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This article maps the behaviours of two middle powers, Australia and Indonesia, as a response to the emergence and evolution of the Indo-Pacific concept. The background for this analysis is the emergence and development of the 'Indo-Pacific' concept as a response to crises of legitimacy enveloping the region and how countries in the region, including middle powers, respond to it. Using a minimalist definition which I have developed of a middle power as a country with a middle level of power capabilities and a penchant for cooperation, this article develops a framework based on two dimensions of outcome (ranging from status-quoist to reformist outlooks) and process (ranging from Lockean to Kantian strategies) to facilitate a more open-ended approach towards looking at middle-power behaviours beyond the common categorisation of traditional/emerging, and Western/non-Western. Using Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and 2023 National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, and Indonesia's 2015 Defence White Paper and 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, this article concludes that while Australia is exhibiting a status-quoist/Lockean approach, Indonesia is demonstrating a reformist/Kantian approach towards the Indo-Pacific. The outcome-process dimension framework developed in this article is useful as a tool to map other middle power behaviours in various contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines three sites where diplomacy interacts with geoscience, international law, and military capabilities. These sites, invisible to the general public due to their subterranean character, are undersea long-distance telecommunications cables; submarine operations; and espionage operations. The paper uses these subterranean sites to shed light on the hidden dimensions of Australian statecraft. Taken as a whole, they illustrate the influence of elite economic interests in Australia's national security objectives. The covert instruments of statecraft are devoted not just to military security but to the power and interests of the private sector. These interests heavily influence the concept of "national interest" in Australia's external relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most successful defence pacts in history, Australia's alliance with America is becoming ever more central to our strategic policy. This is a bipartisan trend that has been supported by previous governments, including in the Morrison government's 2020 Defence Strategic Update, and is being implemented by the Albanese government, as confirmed in its 2023 Defence Strategic Review. At the same time, successive U.S. administrations have refocussed on the Indo-Pacific despite competing strategic priorities in other regions, including the Ukraine war. This has led to Australia and America pursuing a policy of deeper integration of their armed forces at the operational and strategic levels. This is most visible in northern Australia, whose value to Australian and allied defence planning is increasing for geopolitical reasons. Building on the Marine rotational force in Darwin announced in President Obama's pivot to Asia, U.S. force posture initiatives are upgrading northern Australian defence infrastructure and deploying additional forces for exercises and contingency planning at a time when Australia is also investing in its northern bases. While cutting-edge capabilities such as SSN-AUKUS submarines will boost Australia's strategic contribution to the alliance, its strength lies in the solid public support it enjoys. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'Asian Visits Fund' was the Australian Government's first Cold War people-to-people public diplomacy programme. Standing in the Fund's way was Australia's racially restrictive immigration programme. A central feature of the scheme, therefore, was to present a vision of a non-racial Australia through the new national ideology of Assimilation. The treatment of indigenous Australians was showcased as one way to highlight Assimilation and debunk broader claims of racism. Ultimately, however, the Asian Visits Fund was unable to alter the negative perception of Australia's immigration policy. It was the last major initiative aimed at selling the unsellable 'White Australia Policy'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of Australia's main policy interventions in the South Pacific since the end of the Cold War was sanctions on Fiji in response to the latter's December 2006 coup. Dubbed 'Smart' sanctions, this policy was not only designed to pressure Fiji to return to democracy, but also to sustain Australia's longstanding regional leadership aspirations, aspirations which went hand in hand with its 'strategic denial' of unwelcome geopolitical challengers (Hawksley Global Change, Peace & Security, 21(1) 115-130, 2009). There has been little analysis of the unintended consequences of sanctions, namely, whether 'Smart' sanctions ironically contributed to greater strategic competition in the South Pacific, weakened regional security and prompted expressions of Pacific regionalism that excluded Australia. In the years after the coup, Canberra achieved its primary aim of being, and being seen to be, the dominant power in the South Pacific. However, during this time, Fiji "Looked North" and Pacific Island Countries (PICs) developed greater confidence in the 'New Pacific Diplomacy', thus providing the opportunity for China and other powers to expand their influence in the region (Fry and Tarte, 2015). To the backdrop of growing concern about Chinese influence, the failure of 'Smart' sanctions against Fiji shows the constraints of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. The fact that sanctions are no longer a palatable policy option has not been adequately canvassed in the literature. In this context, in order to counter Chinese influence, Australia requires greater soft power resources and a sustained effort to listen to the concerns of PICs in order to achieve Australia's interests (Newton, 2020b). In the 'New Pacific Diplomacy', threatening sanctions is likely to be counterproductive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the onset of the COVID‐19 pandemic, the Australian Government has been ambiguous in the way it has communicated the aid budget. On some occasions, it has sought to downplay increases in aid spending, while at other times it has sought to downplay cuts to aid spending. We draw on interviews with federal parliamentarians and key informants to understand these dynamics, in the context of obtaining their views on changes to Australia's post‐COVID‐19 aid policy. We find evidence that a new political consensus is forming around Australian aid. While this 'cautious consensus' countenances aid spending increases, motivated in part by humanitarian concerns but especially by anxiety about increasing Chinese influence in the region, these priorities are tempered by considerable concern about public backlash at a time of significant economic challenges for Australian citizens. Based on this evidence, we define the contours of an emerging 'cautious consensus' by showing how it will differ from the earlier 'golden consensus' era of Australian aid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]