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Purpose. Determination of the optimal ratio of determinism and stochasticity on the basis of monitoring the activity of an iron ore enterprise in order to eliminate uncertainty when making management decisions. Methodology. In the research process, the methodological principles of system analysis were applied, namely entropy-information relations characterizing the structure and state of subsystems. Methodical approaches of the theory of information regarding the determination of the measure of information for the elimination of uncertainty. Methodology for monitoring the activities of enterprises in accordance with the accumulation and storage of information to ensure effective management. Findings. It has been proven that in the process of monitoring the functioning of an iron ore enterprise, the amount of information increases. Thus, the presence of stochastic relationships becomes an objective necessity. However, at the same time deterministic connections do not become less essential. The amount of information is increasing, which is the basis for the appearance of redundant information. It is substantiated that stochastic connections are a source of new, unpredictable information that is received through channels from the external environment. Originality. For the first time, the ratio of deterministic and stochastic information links in the functioning of the enterprise has been investigated and numerically determined on the basis of monitoring, which forms the basis for eliminating uncertainty when making management decisions. Practical value. The analysis of the monitoring process of iron ore enterprises shows that, having achieved determination at a given level of management, the corresponding system continues development at a more complex level. For iron ore enterprises, there is a transition from paper media to digital systems. As a result of innovation, a high degree of determination can be achieved. Nevertheless, the statement that the limit of any development is narrow specialization, which is due to the complete determination of the system, is correct with one significant caveat: the considered development process is carried out at an unchanged structural level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is a discussion of the concept of power in three different social theories that are often applied to educational research: the theories of Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault. In everyday life, the concept of power is used as if it only had a single connotation: power as possessed by someone (“the powerful”) while exercised over someone else (“the powerless”). In this case, power is considered as a (potentially) repressive force and ascribed to a person, a culture, a state, or a society. Though, power can be comprehended otherwise: as non-possessed and productive. In the paper, the three conceptions of power are presented and discussed in relation to each other and to specific philosophical themes like dualism, reductionism, determinism and autonomy, truth, normativity, and relativism. Finally, the paper shows that the applied powerconcept has significant consequences for the way the educational researcher analyzes conflicts, and therefore also for our understanding of the world in which we live. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Nicolas Gisin suggests that by conducting physics with intuitionistic rather than classical mathematics, rich temporality—that is, passage and tense, and specifically the future's openness—can be incorporated into physics. Physics based on classical mathematics is tenseless and deterministic, and that, so he holds, renders it incongruent with experience. According to Gisin, physics ought to represent the indeterminate nature of reality, and he proposes that intuitionistic mathematics is the key to succeeding in doing so. While I share his insistence on the reality of passage and tense and on the future being real and open, I argue that the amendment he offers does not work. I show that, its attunement to time notwithstanding, intuitionistic mathematics is as tenseless as classical mathematics and that physics is bound to remain tenseless regardless of the math it employs. There is much to learn about tensed time, but the task belongs to phenomenology and not to physics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore the problem of human freedom and responsibility in light of current neuroscientific research, particularly focusing on Libet-style experiments. Beginning with a review of significant experiments on the nature of human will, starting with Libet's influential series from the 1980s, I survey various interpretations of these experiments including those that pose challenges to concepts of human freedom and responsibility. Subsequently, I introduce the perspective of Mehmed Akkirmânî (d. 1760), an Ottoman scholar who advocates for a libertarian view of human freedom within an occasionalist framework and constructs sophisticated arguments against theological determinism. Akkirmânî's analysis of human will delineates different aspects such as inclinations, intentions, and decisions, positing that humans possess freedom solely in their conscious decisions, thereby suggesting a limited scope of free will. I argue that Akkirmânî's views are remarkably consonant with contemporary scientific findings and align with some libertarian positions. His occasionalist perspective offers an alternative model to contemporary naturalist physicalism in elucidating the connection between mental and neurophysical states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the riddle of Oedipus? This paper is an exploration of the philosophy involved in Sophocles' famous play Oedipus Tyrannus. The play involves a riddler who becomes king, a man who is famously good at understanding what others find obscure, and yet is unable to see it when he is confronted by an obvious set of uncomfortable truths about himself. As well as for Oedipus, the play poses a number of different riddles for us: in particular it is a study of responsibility and shame, and of deliberation and choice. Like any work of art, the play does not tell us what conclusions we should reach; but it does show us some questions that need asking, and indeed some riddles that we face. