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Victory Day celebrations in Russia have frequently been characterized as a vehicle for state militarism, particularly in the context of the full‐scale invasion of Ukraine. This article challenges the notion that the state is the sole proprietor of this national holiday. Drawing on recent ethnographies of Victory Day, the article argues that a trend towards patriotic performativity increasingly defines public celebrations. This trend has two outcomes: strengthening participants' sense of national community while reinforcing statist discourse – even among the holiday's critics. By examining the relationship between the Russian state and Victory Day, the article illuminates the crucial distinction between a reiterated, performative victory and the realities of actual warfare. This analysis contributes to broader discussions on collective memory, state power and the role of public celebrations in shaping national identity in post‐Soviet contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National pride relates to nationalism, one of the most powerful forces in modern politics. Many surveys have shown that most citizens are proud of their countries, but few have directly examined the underlying reasons for why people are proud of their countries. Using parallel national surveys in China and the United States, we investigate the sources and contents of national pride in the two most powerful nation‐states in the world. Our results reveal clear differences between citizens in the two countries. While the sources of American national pride are largely ideational, the sources of Chinese national pride tend to be material. The evidence provides a first set of insights into the sources of national pride and challenges conventional depictions of nationalism as a monolithic concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kirmānī (d. 1871) wrote Khātamayah nāṣirīyyah (Naṣīrean Epilogue), a concise treatise of a few pages, in 1865 (eighteenth of Rajab of 1273 hijri); thirteen years after the emergence of the Bābī movement and seven years after the execution of Sayyid ʿAlī Muḥammad Shīrāzī (d. 1850) in Tabriz. In this treatise, he expresses his loyalty to both the fourth Qajar monarch, Nāṣir al‐Dīn Shah (d. 1896) and Twelver Shīʿīsm. Furthermore, he expounds on the political inclination of Kirmānī Shaykhīsm as well as the suspicious affiliation of his school with the Bābīs, which was a matter of speculation for the court. Khātamayah nāṣirīyyah, which took its name from the Shah, should be treated as Kirmānī's political manifesto, reflecting his uncomfortable attitude toward the presence of foreigners in a Muslim country, which was resented by the monarch as well. Kirmānī not only takes sides with him, but also warns him of the harm of becoming too close to infidels, which may even result in the dominance of kuffār on Muslim territories. Kirmānī's outlook toward politics was largely shaped by the Bābī movement. As no hint of having any political philosophy is traceable in his writings prior to 1260 H/1852, and since Khātamayah nāṣirīyyah was written shortly after the suppression of the movement, one can come to the conclusion that the socio‐religious anxiety and the radical tone of Bābīsm made him adopt such a conservative approach, which seemed to be the only tenable way of representing his patriotism. Moreover, Khātamayah nāṣirīyyah, should be treated as the official response of the Shaykhī school to the messianic radicalism of Shīrāzī and his followers. Khātamayah nāṣirīyyah has a sister text, Nāṣirīyyah dar jihād (Naṣīrean in Jihād), which was finished in the same year, although it is lengthier and discusses Jihād, inter alia, in a more nuanced way. In some copies, Nāṣirīyyah is published with Khātamah as its epilogue. In this paper, I will read and analyze both Khātamayah nāṣirīyyah and Nāṣirīyyah dar jihād to investigate Kirmānī's stance on politics, religion and nationalism. Relevant to this are his arguments against any probable affiliation with Bābīsm. As a product of its time, Khātamayah nāṣirīyyah reflects the concerns of a jurist‐theologian who was able to foresee how the religious messianism and social radicalism of Bābīsm and similar movements, can bring considerable changes to state, society and faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the issue of Russian imperial nationalism in the early phase of its formation, namely the nationalization of patriotism in literature during the Crimean War, 1853–56. Using historical studies and theories of nationalism, the author shows how and why an acute discourse of a nationalistic experience of community uniting the elite with the common people arose in St. Petersburg society, theater, and literature. Drawing on many published and archival materials, the article describes the institutions of escalating nationalism (thick journals, newspapers, the Maritime Ministry, theater, salons, and circles), everyday rituals (wearing "Russian" clothes), and the images of peasants, who in the fiction of Aleksei Potekhin, Aleksei Pisemskii, Ivan Gorbunov, Ivan Turgenev, and Dmitrii Grigorovich acted as bearers of authentic "Russianness." The growing popularity of these writers' texts can be explained by the fact that they demonstratively linked the psychology and subjectivity of peasant characters with their ethnic identity. Contrary to official propaganda that portrayed peasants as loyal to the tsar, faith, and Fatherland, the new representation satisfied the demand of the elite and socially diverse theater audience for images of unity within a single national community and compensated for the disappointment of defeats at the front. