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The predominant position in the reproductive rights literature argues that access to assisted reproductive technologies (ART) forms part of an individual's right to reproduce. On this reasoning, refusal of treatment by clinicians (via provision) violates a hopeful parent's reproductive right and discriminates against the infertile. I reject these views and suggest they wrongly contort what reproductive freedom entitles individuals to do and demand of others. I suggest these views find their origin, at least in part, in the way we define "reproduction" itself. This paper critically analyses two widely accepted definitions of human reproduction and demonstrates that both are fundamentally flawed. While the process of reproduction includes the biological acts of begetting and bearing a child, I argue that it does not extend to include rearing. This reworked definition has little impact in the realm of sexual reproduction. However, it has significant ethical implications for the formulation and assignment of reproductive rights and responsibilities in the non-sexual realm in two important ways. First, a claim to access ART where one has an intention to rear a child (but does not beget or bear) cannot be grounded in reproductive rights. Second, lacking an intention to rear does not extinguish the reproductive rights and responsibilities for those who collaborate in the process. I conclude that clinicians collaborate in non-sexual reproduction at the point of triggering conception (begetting) and therefore have the right to refuse to be involved in non-sexual reproduction, in some instances, as do all reproductive collaborators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For females without a functioning womb, the only way to become a biological parent is via assisted gestation—either surrogacy or uterus transplantation (UTx). This paper examines the comparative impact of these options on two types of putative 'womb‐givers': people who provide gestational surrogacy and those who donate their uterus for live donation. The surrogate 'leases' their womb for the gestational period, while the UTx donor donates their womb permanently via hysterectomy. Both enterprises involve a significant degree of self‐sacrifice and medical risk in order to enable another person(s) to become a parent by either providing gestational labour or enabling the other person to undertake gestation themselves. In this paper, we explore the burdens and the benefits from the perspective of the womb‐giver in order to inform ethical debate about assisted gestation. This is a perspective that is often neglected in the bioethical discourse. With both surrogacy and UTx, when success follows the womb‐giver's sacrifice, the key benefit is delivered to the intending parent(s), but as this article examines, the womb‐giver may also enjoy some unique (relational) benefits as a result of their sacrifice. Ultimately, the choice of how a womb‐giver lends assistance in gestation will impact on their bodily autonomy; some will prefer to carry a pregnancy and others to donate their uterus. We argue that the perspective of the womb‐giver is crucial and thus far has not been afforded sufficient consideration in ethical discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assisted reproduction often involves biological contributions by third parties such as egg/sperm donors, mitochondrial DNA donors, and surrogate mothers. However, these arrangements are also characterised by a biological relationship between the child and at least one intending parent. For example, one or both intending parents might use their own eggs/sperm in surrogacy, or an intending mother might conceive using donor sperm or gestate a donor embryo. What happens when this relationship is absent, as in the case of 'double‐donor surrogacy' arrangements (DDS)? Here, a child is conceived using both donor eggs and sperm, carried by a surrogate, and raised by the commissioning parents. In this paper, I critically examine proposals to allow DDS in the United Kingdom, and the intentionalist justification for treating this practice distinctly (morally and legally speaking) from private adoption. I argue that the intentionalist approach cannot plausibly justify such a distinction and that other approaches to moral parenthood are also unlikely to succeed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Qualitative studies on assisted reproductive technology commonly focus on the perspectives of participants living in major metropolises. In doing so, the experiences of those living outside major cities, and the unique way conditions of spatiality shape access to treatment, are elided. In this paper, we examine how location and regionality in Australia impact upon access and experience of reproductive services. We conducted twelve qualitative interviews with participants residing in regional areas across Australia. We asked participants to discuss their experience with assisted reproduction services and the impacts of location on access, service choice, and experience of care, and analysed the data using reflexive thematic analysis, as outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006, 2019). Participants in this study reported that their location impacted the services available to them, required considerable time in travel, and reduced continuity of care. We draw on these responses to examine the ethical