moral, mental, and physical harm informants face in the field. While this is generally problematic, the issue becomes more pronounced when considering law enforcement's use of juveniles to combat crimes perpetrated against and among children. A juvenile's brain is developmentally distinct from an adult's. During late adolescence, the brain goes through major maturation processes that significantly affect a juvenile's ability to assess risk, make forward-thinking decisions, override emotions with logic, and resist social pressures. In other words, the juvenile brain is predisposed to act adverse to self-interests. Within the context of the modern informant system, juveniles engage with police on seriously disadvantaged ground; and because agreeing to assist police has proven to be a death sentence for some, the urgency with which this must be addressed cannot be overstated. America's tolerance of police discretion with respect to the use of juvenile informants must end. Legislatures can facilitate change by implementing safeguards aimed at mitigating the risks posed by a juvenile's physiological predispositions. Namely, legislatures should consider implementing mandatory cooling-off periods, a statutory right to counsel, mandatory parental and judicial consent, prescribed documentation and recordkeeping requirements, and enforced training regimens. Absent empirical data that youth at large are better protected by the abolition of the use of juvenile informants, legislatures looking to implement these suggestions or otherwise restrict the practice should be careful to balance proposed legislation with the needs of law enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]