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I have argued against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities using a time travel-based counterexample. Kelly McCormick has responded to my counterexample by arguing that the time travel scenario must be a scenario in which a time traveler's actions are causally determined; hence, she claims, we should be suspicious of attributing moral responsibility to anyone in such a scenario. In this paper, I respond by arguing that one might be morally responsible in an indeterministic time travel scenario. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper the authors provide an epistemological view on the old controversial random-necessity. It has been considered that either one or the other form part of the structure of reality. Chance and indeterminism are nothing but a disorderly efficiency of contingency in the production of events, phenomena, processes, i.e., in its causality, in the broadest sense of the word. Such production may be observed in natural and artificial processes or in human social processes (in history, economics, society, politics, etc.). Here we touch the object par excellence of all scientific research whether natural or human. In this work, is presented a hypothesis whose practical result satisfies the Hegelian dialectic, with the consequent implication of their mutual reciprocal integration. Producing abstractions, without which, there is no thought or knowledge of any kind, from the concrete, that is, the real problem, which in this case is a given Ontological System or Reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important and most discussed problems of traditional and contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of science is the problem of causality. The problem has generated a lot of controversies and debates from scholars. One clear point amidst these discussions on the causality problem is that the last has neither been written nor heard. It remains an open-ended issue for philosophical consideration. The causation problem itself is not just a problem but a cluster of problems with puzzling questions such as; how do causes bring about their effects? Our concern in this paper is not to examine all the problems that are embedded in the relationship between cause and effect, but to focus on the metaphysical problem of how cause, conceived as a separate event is related or connected to the effect. Several theories have been postulated by Western scholars like Aristotle, Spinoza, Hume, Hempel, Russell, Kant, Mill, among others to explain the kind of causal connection obtainable between causes and effects. Some of these theories of causation are traditional view or common sense view, Humean, and the host of others. It is a fact that some of these theories have failed in proffering a philosophical solution to the traditional causation problem. In an attempt to further reflect on the traditional causation problem, this paper undertakes an exposition of the nature of causality, determinism, freedom and predestination in traditional African thought with the aim of proffering better explanation towards resolving the traditional causation problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evidence of human wickedness in the world is so transparent that no rational person can dispute its reality. This paper approaches the question of the human person from an African philosophical perspective and explores the relation between the apparently free-acting human being and God conceived as the creator of the world and the ultimate cause of the human being. The paper will proffer answers to the following question: to what extent can the human being be absolved of blame for the evil they perpetrate in a world conceived in African traditional religion and thought as the creation of a high deity who could have foreseen the negative bent of human nature and should have made human nature inclined to goodness all of the time? The paper will make novel contributions to the debate about human nature in African philosophical discourse by recasting the human being as a homo melancholicus, or melancholy being, whose evil inclination in the world can best be understood in the context of a tragic vision of reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite wholeheartedly endorsing Lycan's commonsensism on display in On Evidence in Philosophy, this paper raises concerns about three views Lycan defends in that book. The first view is compatibilism about free will and determinism. The paper argues that Lycan's Moorean defense of compatibilism fails and that it is plausible for commonsensists to think that, in their dispute with incompatibilists, the burden of proof is on compatibilists. The second view is Lycan's Principle of Humility, offered as an account of the conditions under which recognized disagreement undermines knowledge. The paper considers a permissive and a demanding way of understanding his Principle of Humility and suggests that, contra Lycan, commonsensism fits better with a permissive understanding. The third view discussed is his coherentism about justification. The paper concludes that commonsensism