implications of uneven distribution of reproductive services in commercial healthcare settings which rely on market-based mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia has recently legalised mitochondrial donation. However, key ethical and legal issues still need to be addressed. This paper maps the relevant issues and offers some suggestions for how they ought to be resolved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since the publication of Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons, bioethicists have tended to distinguish between two different ways in which reproductive technologies may have implications for the welfare of future persons. Some interventions harm or benefit particular individuals: they are "person affecting." Other interventions determine which individual, of a number of possible individuals, comes into existence: they are "identity affecting" and raise the famous "non-identity problem." For the past several decades, bioethical debate has, for the most part, proceeded on the assumption that direct genetic modification of human embryos would be person affecting. In this paper, I argue that that genome editing is highly unlikely to be person affecting for the foreseeable future and, as a result, will neither benefit nor harm edited individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2022, the global commercial surrogacy industry was valued at approximately US$14 billion. This paper explores the issue of surrogacy to reveal how international human rights standards and labor laws treat reproduction as work, building on previous scholarship analyzing similar framing at the grassroots level in Mexico. I argue that the failure to recognize surrogacy as labor is rooted in three lacunae: (1) contemporary policies and practices around surrogacy globally pay little attention to the well-being and rights fulfillment of surrogates themselves, particularly the economic rights of surrogates; (2) the stigma of surrogacy as sexualized care work results in neglect of the labor rights of surrogates in mainstream economic rights discourses; and (3) relevant international rights law has not yet addressed the economic rights of surrogates, nor has it effectively articulated the interdependent relationship between economic rights and reproductive rights. Lastly, I discuss where reproductive rights and economic rights overlap in existing human rights conventions and standards and what possibilities these offer for articulating the interdependence of reproductive and economic rights and for advancing the labor rights of surrogates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I argue that current law and policy governing germline genetic modification are overly broad and in fact prohibit medical interventions normally considered unobjectionable. The root of the problem lies in the fact law and policy tend to espouse a near categorical ban on medical interventions that alter germline DNA. However, if we pay close attention to the biological mechanisms at play we see that many standard medical interventions result in alterations to DNA that can be transmitted to future generations. The correct focus of policy and regulation thus ought to be determining which kinds of transmissible genetic modifications ought to be permitted, and not whether they should be permitted at all. Given that the scientific classification of biological structures involved in the inheritance of traits is unlikely to be in itself ethically significant, ethicists ought to develop a definition of 'gene' fit for ethical purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Egg freezing has led to heated debates in healthcare policy and bioethics. A crucial issue in this context concerns the distinction between "medical" and "social" egg freezing (MEF and SEF)—contrasting objections to bio-medicalization with claims for oversimplification. Yet such categorization remains a criterion for regulation. This paper aims to explore the "regulatory boundary-work" around the "medical"–"social" distinction in different egg freezing regulations. Based on systematic documents' analysis we present a cross-national comparison of the way the "medical"–"social" differentiation finds expression in regulatory frameworks in Austria, Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands. Findings are organized along two emerging themes: (1) the definition of MEF and its distinctiveness—highlighting regulatory differences in the clarity of the definition and in the medical indications used for creating it (less clear in Austria and Germany, detailed in Israel and the Netherlands); and (2) hierarchy of medical over social motivations reflected in usage and funding regulations. Blurred demarcation lines between "medical" and "social" are further discussed as representing a paradoxical inclusion of SEF while offering new insights into the complexity and normativity of this distinction. Finally, we draw conclusions for policymaking and the bioethical debate, also concerning the related cryopolitical aspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article identifies the broad range of ethical concerns and considerations regarding artificial womb technology (AWT). Topics discussed include potential benefits and harms of AWT, decision-making authority of parents, legal status and protections, and fairness of access and the fundamental source of basic legal rights for persons in the U.S.