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article calls for revisiting the predominant yet flawed nationalism‐patriotism dichotomy, which has to date remained unchallenged. It advocates for a more nuanced triad: nationalism, exclusively referring to the nation; patriotism, revolving around the homeland; and democratic patriotism, with democracy as its object of attachment. This novel conceptual approach explicitly theorizes these three objects of attachment, which have hitherto rarely been considered. In so doing, the article synthesizes the field's predominant research traditions that have not been fully recognized as diverging nor been simultaneously investigated. By responding to calls for more theoretically robust measures, it not only makes a theoretical but also an empirical contribution to the field. Drawing on data from a representative sample (N = 1875) in Germany in 2022, the study introduces a three‐factor measurement model of nationalism, patriotism, and democratic patriotism. Taking into account both the antecedents of the triad and its impact on outgroup hostility, the measures are further validated. To establish its applicability in non‐German contexts, the model is additionally supported using data from a representative sample (N = 1164) in Denmark in 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews myths about English identity, using 'myth' in a social scientific way, a truth held to be self‐evident; not something which is patently untrue. It argues that there must be three defining dimensions of English 'nationalism' if it is to be treated as such: first, whether there has been a significant increase in the proportion of people claiming 'English' as their national identity; second, how 'England' is treated as an 'imagined community'; and third, the degree to which the Conservative Party is the political vehicle for English nationalism. These dimensions are labelled the social, the cultural and the political. Only if there is sustained evidence for all three aspects might we consider English nationalism to be a significant phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent debates about whether educators should teach America's racist history have sparked activism and legislation to ensure students are taught American history in such a way that promotes "patriotism," amplifying cherished national myths, emphasizing American exceptionalism, and erasing negative historical facts. Building on insights from both social dominance theory and Christian nationalism research, we propose Christian nationalism combines legitimizing myths that whitewash America's past with authoritarian impulses and thus seeks to enforce "patriotic" content in public school classrooms. We also theorize this connection varies across racial, partisan, and ideological identities. Data from a nationally‐representative survey of Americans affirm Christian nationalism is by far the leading predictor Americans believe "We should require public school teachers to teach history in a way that promotes patriotism." This association is consistent across race (possibly due to divergent meanings of both "Christian nationalism" and "patriotism" across groups), but varies by partisanship and ideological identity for whites. Specifically, Christian nationalism brings whites who identify with the ideological and political left into complete alignment with their conservative counterparts who are already more likely to support mandatory patriotic education. Our findings provide critical context for ongoing battles over public‐school curricula and education's role in perpetuating social privilege. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars note that since the early 1990s, the CCP has been invoking Chinese nationalism to rescue the party's declining ideological legitimacy. Probing China's political indoctrination (thought work), this article makes two contributions to such conventional consensus. First, empirically it argues that the rise of nationalism in the 1990s was not altogether new. Instead, from the early 1980s, the CCP had been switching to "patriotism." Second, this article argues that the communist regime's transition to nationalism was hesitant. It was an interactive process whereby multiple layers of the society and elite, confused alike, worked together to explore whether and how to embrace nationalism. The nation‐building also bore the imprint of the revolutionary and state‐socialist past. This article suggests that though the nation‐state has become the dominant political format of the world, as a pattern it fuses with a society's traditions, preconditions, and internal struggles. Such fusions made nation‐building in the non‐Western world unseparated from quasi‐national legacies such as revolution and socialism and could yield consequences other than capitalism and democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article