is best understood in foundationalist terms and that Lycan's coherentism is, in fact, an inadequately motivated version of foundationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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Copyright of BEÜ Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Bulent Ecevit University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The turn of the twenty-first century was a period of intensified research on the description of the world as a complex structure built of dynamical systems occurring at different levels of reality. Such systems can be described as bundles of processes. Therefore, the most empirically adequate ontology turns out to be processualism. In this paper, I describe a contemporary version of processual philosophy, which I refer to as processual (or dynamical) emergentism. Within the proposed position, the classical formulations of processualism and emergentism are revisited. Both elements complement each other – emergence describes constant, radical novelty as the basic feature of nature, while processualism employs the category of a process, which replaces the classically understood substance. The approach to emergence developed here is ontological and diachronic. I discuss classic determinants of emergence and propose a discussion on the category of supervenience, which in the light of the adopted assumptions turns out to be insufficient to describe the relationship of the dependence of the emergent on its base. Finally, processualism is reconciled with moderate structuralism and strong emergentism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the way in which New Testament writers responded to the experience of rejection, its grief and sometimes resultant anger, both by those who refused to respond positively to the message of the gospel and by those who ceased to continue to believe and left the faith communities. It does so initially by giving attention to the Parable of the Sower in the context of Jesus' ministry, then as interpreted in the context of the early Christian movement and finally in its Markan context. It then considers the processing of rejection in Mark as a whole, the responses to Jesus' rejection both in a sense of solidarity and going beyond it. The paper then discusses Paul's passionate response to rejection from within his own people and his theological response of hope before turning to consider the issues in Matthew and Luke, and briefly in the fourth gospel. Its conclusions are that responses were diverse, both in their scope and in their potential to cause harm and to heal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP), biomedical sciences have moved away from a gene-centred view and towards a multi-factorial one in which environment, broadly speaking, plays a central role in the determination of human health and disease. Environmental exposures have been shown to be highly prevalent in disease causation. They are considered as complementary to genetic factors in the etiology of diseases, hence the introduction of the concept of the "exposome" as encompassing the totality of human environmental exposures, from conception onwards (Wild in Cancer Epidemiol Biomark Prev 14:1847–1850, 2005), and the launch of the Human Exposome Project (HEP) which aims to complement the HGP. At first sight, and seen as complementary to the genome, the exposome could thus appear as contributing to the rise of novel postgenomic deterministic narratives which place the environment at their core. Is this really the case? If so, what sort of determinism is at work in exposomics research? Is it a case of environmental determinism, and if so, in what sense? Or is it a new sort of deterministic view? In this paper, we first show that causal narratives in exposomics are still very similar to gene-centred deterministic narratives. They correspond to a form of Laplacian determinism and, above all, to what Claude Bernard called the "determinism of a phenomenon". Second, we introduce the notion of "reversed heuristic determinism" to characterize the specific deterministic narratives present in exposomics. Indeed, the accepted sorts of external environmental exposures conceived as being at the origins of diseases are determined, methodologically speaking, by their identifiable internal and biological markers. We conclude by highlighting the most relevant implications of the presence of this heuristic determinism in exposomics research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the position on free will which is defended in 'Freedom: An Impossible Reality' is not, as Tallis claims, a compatibilist view, but actually a version of libertarianism. While endorsing many aspects of that libertarian view itself, the paper raises questions about how one of the central arguments for Tallis's view is supposed to work, and queries whether it really follows from the fact that we need to stand apart from nature in a certain sense, in order to develop the kind of abstract knowledge that is constituted by the body of scientific law, that our own actions are not mere manifestations of what Tallis calls the 'habits of nature'. It is also suggested that while a strong case can be made for many varieties of human exceptionalism, Tallis's view of animal behaviour may be too simple and that there are examples of animal agency which cannot be explained merely by the associative learning which appears to be the highest grade of animal cognition that Tallis countenances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper replies to commentary on my On Evidence in Philosophy, offered by critics Michael Bergmann and Earl Conee. It addresses their concerns regarding (1) whether my explanatory coherentism can explain the justification of introspective beliefs; (2) whether my epistemology is really coherentist rather than foundationalist; (3) my Principle of Humility; (4) my defense of free‐will compatibilism; (5) whether question‐begging is always unacceptable; and (6) whether intuitions qualify as evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

