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While fossil fuels are a well‐researched element of nationalist discourse, the relationship between nationalism and renewable energy has not yet been adequately explored. We address this gap by investigating the impact of the energy transition on the Scottish National Party's (SNP) discourse between 1983 and 2021. Through an analysis of SNP manifestos and speeches, we discursively trace the evolution of three pertinent amalgams of nationalism—green nationalism, resource nationalism and techno‐nationalism—revealing renewable energy to have been co‐opted and deployed in all three. Rather than the energy transition intuitively resulting in the decline of fossil fuel‐based nationalisms in favour of those rooted in an emergent renewable energy paradigm, we find that adaptations in the SNP's discursive strategies allowed the former to co‐exist with the latter, enhancing complementarity and mitigating goal conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the factors that affect domestic tourist attachment to dark tourism destinations by developing a hybrid model using several methods, including structural equation modeling (SEM) and fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (FAHP), predicated on attachment theory. The study collected data from 60 tourism experts and 622 domestic tourists. The study found that tourist motivation, national identity, tourism impacts, and destination attachment are all crucial factors that explain domestic tourist behavior towards dark tourism. The results of the mediation analysis indicate that destination attachment mediates the relationship between tourist motivation, national identity, and negative tourism impact with tourist satisfaction. The FAHP results show that place identity has the highest influence while place dependence has the lowest influence in shaping domestic tourists' selection of dark tourist destinations. The study's findings provide valuable insights for tour operators and destination managers to meet domestic tourists' expectations of dark tourism, adding to the existing knowledge related to the factors that impact dark tourism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews myths about English identity, using 'myth' in a social scientific way, a truth held to be self‐evident; not something which is patently untrue. It argues that there must be three defining dimensions of English 'nationalism' if it is to be treated as such: first, whether there has been a significant increase in the proportion of people claiming 'English' as their national identity; second, how 'England' is treated as an 'imagined community'; and third, the degree to which the Conservative Party is the political vehicle for English nationalism. These dimensions are labelled the social, the cultural and the political. Only if there is sustained evidence for all three aspects might we consider English nationalism to be a significant phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is well documented that individuals' conceptions of national identity influence their opinions about immigration. The most well‐known ideal types to capture conceptions of national identity are the civic and ethnic conceptions. Yet, this dichotomy does not reflect contemporary debates about immigration, which are framed in cultural terms. Scholars have thus proposed a cultural conception of national identity. The relationship between this conception and immigration, however, remains contested. Using an innovative approach to studying public opinion, this research analyses qualitative interviews conducted with individuals from the general public to investigate how each conception of national identity influences opinions about immigration in the context of Quebec, Canada. It shows that the cultural conception of national identity is related to both positive and negative opinions about immigration. This is explained by an evaluation mechanism whereby individuals evaluate if immigrants are included or excluded from the national group based on their (non)conformity to specific markers of identity. This evaluation is subjective and is often informed and substantiated by mediatised information about immigration‐related issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For all their interest as social phenomena, nations and nationalism have proven to be difficult terms to define, which has resulted in a lack of consensus among scholars working on these subjects. In this paper, it is my intention to expose the deep chasm that engulfs our present knowledge about what nations are. My method for achieving this goal comprises a critical engagement with the most popular definitions of nations and nationalism based upon a single hypothetical premise: that the Holy See of the Catholic Church, with its seat in Vatican City, is a nation‐state which represents a purported Catholic nation. The results of this study suggest that current approaches to the definition of nations and nationalism – be they based on alleged objective criteria, voluntary association, political organization, communal imagination, or organizational patterns – are generally incapable of dismissing the claim of Catholics to nationhood. Despite this fact, certain elements sketched within some of these definitions might hold the key to developing more precise and usable definitions of these two concepts in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent work suggests that collective narcissism—an exaggerated, unrealistic belief in an ingroup's greatness that demands constant external validation—is a strong predictor of a variety of political attitudes. In the present study, we use nationally representative panel data from Poland to examine the relationship between national collective narcissism and nationalism, a belief that the national ingroup is superior and should dominate other nations. We first demonstrate that national collective narcissism, nationalism, and mere satisfaction with national ingroup are distinct. In turn, in both cross‐sectional and panel analyses, we find that (1) national collective narcissism is positively