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Recent research in economic history has found that mortgage debt in relation to GDP has taken off in the historical long run ("great mortgaging"), as growing banking assets have been redirected into mortgage credit. This paper maps the parallel long-run investment history of private (life) insurance as the much overlooked second pillar of the financial system. Drawing on in-depth studies of the US and Germany, it finds that a "great de-mortgaging" took place in insurers' portfolios, with mortgages falling from up to 90 percent in the 19th century to below 5 percent today in favor of fixed-income securities. A parallel shift to secondary mortgage bonds has hardly offset this decline, while direct real estate remained largely a residual investment class. Banks' great mortgaging is thus partly an institutional substitution effect. The paper sees insurers' asset shift itself as mainly driven by long-run changes in capital demand and competition with banks and pension funds. It extends these findings to other long-term institutional investors and other OECD countries in the historical long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Departing from research on Westphalian leases between 1600 and 1900 the paper discusses the lease market of and price determination on three Westphalian estates. While economic history approaches suppose that leases can be seen as market relations and are therefore useful indicators to measure agricultural productivity, a more anthropological perspective emphasises the social relations between lessor (here: noble estate owner) and leaseholders. The choice of an adequate perspective has significant implications for research on agricultural productivity based on rents and leases. Our results indicate that the contractual arrangement of leasehold (well defined duration, announcement, auctions) was used to achieve the highest possible leases. However, at least until the 1830s, demand for leasehold land was rather low and leaseholders could benefit from a lack of competition. Price determination of leases resulted in rents below the Ricardian rent. Therefore, we argue that important assumptions of the established price approach, which uses leases as proxies for productivity, are not met and the analysis of agricultural productivity requires additional evidence on the leaseholder's income and profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the evolving landscape of civic engagement in rural areas in Germany, highlighting how traditional organizations like volunteer fire brigades and choral societies are experiencing membership declines and being supplemented by new forms of engagement such as temporary festivals. It notes that while rural areas generally exhibit higher levels of civic participation compared to urban settings, the dynamics are influenced by economic conditions and regional differences.

What characterizes regions where right‐wing populist parties are relatively successful? A prominent hypothesis proposed in the emerging "geography of discontent" literature claims that places that are "left behind" constitute a breeding ground for the rise of populism. We re‐examine this hypothesis by analyzing the rise of populism in Germany. Our results suggest that high vote shares of populist parties are associated with the long‐term decline of a region's relative welfare, which goes beyond a lifespan of people inhabiting such "left behind" places. Moreover, we are able to show that a place‐based collective memory about past prosperity plays a crucial role in shaping present resentment. Finally, we find the education level of the regional population to be an important channel through which the collective memory about the past translates into populism support today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The well‐known German aversion to inflation has attracted a lot of interest and is often attributed to a specific historical memory: Weimar. Yet we do not know much about why hyperinflation seems to overshadow the Great Depression in German collective economic memory. To answer this question, we study what exactly it is that Germans believe to remember about their past. Using original survey data, we show that many Germans do not distinguish between hyperinflation and the Great Depression, but see them as two dimensions of the same crisis. They conflate Weimar economic history into one big crisis, encompassing both rapidly rising prices and mass unemployment. Additionally, more educated and politically interested Germans are more likely to commit this fallacy. Our finding thus nuances ideational explanations for Germany's economic policy stance in the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]