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Equity incentive, as an institutional arrangement for the coordination of the interests of shareholders and managers, has been widely implemented by public companies in developed capital markets throughout Europe and America. However, does it work and/or when might it be more effective in emerging market economies such as China? We aimed to understand the effects of equity incentive plans implemented by listed companies in China and the potential influence of the general characteristics of contracts on the effectiveness of equity incentive plans. Based on behavioral decision theory, this paper adopts a multivariate linear regression model to analyze the 1695 equity incentive plans implemented in Chinese listed companies between 2010 and 2018 with their two-year lagged performance data. The empirical results show that the operational performance of companies after implementing equity incentive plans shows a trend of polarization. In the 95% confidence interval, the effect of restrictive stock incentive and exercise-constrained variables is not significant, while the validity period has a significant positive correlation and incentive intensity has a significantly negative correlation with the company's operational performance. Furthermore, the negative effects mentioned above become more obvious with a longer plan implementation period. Based on these conclusions, we suggest that companies could adopt equity incentive plans with a relatively longer validity period and more reasonable incentive intensity. Additionally, it would be better for companies to select non-restricted stocks as incentive tools if there is no obvious preference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]