brings, for the first time, two of the most pivotal distinctions in nationalism studies into extended dialogue: the civic–ethnic distinction (CED) and the nationalism–patriotism distinction (NPD). By reviewing both the evolution of those distinctions over the previous decades and the ways in which they have been used in quantitative empirical research, we argue that the CED's evolution has been a partial success story, whereas discourse around the NPD has not seen substantial development. Despite lingering inconsistencies, researchers drawing on the CED have been successful in addressing different lines of critique and in using the CED as a heuristic for investigating notions of nationhood as expressed in public perceptions. In contrast, there has been only limited dialogue between theoretical and empirical approaches to the NPD. The article illustrates how research drawing on the NPD could profit from the CED's evolution. We close by providing a conceptual roadmap to guide the path towards more terminological clarity and to construct more theoretically robust measures for nationalism and patriotism. We specifically suggest that nationalism and patriotism should be consistently understood as ideal types that citizens can simultaneously hold to varying degrees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article in this journal, Josep Lobera and Juan Roch formulate a thoughtful critique of scholarly works on the nationalist dimension of left‐wing populist discourses, and, in their analysis on Podemos, they engage especially with my works on the subject. They argue that not only do Podemos supporters express lower levels of national identification than the rest of the Spanish population, but also that, coherently with its electorate, Podemos avoids talking about issues related to Spanish identity and exhibits a non‐nationalist or even anti nationalist narrative. Contrarily, in my studies I found that Podemos has made extensive use of nationalist rhetoric. In this article I briefly respond to their critique, further clarifying the findings of my works and explaining why they do not match with the findings of Lobera and Roch. More broadly, I see this response as a chance to contribute to the further development of the recent and vibrant scholarly debate on the Left and its relation to nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main thesis of this article is that nationalist political discourses emerged in Hungary more suddenly, radically, and earlier than previously thought. An underlying assumption is that nationalism may be best understood through an analysis of political discourses. The sudden appeal of these kinds of political discourses demands explanation. How did the discourses of nation overwrite earlier discourses? How did they gain social, political and cultural legitimacy? How were they related to the Enlightenment? In answering these questions, we first point to the ambiguity and fluidity of new concepts and terms, such as nation, language, fatherland, patriot, and foreigner. These key concepts of nationalist discourses provided innovative and independent sources of political legitimation. They enabled the frameworks of political life and thought to be re‐established. They made for an easy entry into politics because they were rooted in familiar, earlier political discourses. However, for the success of nationalism as a political paradigm, the new discourses of nation also had to make attractive ideological offers and project positive visions of the future. These offers, as we will show, were built on an appeal to "public happiness." They bound together Magyarisation and nationalism and grew from an ideology into a political programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main thesis of this article is that nationalist political discourses emerged in Hungary more suddenly, radically and earlier than previously thought. An underlying assumption is that nationalism may be best understood through an analysis of political discourses. The sudden appeal of these kinds of political discourses demands explanation. How did the discourses of nation overwrite earlier discourses? How did they gain social, political and cultural legitimacy? How were they related to the Enlightenment? In answering these questions, we first point to the ambiguity and fluidity of new concepts and terms, such as nation, language, fatherland, patriot and foreigner. These key concepts of nationalist discourses provided innovative and independent sources of political legitimation. They enabled the frameworks of political life and thought to be re‐established. They made for an easy entry into politics because they were rooted in familiar, earlier political discourses. However, for the success of nationalism as a political paradigm, the new discourses of nation also had to make attractive ideological offers and project positive visions of the future. These offers, as we will show, were built on an appeal to 'public happiness'. They bound together Magyarisation and nationalism and grew from an ideology into a political programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his own era, Arthur Schopenhauer was criticized for his conspicuous lack of patriotism. The critics were correct in the sense that Schopenhauer was a