related to nationalism, whereas satisfaction with the national ingroup is not; and (2) national collective narcissism is a stronger predictor of nationalism than national ingroup satisfaction is in absolute terms. Our analyses thus provide evidence that nationalism may be rooted in narcissistic exaggeration of the greatness of the national ingroup rather than nonnarcissistic national ingroup satisfaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an era of unprecedented numbers of migrants from the global south to the global north, nationalism has become synonymous with liberal states' ethnocentric, xenophobic, and racist immigration policies. The Trump administration's treatment of Central American refugees has been taken as a prime example. By focusing on liberal cultural nationalism, this paper demonstrates that these prevailing perceptions about nationalism are unfounded. Although liberal cultural nationalism has been accused of endorsing restrictive immigration policies, the degree to which liberal cultural nationalism's immigration policies are restrictive is context dependent; under certain circumstances, liberal nationalism may call for relaxing immigration policies to admit certain types of immigrants by invoking the idea of national responsibility. Consequently, liberal cultural nationalism offers one of the strongest liberal arguments for admitting certain kinds of migrants from the global south. The Central American refugee crisis at the U.S. southern border is analysed as a case study to illustrate this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A national dress is a reflection of national consciousness towards the nation and its cultural heritage. Instead of simply being functional, a national dress is also a script that exhibits people's identities. This study examines how Zimbabweans identify with the national dress as a facet of achieving national identity. Qualitative research methods and Gramscianism were employed in the study. It is revealed that the majority of Zimbabweans fail to identify with the national dress due to political, cultural and economic reasons. The national dress is perceived as a campaign strategy being used by the state to achieve political expediency and to be seen as champion of moral as well as cultural regeneration. Some participants associate the dress with cultural imperialism and waste of resources. Very few participants take the dress as a positive step towards the decolonisation of cultural spaces and identities. Conclusively, the majority of Zimbabweans find the dress insignificant in their lives and in national identity construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been changes in how support is rallied for the secessionist process in the Basque Country this century. We can appreciate a new scheme based on factors relating to welfare along with the traditional scheme based, above all, on factors relating to identity. How important is each of them? By using the statistical technique of logistic regression, we have been able to look deeper into the variables that explain being favourably disposed to a Basque state, as well as those that explain a change in stance, based on a variety of dimensions. The results indicate, on the one hand, that there is currently no one factor to explain a favourable position towards a Basque state. What's more, in the future, the stances on a Basque state are likely to shift more easily, depending on the interests and sentiments at any given moment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Liberal nationalism has been the subject of increased attention in the wake of the 2010s rise in national populism. It has been seen to offer a concessionary form of national identity which is compatible with the liberal values of inclusivity and egalitarianism. This paper argues that recent attempts to delineate the contours of a specifically liberal national identity fail to highlight much that is distinctively liberal, as opposed to conservative, about its content. The criteria that such attempts propose typically apply almost equally to conservative accounts, thereby overshooting the target. However, further ideological excavation reveals that there is an alternative axis for distinguishing between liberal and conservative conceptions of national identity: democratic inclusivity. The paper further proposes that shifting the emphasis to this dimension, and to liberal and conservative accounts differing aims and formation processes, is conducive to both greater ideological transparency and bridging the gap between theory and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I explore whether, and if so how, national identity affects the level of formal democracy in a country. I theorize and then investigate four assumptions: (i) classical nationalist stances hold that national membership depends on the accident of origin and cultural markers learned by early socialization. This non‐voluntary identity gives human beings a natural sense of belonging in society and fosters solidarity and trust that lead to better democracy; (ii) drawing on ideas about core values of ideal democracy the non‐voluntarist national identity exhibits an inherent contradiction between in‐group bias and intrinsic equality, which leads to lower levels of democracy; (iii) homogeneity in belief about what constitutes national belonging eases the dynamics between majority and minority, which benefits democracy; (iv) the presence of an in‐group identity, understood as a shared fellow‐feeling, boosts trust and solidarity and thereby benefits democracy. Individual‐level data about national identity comes from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 2013). Data about democracy comes from Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al., 2021; Pemstein et al., 2021). Results indicate that higher levels of non‐voluntarist features of national identity are strongly negatively correlated with levels of democracy and heterogeneity in beliefs about what constitutes national belonging relating to a higher level of liberal democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]