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The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) bills itself as an alliance. It is seen as Russia's hedge to NATO, yet it often acts in an inconsistent manner vis-a-vis its members when they face crisis situations. These situations are complicated by the fact that the alliance engages in a policy of strategic ambiguity without making a firm commitment to either side of a dispute. Since Russia often acts as a security guarantor on a bilateral level for these states, staying in the alliance may become counterproductive. In order to prevent defection of its members and assuage their fears of abandonment, while maintaining this unofficial policy of strategic ambiguity, and thus help the alliance patron, Russia, avoid entanglement, reassurances are needed. These reassurances come in the form of sunk costs, specifically joint annual military exercise, and the 2022 intervention in Kazakhstan. These sunk costs by the CSTO enhance its reputation for reliability, while maintaining its policy of strategic ambiguity. They reassure its members, assuaging their fear of abandonment, and keeping them invested in the alliance. This will be shown through the use of process tracing in a case study that examines an internal alliance dilemma with two of the organization's members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Russia have a demonstrable record of coordinating their votes at the United Nations Security Council over the past 12 years. China, in particular, has coordinated its vetoes to align with Russia, while Russia still uses its veto in isolation of other states, except for Chinese abstentions. It is widely acknowledged in the literature on Chinese–Russian foreign relations that the two states are in a strategic partnership; however, there is open debate as to how long this partnership can be sustained. Both China and Russia seem to value the partnership, but trust-building is needed to sustain it due to the growing power imbalance between them. One way that trust can be built is through costly signalling, which provides reassurances to the receiving state that the signaller has benign intentions. This article argues that China is engaged in costly signalling to Russia by aligning its votes with Moscow at the expense of angering the other permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, France and the United Kingdom—which in turn sours the relations between them. China is attempting to reassure Russia, the weaker partner, that it still values their friendship, and Russia has reciprocated by relying more on China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]