David Lewis' contemplations regarding divine foreknowledge and free will, along with some of his other more substantial work on modal realism and his counterpart theory can serve as a springboard to a novel solution to the foreknowledge and metaphysical freedom puzzle, namely a proposal that genuine metaphysical freedom is compatible with determinism, which is quite different from the usual compatibilist focus on the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. This paper argues that while Lewis opens the doors to such a possibility, in order to fully elucidate a genuinely metaphysical compatibilist account, Lewis' own counterpart theory must be abandoned in favour of an account of trans-world identity that is theoretically framed by a modified version of Robert Nozick's closest continuer theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a novel argument for fatalism: if one accepts the logical possibility of fatalism, one must accept that fatalism is true. This argument has a similar structure to the 'knowability paradox', which proves that if every truth can be known by someone, then every truth is known by someone. In this paper, what I mean by 'fatalism' is that whatever happens now was determined to happen now in the past. Existing arguments for fatalism assume that the principle of bivalence holds even for future propositions, that past truths are necessarily true, and/or that possible propositions never change into impossible propositions. However, my argument does not assume such premises. It assumes only the logical possibility of fatalism. Here, what I mean by 'fatalism is logically possible' is that there is at least one possible world where whatever happens now was determined to happen now in the past. Since this assumption is weak (thus is plausible), I believe it to be much stronger than the existing arguments for fatalism. In addition, I also show that what will happen in the future is determined now. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the account of teleology previously proposed by the authors is consistent with the physical determinism that is implicit across many of the sciences. We suggest that much of the current aversion to teleological thinking found in the sciences is rooted in debates that can be traced back to ancient natural science, which pitted mechanistic and deterministic theories against teleological ones. These debates saw a deterministic world as one where freedom and agency is impossible. And, because teleological entities seem to be free to either reach their ends or not, it was assumed that they could not be deterministic. Mayr's modern account of teleonomy adheres to this basic assumption. Yet, the seeming tension between teleology and determinism is illusory because freedom and agency do not, in fact, conflict with a deterministic world. To show this, we present a taxonomy of different types of freedom that we see as inherent in teleological systems. Then we show that our taxonomy of freedom, which is crucial to understanding teleology, shares many of the features of a philosophical position regarding free will that is known in the contemporary literature as 'compatibilism'. This position maintains that an agent is free when the sources of its actions are internal, when the agent itself is the deterministic cause of those actions. Our view shows that freedom is not only indispensable to teleology, but also that, contrary to common intuitions, there is no conflict between teleology and causal determinism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Consequence Argument is the classic argument for the incompatibility of determinism and our ability to do otherwise. Daniel C. Dennett objects that the Consequence Argument suffers from the same error as a clearly unconvincing argument that there are no mammals. In this paper, I argue that these arguments do not suffer from the same error. The argument that there are no mammals is unconvincing as it takes the form of a sorites, whereas the Consequence Argument does not. Accordingly, Dennett's objection misses its mark. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important aspect of the nineteenth century debate on the relationship between science and religion concerned the popularity of deterministic views among scientists. An integral part of Comte's positivism, the idea of immutable laws that determined natural and social phenomena became an increasingly prevalent component of scientific perspectives in the Darwinian era. Referring to this tendency as 'scientific fatalism,' critics likened it to Calvinist predestination, which transformed the debate into one involving polemics about different branches of Christianity as well. This paper focuses on a neglected aspect of this debate, namely, the role that references to Islam and Turks played in it. 'Mohammedan fatalism,' already a common theme in justifications of colonialism, promptly became a tool with which to condemn new scientific views. Comparing French, British, and American writings on the topic, the paper illustrates that while there emerged approaches that praised the fatalism of Muslims while making a case for scientific determinism, most scientists and thinkers resorted to condemning the fatalism of Muslims in order to distinguish their views from it. In this respect, the paper demonstrates how political and religious discourses played a significant part in the shaping of scientific discourse in the Victorian era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Metafísica y Persona. Revista Sobre Filosofía, Conocimiento y Vida is the property of Universidad Popular Autonoma del Estado de Puebla A.C. