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This article offers a monetary perspective on capital flows and the Eurozone's north-south divide. It argues that finance-centric narratives in comparative political economy rightly emphasize financial instability in the periphery, but that the role of capital flows therein requires clarification. The article draws on post-Keynesian monetary theory, coherent accounting, and balance-of-payments data to make three points. First, the focus on the financial account as a driver of current accounts should be abandoned in favor of an analysis of gross capital flows. Gross flows need not stem from excess savings in core countries and can be independent from trade flows. Second, explanations of financial instability in the periphery should go beyond bank flows and consider speculative portfolio flows into bond markets and foreign direct investment into real estate. Third, rising spreads in the periphery during the Eurozone crisis and the outbreak of the pandemic were not triggered by balance-of-payments problems but by a reversal of speculative bond flows. Comparative political economy should thus dedicate more attention to institutions that render peripheral countries susceptible to speculative flows into asset markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to investigate the long run sustainability of a growth path led by multiple non-creating capacity autonomous expenditures in a demand led-supermultiplier model for a small open economy. Using two different models the results show that it is impossible to have in the same model long-term economic growth driven by the non-capacity creating component of domestic demand, exogenous income distribution, long-run balance between productive capacity and aggregate demand and balance of payments equilibrium. Economic viability of the balanced-growth path demands growth to be led by exports, at least for small open economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article implies that the time is ripe for a new paradigm in economic theory comprising classical (Ricardian) and Keynesian elements of analysis. The central Section Five presents the basic equations of classical-Keynesian political economy, the price and the quantity equation, based on three constitutive principles: the classical labour value and surplus principles and the Keynesian principle of effective demand. Subsequently, two employment mechanisms implied in the super-multiplier relation, the classical-Keynesian quantity equation, are mentioned, the internal and the external employment mechanism. Section Seven provides an analysis of the actual situation on the basis of the external employment mechanism, associated with cumulative processes of increasing disequilibria and inequalities. Given this, it ought to be replaced by the internal employment mechanism, allowing for Keynesian employment and distribution policies (Section Eight). However, the internal mechanism can only be implemented if a new world economic order is brought about, based upon a supranational currency, that is, Keynes's bancor, to ensure balance of current account equilibria worldwide. Section Ten sets forth Keynes's social liberalism, the social philosophy underlying classical-Keynesian political economy, the fundamental social ethical value of which is the Common Good. Social Liberalism thus emerges as the alternative to Capitalism and Socialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Greek crisis shocked many by its magnitude and by the nature of the policies implemented in its aftermath. The radical nature of the so-called Memorandum of Understanding was justified by the imbalances that the Greek economy experienced before the crisis. The current account deficit had been rising, as private and external debts. In addition, the ratio of public debt to GDP exceeded 100%. The crisis has been widely explained by a lack of fiscal discipline, a loss of competitiveness, and the rise of capital inflows. In this article, we seek to refute these narratives and offer a post-Keynesian interpretation of the Greek economic trajectory. Growing private indebtedness boosted imports. The resulting current account deficits were offset by rising capital inflows. Greece's high level of public debt goes back to the 1980s. The narrow tax base of the country and usurious interest rates are to blame. However, none of these trends was sufficient to trigger the sovereign debt crisis. We argue that the main cause of the Greek crisis lies in the political economy of the Eurozone, and more particularly in its asymmetric governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]