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This paper examines the divergent trajectories of automotive investment and employment in Detroit, Michigan and Windsor, Ontario. Located on opposite shores of the Detroit River, in the United States and Canada respectively, Detroit and Windsor are the founding cities of the North American auto industry. Long dominated by the Big Three, their factories have produced vehicles for the same continental market since 1965. Each has weathered parallel challenges since then, including spikes in the price of oil, the Big Three's loss of market share, the transition to lean production, and the near-collapses of Chrysler and GM. Yet Detroit began deindustrializing decades earlier and lost much more employment than Windsor. To determine why, we compared their automotive sectors from 1900 to the 2010s. Since the Depression, each city has repeatedly confronted the prospect of deindustrialization, but three factors have made Windsor more resilient: (1) federal and provincial interventions on its behalf, (2) Windsor's greater competitiveness with respect to factor costs, quality, and innovation, and (3) Windsor's annexation of outlying territory to capture new factories. These differences show how national, subnational, and regional/local policies have mediated corporate decision-making to produce a variegated North American Rust Belt, with Canada outperforming the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that elevated levels of gun homicide and gun suicide among younger black men and middle-aged white men, respectively, are the consequences of a political economy that produces widespread despair among the most vulnerable segments of the laboring classes. Understood in this way, these phenomena share a common etiology whose roots can be traced to two major, temporally distinct developments: (1) postwar shifts in the political economy that redefined central cities as sites of black dislocation, and (2) the more recent intensification of globalization and investor class power that has redefined smaller cities, towns, and rural communities as sites of white dislocation. These transformations have rendered working-class blacks and whites (and others) vulnerable to a wide range of maladies and adverse social outcomes, including involvement in gun violence. In addition to examining these political-economic transformations and their effects on black and white working-class communities, this article also explores the divergent racialized manifestations of gun violence within these demographic groups. While micro and mezzo interventions are typically stressed to respond to these issues, their ultimate resolution requires recognition of their common roots in conditions of structurally imposed despair and the concomitant remedy of those conditions at the macro level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the phenomenon of deindustrialization and its consequences in France, particularly since the 1970s. It discusses how factors such as globalization, financial liberalization, and European integration, combined with the lack of coherent public policies, have led to a decline in the industrial sector's contribution to the French Gross Domestic Product. It suggests argues for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between deindustrialization and neoliberalism.

In the middle of the 20th century, economic theories predicted an evolution towards development that involved the tertiarization of the productive structure, with industry losing weight to the benefit of commerce and services. This model justified the deindustrialization of countries when, promoting globalization, large companies relocated production phases to third countries to take advantage of lower labor costs. Since the Great Recession and aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic and other economic factors, globalization seems to be entering a new phase in the third decade of the 21st century, in which Global Value Chains are changing to become even more regional and reshoring is a strategy increasingly employed by large European and North American companies. In the medium term, this global change will have a considerable impact on land systems on a global scale in what could be a new reindustrialization of the old continent. The article presents an investigation carried out on the impact of reshoring in leading European companies in six different industrial branches. The results of the research show how the relocation of the industry in the most developed countries is an incipient trend practiced by the leading European companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• This paper examines the dynamics of deindustrialization in developed countries during the 1970–2015 period, investigating the patterns and factors underlying manufacturing employment growth in 12 developed economies. • The paper shows that deindustrialization is a persistent pattern that experienced a significant structural change in the post-1990 period, in which the acceleration of globalization with the rise of North-South trade appeared to have a significant effect. • Industries with higher relative labour productivity are significantly more resistant to deindustrialization, particularly in the post-1990 period, and this effect is stronger for low-tech industries. • Deindustrialization tends to be more severe in countries with larger populations and a deficit-prone trade balance, and these links have become more pronounced in the post-1990 period. This paper examines the dynamics of deindustrialization in developed countries during the 1970–2015 period, investigating the patterns and factors underlying manufacturing employment growth in 12 developed economies. The study discloses seven key findings with valuable policy insights. In particular, the paper shows that deindustrialization is a persistent pattern that experienced a significant structural change in the post-1990 period, in which the acceleration of globalization with the rise of North-South trade appeared to have a significant effect. Furthermore, industries with higher relative labour productivity are significantly more resistant to deindustrialization, particularly in the post-1990 period, and this effect is stronger for low-tech industries. In addition, deindustrialization tends to be more severe in countries with larger populations and a deficit-prone trade balance, and these links have become more pronounced in the post-1990 period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the middle of the 20th century, economic theories predicted an evolution towards development that involved the tertiarization of the productive structure, with industry losing weight to the benefit of commerce and services. This model justified the deindustrialization of countries when, promoting globalization, large companies relocated production phases to third countries to take advantage of lower labor costs. Since the Great Recession and aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic and other economic factors, globalization seems to be entering a new phase in the third decade of the 21st century, in which Global Value Chains are changing to become even more regional and reshoring is a strategy increasingly employed by large European and North American companies. In the medium term, this global change will have a considerable impact on land systems on a global scale in what could be a new reindustrialization of the old continent. The article presents an investigation carried out on the impact of reshoring in leading European companies in six different industrial branches. The results of the research show how the relocation of the industry in the most developed countries is an incipient trend practiced by the leading European companies.