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Efil Journal of Economic Research / Efil Ekonomi Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Efil Journal of Economic Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Avicenna's discussion of future contingent propositions is sometimes considered to entail metaphysical indeterminism. In this paper, I argue that his logical analysis of future contingent statements is best understood in terms of the epistemic modality of those statements, which has no consequences for modal metaphysics. This interpretation is corroborated by hitherto neglected material concerning the question of God's knowledge of particulars. In the Taʿlīqāt, Avicenna argues that God knows particulars by knowing their complete causes, and when contrasted with the human knowledge of particulars, this epistemically superior access shows that the contingency of statements about future particulars is not due to the modal properties of real particulars but to the nature of human access to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we clarify, unpack, and ultimately resist what is perhaps the most prominent argument for the compatibility of free will and determinism: the epistemic argument for compatibilism. We focus on one such argument as articulated by David Lewis: (i) we know we are free, (ii) for all we know everything is predetermined, (iii) if we know we are free but for all we know everything is predetermined, then for all we know we are free but everything is predetermined, (iv) if for all we know we are free but predetermined, then it is really possible that we are, so (v) compatibilism. We uncover how the crucial epistemic modality underlying (iv) must be understood, and contend that, understood this way, the libertarian can resist (iv). Importantly, however, resisting the argument does commit the libertarian to what has been called "flip-flopping"—but we argue that this is perfectly coherent. We conclude by articulating two crucially ways the libertarian can resist the argument, by saying that we can know that determinism is false "from the armchair". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the roles of empiricism and determinism in science and concludes that the intellectual exercise that we call "science" is best described as the transition from empiricism (i.e., observation) to determinism, which is the philosophy that the future can be predicted from the past based on the natural laws that are condensations of all previous scientific knowledge. This transition (i.e., "science") is accomplished by formulating theories to explain the observations and models that are based on those theories to predict new phenomena. Thus, models are the computational arms of theories, and all models must possess a theoretical basis, but not all theories need to predict. The structure of a deterministic model is reviewed, and it is emphasized that all models must contain an input, a model engine, and an output, together with a feedback loop that permits the continual updating of the model parameters and a means of assessing predictions against new observations. This latter feature facilitates the application of the "scientific method" of cyclical prediction/assessment that continues until the model can no longer account for new observations. At that point, the model (and possibly the theory, too) has been "falsified" and must be discarded and a new theory/model constructed. In this regard, it is important to stress that no amount of successful prediction can prove a theory/model to be "correct", because theories and models are merely the figments of our imagination as developed through imperfect senses and imperfect intellect and, hence, are invariably wrong at some level of detail. Contrariwise, a single failure of a model to predict an observation invalidates ("falsifies") the theory/model. The impediment to model building is complexity and its impact on model building is discussed. Thus, we employ instruments such as microscopes and telescopes to extend our senses to examining smaller and larger objects, respectively, just as we now employ computers to extend our intellects as reflected in our computational prowess. The process of model building is illustrated with reference to the deterministic Coupled Environment Fracture Model (CEFM) that has proven to be highly successful in predicting crack growth rate in metals and alloys in contact with high-temperature aqueous environments of the type that exist in water-cooled nuclear power reactor primary coolant circuits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ethos (0860-8024) is the property of John Paul II Institute, Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, I will try to consider the usual allegations of determinism that are directed towards Bourdieu's notion of habitus from a slightly different perspective. One of the most common arguments found in these types of charges is that Bourdieu unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile objective and subjective aspects of social life under one notion. According to critics, habitus is not a viable solution to structure vs. agency debate simply because it cannot be both determined by social structure and open to contingency of autonomous subjective interpretations of the social world. I will show that this critique of Bourdieu actually is inspired by incompatibilist philosophy which maintains that regarding human action either determinism or free will can be true. However, those sociologists who, in