Recently, Australia became the second jurisdiction worldwide to legalize the use of mitochondrial donation technology. The Mitochondrial Donation Law Reform (Maeve's Law) Bill 2021 allows individuals with a family history of mitochondrial disease to access assisted reproductive techniques that prevent the inheritance of mitochondrial disease. Using inductive content analysis, we assessed submissions sent to the Senate Committee as part of a programme of scientific inquiry and public consultation that informed drafting of the Bill. These submissions discussed a range of bioethical and legal considerations of central importance to the political debate. Significantly, submissions from those with a first-hand experience of mitochondrial disease, including clinicians and those with a family history of mitochondrial disease, were in strong support of this legislation. Those in support of the Bill commended the two-staged approach and rigorous licencing requirements as part of the Bill's implementation strategy. Submissions which outlined arguments against the legislation either opposed the use of these techniques in general or opposed aspects of the implementation strategy in Australia. These findings offer a window into the ethical arguments and perspectives that matter most to those Australians who took part in the Senate inquiry into mitochondrial donation. The insights garnered from these submissions may be used to help refine policy and guidelines as the field progresses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Innovation is a key driver of care provision in assisted reproductive technologies (ART). ART providers offer a range of add‐on interventions, aiming to augment standard in vitro fertilization protocols and improve the chances of a live birth. Particularly in the context of commercial provision, an ever‐increasing array of add‐ons are marketed to ART patients, even when evidence to support them is equivocal. A defining feature of ART is hope—hope that a cycle will lead to a baby or that another test or intervention will make a difference. Yet such hope also leaves ART patients vulnerable in a variety of ways. This article argues that previous attempts to safeguard ART patients have neglected how the use of add‐ons in commercial ART can exploit patients' hopes. Commercial providers of ART should provide add‐ons only free of charge, under a suitable research protocol. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mitochondrial replacement technology (MRT) is an emerging and complex bioethical issue. This treatment aims to eliminate maternal inherited mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) disorders. For Muslims, its introduction affects every aspect of human life, especially the five essential interests of human beings—namely, religion, life, lineage, intellect, and property. Thus, this technology must be assessed using a comprehensive and holistic approach addressing these human essential interests. Consequently, this article analyses and assesses tri-parent baby technology from the perspective of Maqasidic bioethics—that is, Islamic bioethics based on the framework of Maqasid al-Shariah. Using this analysis, this article suggests that tri-parent baby technology should not be permitted for Muslims due to the existence of third-party cell gametes which lead to lineage mixing and due to the uncertain safety of the therapy itself and because the major aim of the technology is to fulfil the affected couples interest to conceive their own genetically healthy child, not to treat and cure mtDNA disorders sufferers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because many involuntarily childless people have equal interests in benefitting from assisted reproductive technologies like in vitro fertilization as a mode of treatment, we have normative reasons to ensure inclusive access to such interventions for as many of these people as is reasonable and possible. However, the prevailing eligibility criterion for access to assisted reproductive technologies—'infertility'—is inadequate to serve the goal of inclusive access. This is because the prevailing frameworks of infertility, which include medical and social infertility, fail to precisely capture and unify the relevance of certain involuntarily childless experiences as warranting assisted reproductive technology (ART) treatment. I argue that the least we can do for those who have an interest in accessing ARTs is to conceptualize involuntarily childless experiences in dialogue with interactionist and ecological models of disability, to outline a unified and more inclusive eligibility criterion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 1980's, with the clinical advent of in vitro fertilization resulting in so-called "test tube babies," a wide array of ethical considerations and concerns regarding artificial womb technology (AWT) have been described. Recent breakthroughs in the development of extracorporeal neonatal life support by means of AWT have reinitiated ethical interest about this topic with a sense of urgency. Most of the recent ethical literature on the topic, however, pertains not to the more imminent scenario of a physiologically improved method of neonatal care through AWT, but instead to the remote scenario of "complete ectogenesis" that imagines human gestation occurring entirely outside of the womb. This scoping review of the ethical literature on AWT spans from more abstract concerns about complete ectogenesis to more immediate concerns about the soon-to-be-expected clinical life support of what we term the fetal neonate or fetonate. Within an organizing framework of different stages of human gestational development, from conception to the viable premature infant, we discuss both already identified and newly emerging ethical considerations and concerns regarding AWT and the care of the fetonate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article in this journal, Alex Mullock, Elizabeth Chloe Romanis and Dunja Begović provide an analysis of gestational surrogacy and uterus transplantation (UTx) from the perspective of those who may decide to act as gestational surrogates and womb donors, referred to as 'womb‐givers'. In this article, I advance two sets of claims aimed at critically engaging with some aspects of their analysis. Firstly, I argue that the expression 'womb‐givers' obscures the biologically, socially and politically salient issue that those who engage in these practices are primarily persons and women. My contention is that this is of substance in discussions of the burdens and benefits of gestational surrogacy and UTx, which need to consider the specific position that women occupy in society, and the hierarchies that mediate their lives, experiences and preferences. Second, I argue that, if one were to take seriously the experiences and preferences of the women who may engage in these practices, and their bodily autonomy, then gestational surrogacy and UTx should be regarded as biologically and sociopolitically incommensurable. Mullock et al. overlook important aspects of gestational surrogacy, such as the embodied nature of pregnancy and childbirth, the sociopolitical significance of these experiences, and the often‐oppressive social norms that shape them. Whilst biology is not destiny, I suggest that it is socially and politically 'sticky' when it comes to this significance and norms, especially within the sphere of reproduction. Towards the end of the article, I query the authors' conceptualisation of bodily autonomy and of the instruments that enable its respect and promotion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses about artificial womb technology and their articulation of the four domains of fetal development and the correlated ethical considerations to delineate many ethical questions relevant to future discoveries in reproductive ethics. Topics discussed include ethical landscape risk reinforcing rather than addressing injustice, bioethical scholarship on both equity and feminism and the biopolitical frameworks which shape the boundaries of bioethical .