lifelong anti‐nationalist in a period of rising cultural and political nationalism. This article reconstructs Schopenhauer's critique of nationalism. First, it articulates his double ethical and intellectual case against the idea of the nation as a community supposed to give shape to the allegiances and obligations of its members. Second, it turns to his critique of teleological national history, according to which nations are collective agents with a single fate. Third, it reviews his caustic criticism of the increased importance of the vernacular in scholarly communication and the early Germanist attempt to establish an exclusively German literary canon; to Schopenhauer, nationhood was not even a useful category of cultural appreciation. Through this reconstruction, Schopenhauer emerges as a fierce anti‐nationalist who systematically questioned the importance of the nation as a supposedly cohesive community of solidarity and mutual care, a unified collective political and historical subject, or even a meaningful cultural or literary phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jacop Custodi elaborated recently a response to our article "A nationalist party with non‐nationalistic voters? Discussing the limits of nationalism in party categorisation" published in the journal Nations & Nationalism. We consider the work of Custodi is an important and original contribution to the study of left politics and nationalism. This being said, we reflect on the negative consequences of overstretching the category nationalism, both referring to parties and to political discourse. The aim of this reply is unpacking and explaining these negative consequences and offering an alternative as well as responding to some specific points raised by Custodi in his reply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our reply to Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2021) is in three parts. First, we clarify the aim of our research note (Eger & Hjerm, 2021). Our original critique was based on a replication of their inductive analysis, and we evaluated their work using best practices for the methodology that they chose. Our argument is straightforward: If one is going to use inductive methods to say something meaningful about the real world, one needs to make sure that the model being advanced fits the data. We present additional evidence supporting our original critique. Second, we discuss whether their new analyses bolster their original results and conclusions. Third, because their own results actually suggest that different levels of American nationalism exist rather than qualitatively different types, we question their claim of convergent validity. In short, we stand by our original critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most theoretical and empirical approaches to nationalism not only distinguish between ethnic and civic notions of national belonging but also differentiate national identity from national hubris, pride, and attachment. In this research note, we examine recently published research on nationalist sentiments in the United States that takes a different approach. The study in question, 'Varieties of American Popular Nationalism' by Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016), has already become quite influential in the field and has the potential to change how we conceptualise and operationalise attitudes about the nation. In this research note, we revisit its analytical strategy and exploratory methods. We ask two questions. First, does this study allow us to draw conclusions about American nationalism? To answer this, we replicate the original model and then execute additional postestimation analyses, whose results undermine the study's main conclusions. Second, we investigate whether judicious revisions to the study's model generate results that would lead us to the article's same conclusions. The 385 additional models lend no support. Based on this evidence, we argue that the original study's conclusions stem from a misinterpretation of its latent class analysis (LCA), as our own analyses demonstrate that there is no empirical basis for its claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does attachment to a nation enhance or dampen support for the European Union (EU)? Using the 2003 and 2013 ISSP national‐identity modules, we isolate and provide multi‐item measures of two distinct types of national attachment—nationalism and patriotism. We find that they are positively related yet have divergent effects. We validate the measures showing that nationalism increases, and patriotism decreases, support for nationalistic policies (anti‐immigration and protectionism) as expected. We then test the effects of nationalism and patriotism on EU attitudes and find that nationalism increases, and patriotism decreases, opposition to the EU. The presence of a neo‐nationalist political party enhanced the effects of nationalism on opposition to the EU, underscoring the importance of political rhetoric in shaping nationalistic EU opposition. In further support of the rhetoric hypothesis, the most‐educated nationalists are most likely to oppose the EU in countries with a neo‐nationalist political party and vote for such parties when present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]