criticising Bourdieu's understanding of habitus, follow the incompatibilist line of reasoning usually overlook the compatibilist side of this old debate in moral philosophy. In that regard, I will argue that Frankfurt and Taylor's compatibilist account of second order desires and strong evaluations can help us to better understand how habitus can be determined by environmental social factors and, at the same, time not only foster free will, but also provide a theoretical insight into radical forms of social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To pass moral judgment about others as well as ourselves is a common custom and a significant trait in our lives. Indeed, such an attitude and activity undergird the foundation of much of human social relationships and transactions. But, are we truly in a position to engage in such ethical evaluations? Paul Tillich and Thomas Nagel deliver a negative response to the question and counsel their respective readers and audiences to refrain from engaging in moral assessment of others as well as ourselves. Although the two thinkers come from diverse, if not diametrically opposite, backgrounds and pursue different intellectual and theoretical objectives, they seem to converge on this counsel and the groundings for it. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to examine their respective reasoning from a comparative metaethical perspective to note their underlying reflections on human condition and, more importantly, to trace the ramifications of such a comparison. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article seeks to read Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles and Sadeq Chubak’s Puppetry (Kheymeh-Shab-Bazi in Persian) in order to demonstrate their similar treatment of both ‘the natural’ and the fate of human beings when positioned in contrast with the natural. Hardy and Chubak, despite belonging to distinctive contexts, were both under the influence of the premises of Naturalism. The present paper aims to explore these two works of fiction in order to compare the way both authors employed the Naturalist literary trend in their style of writing, characterization, and perspective. Both authors employed an objective viewpoint, pretty similar to how scientists approach their object of study; they kept their distance from their narrations, with no particular effort to interfere in or to comment on the occurrences of such narrations. This research focuses on how, through utilizing Naturalistic principles, they endeavored to expose the quivering position of human beings when exposed to the powerful impacts of the natural. The study focuses on their similar approaches towards apparently dissimilar issues which, despite the considerable discrepancy concerning the socio-cultural contexts of their works, lurked below the surface of the fiction they produced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I present an overview of the life and work of Donald MacCrimmon Mackay, a distinguished Christian polymath who made significant contributions across a number of domains in science and philosophy in the middle part of the 20th Century, and the centenary of whose birth was in 2022. After a brief biographical sketch, we will review his contribution to theology & science, the main ones of these being: complementarity, an innovative concept relating information and matter, and mind and brain; and logical indeterminism, a proposed solution to the problem of free will and determinism. I hope that this overview will stimulate interest in, and further exploration of, his ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a new argument for compatibilism about moral responsibility by drawing attention to some overlooked implications of incompatibilism. More specifically, I argue that incompatibilists are committed to some unsavory claims about pairs of agents in deterministic worlds. These include comparative claims about moral responsibility, blameworthiness, desert, punishment, and the fittingness of reactive attitudes. I argue that we have good reasons to reject such comparisons because they fail to account for key differences between deterministic agents. This provides us with reason to embrace compatibilism and reject incompatibilism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brian Cutter (Analysis 77: 278-287, 2017) argues that one of the most prominent versions of the consequence argument—viz., Peter van Inwagen’s (An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press, 1983) ‘Third Formal Argument’—does not support an incompatibility thesis that every paradigmatic compatibilist would reject. Justin Capes (Thought 8: 50-56, 2019) concedes Cutter’s conclusion concerning van Inwagen’s Third Formal Argument and tries to meet the important challenge that Cutter issues at the end of his paper—viz., articulate a promising version of the consequence argument whose conclusion is an incompatibility thesis that every paradigmatic compatibilist would reject. After arguing that Capes’s response to Cutter’s challenge fails, I meet Cutter’s challenge by presenting and discussing a version of the consequence argument that focuses on ordinary human agents in circumstances that are ordinary for human agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kulp et al. proposed the number of missing ordinal patterns as a test statistic to detect the nonlinearity of time series in 2017. Inspired by the article, we propose a novel method called the number of missing dispersion patterns (NMDPs), which refers to the number of dispersion patterns that do not appear in the series after being symbolized using the Rostaghi and Azami method. The proposed method can distinguish between deterministic and stochastic dynamics