The article focuses on identifying ethical considerations and concerns regarding artificial womb technology (AWT) and care of the fetonate. Topics discussed include legal and ethical status of the fetonate, the role and status of the mother in first-in-human trials and neonatal physiological transition, including blood pressure/distress and respiration.

The article focuses on feminist concerns about artificial womb technology (AWT). Topics discussed include risks and benefit from the use of AWT, use of AWT to justify restrictions on reproductive rights, such as abortion, and impact of AWT on the relationships between the pregnant person and their child.

The article discusses the ethical and legal definitions of terms like fetonates or gestatelings for conceptual clarity of artificial womb technology (AWT). Topics discussed include utilizing and adapting language within our existing vocabulary, significant differences between the subject of AWT and a neonate and comprehensive investigation of the potential ethicolegal issues arising from gestation outside of the body.

The article discusses the rise to a proliferation of terms such as fetonate, neonate and gestateling to denote the subject of artificial womb technology (AWT). Topics discussed include the goal of AWT to provide optimal care for extremely premature infants, terms like gestateling introduced to address this seeming disparity between physiology and ethics and the improvement of neonatal care at the limit of viability.

The use of embryonic genome editing tools is often touted as a way to ensure the birth of healthy and genetically related children. Many would agree that this is a worthy goal. Yet the purpose of this article is to argue that, if we are concerned with justice, accepting such a goal as morally appropriate commits one to rejecting the use of social resources for further development of embryo editing for reproductive purposes. This is so because there are safer and more effective means that can allow many more prospective parents to achieve the same valued goal and that can offer additional benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author comments on the theoretical and practical reasons for and bioethics of human germline genome editing. The author references the concept of non-identity problem and moral obligations to explain that genome editing is wrong. The author considers the use of person-affecting arguments by policy makers and practitioners. The author views that psychological connectedness and continuity is a reductionist and revisionary view of personal identity.

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The article presents the discussion on noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) being implemented as a first-trimester prenatal screening modality in healthcare systems around the world. Topics include using NIPT for detecting copy number variants, single-gene disorders, and microdeletion syndromes; and being useful for reproductive decision-making providing reasons for women or couples considering the termination of pregnancy.