well. By comparing the statistical difference between the NMDP results of the original series and the NMDP results of the wavelet iterative amplitude adjustment Fourier transform surrogate series, NMDP is demonstrated as a useful statistic for testing series nonlinearity. In this paper, we first apply NMDP to the model time series and verify its effectiveness as a test for determinism as well as nonlinearity and its ability to distinguish noise-contaminated series from purely stochastic series. We then apply NMDP to different stock index time series. The experiment results show that our method may be a suitable tool for quantifying the complexity of the inherent structure of the market under different development levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Game engines are increasingly used as simulation platforms by the autonomous vehicle community to develop vehicle control systems and test environments. A key requirement for simulation-based development and verification is determinism, since a deterministic process will always produce the same output given the same initial conditions and event history. Thus, in a deterministic simulation environment, tests are rendered repeatable and yield simulation results that are trustworthy and straightforward to debug. However, game engines are seldom deterministic. This paper reviews and identifies the potential causes and effects of non-deterministic behaviours in game engines. A case study using CARLA, an open-source autonomous driving simulation environment powered by Unreal Engine, is presented to highlight its inherent shortcomings in providing sufficient precision in experimental results. Different configurations and utilisations of the software and hardware are explored to determine an operational domain where the simulation precision is sufficiently high i.e. variance between repeated executions becomes negligible for development and testing work. Finally, a method of a general nature is proposed, that can be used to find the domains of permissible variance in game engine simulations for any given system configuration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a metaphysical framework for distinguishing between human and machine intelligence. It posits two identical deterministic worlds -- one comprising a human agent and the other a machine agent. These agents exhibit different information processing mechanisms despite their apparent sameness in a causal sense. Providing a conceptual modeling of their difference, this paper resolves what it calls “the vantage point problem” – namely, how to justify an omniscient perspective through which a determinist asserts determinism from within the supposedly deterministic universe.

This paper is a defense of the big ideas behind the free-thinking argument. This argument aims to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with epistemic responsibility in a desert sense (being praised or blamed for any thought, idea, judgment, or belief). This lack of epistemic responsibility is problematic for the naturalist. It seems to be an even worse problem, however, for the exhaustive divine determinist because not only would humanity not stand in a position to be blamed for any of our thoughts and beliefs, but it also surfaces a "problem of epistemic evil", which can be raised against the knowledge of God, the rationality of humans, and the trustworthiness of Scripture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper aims to relate two debates about how logic and language influence thought. There is an axis of discussion about whether there exists a plurality of logic or a single logical system as an evaluation criterion for any reasoning context. In linguistics, the debate arising from the strong and weak interpretations of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has centralized the discussion around the degree of influence or determination of language on thought. From different perspectives and theoreticalconceptual frameworks, logic, and linguistics delimit and problematize a field of inquiry and reflection. The article, from a transdisciplinary perspective, intends to account for and postulate communicating vessels between these debates, considering the nuances of each approach. It also seeks to propose its own hypothesis on the problem raised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of the human beast is assigned to the French novelist, Émile Zola, who is the first to codify principles of Naturalism, against which all future naturalist works would be compared. In his novels, especially in the saga Les Rougon-Macquart, the human beast, «la bête humaine», appears as a literary character embedded in the lower social strata, who, due to harsh working and living conditions in the French capital during the Second Empire, acts according to its most basic instincts. The actions of a human beast are violent and brutal and its behavior conditioned by limited education. In his novels, Zola applies the doctrines of biological determinism as well as the laws of heredity attained from scientific readings that were very popular among the intellectuals of the period. However, the theoretical principles recollected in Le roman expérimental (G. Charpentier et Cie Éditeurs, 1880) were not equally applied in other countries due to different literary precedents as well as diverse socio-historical and philosophical backgrounds. This paper aims to examine the nuances in the aesthetic representation of the human beast in Zola's L'Assommoir (1877), Galdós' La Desheredada (1881) and Crane's Maggie, a Girl of the Streets (1843), delving into the behavioral patterns which shape the unique characteristics of their human beasts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]