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In Nationalism and Culture, now a largely forgotten book, the anarchist thinker Rudolf Rocker offers a compelling account of the nationalist phenomenon, from its origins and development to its influence (or lack thereof) over the linguistic and cultural practices of the large groups of people that typically encompass a nation‐state. The present paper aims to revisit and update Rocker's book, highlighting its relevance and potential contribution to the modern study of nationalism. In particular, I employ the tools of Noam Chomsky's generative study of language to characterise the roles language and culture play in the formation of national identities, in so doing unearthing some of the psychological underpinnings of nationalist beliefs and thus, furthermore, clarifying the actual effects of nationalist policies on language, culture, and artistic creativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews myths about English identity, using 'myth' in a social scientific way, a truth held to be self‐evident; not something which is patently untrue. It argues that there must be three defining dimensions of English 'nationalism' if it is to be treated as such: first, whether there has been a significant increase in the proportion of people claiming 'English' as their national identity; second, how 'England' is treated as an 'imagined community'; and third, the degree to which the Conservative Party is the political vehicle for English nationalism. These dimensions are labelled the social, the cultural and the political. Only if there is sustained evidence for all three aspects might we consider English nationalism to be a significant phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Secularisation theory contends that religiosity and trust in religious organisations tend to decline when trust in their secular counterparts increases. However, it is puzzling why religious organisations receive public trust as high as their secular counterparts in countries where religiosity is low. If religious organisations are deemed to be doomed as trust in secular counterparts rises, why do people still trust them? We argue that a high level of trust in religious organisations is associated with their importance in nation‐building and national identity construction: Individuals with a strong national identity are more likely to trust religious organisations. Using both qualitative and quantitative data about public trust in the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) and Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC), this study finds that the historical role of religious organisations in strengthening national cohesion and building national identity during times of instability leads ordinary citizens to place both generational and strategic trust in these religious organisations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Danish‐Jewish publisher Meïr Aron Goldschmidt was an active political voice in Denmark in the 1840s and 1850s during the crisis of the Danish Oldenburg monarchy, when the 'Danish Empire' was troubled by territorial defragmentation, succession crisis, foreign military threats, Danish–German ethnic tensions and calls for democratic reforms by National Liberals. This article reflects on Goldschmidt's life and works as he attempted to syncretise the inherent dualities of nationalism and liberalism. His vision became a Swiss‐inspired federalism that should create a shared national identity based on liberal democracy to reunite the ethnic groups of the 'Danish Empire'. Ultimately, history took another course, and the nationalist path was taken with disastrous results for Denmark. However, Goldschmidt has left a legacy in his writings as a microcosm of the ideas of his time by trying to syncretise nationalism and liberalism, cosmopolitanism and nationalism and a Danish and Jewish national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is well documented that individuals' conceptions of national identity influence their opinions about immigration. The most well‐known ideal types to capture conceptions of national identity are the civic and ethnic conceptions. Yet, this dichotomy does not reflect contemporary debates about immigration, which are framed in cultural terms. Scholars have thus proposed a cultural conception of national identity. The relationship between this conception and immigration, however, remains contested. Using an innovative approach to studying public opinion, this research analyses qualitative interviews conducted with individuals from the general public to investigate how each conception of national identity influences opinions about immigration in the context of Quebec, Canada. It shows that the cultural conception of national identity is related to both positive and negative opinions about immigration. This is explained by an evaluation mechanism whereby individuals evaluate if immigrants are included or excluded from the national group based on their (non)conformity to specific markers of identity. This evaluation is subjective and is often informed and substantiated by mediatised information about immigration‐related issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent decades have seen an increase in white supremacist appropriations of the Middle Ages. While many medievalists have sought to distance medieval studies from racist appropriations, these appropriations echo positions advanced and legitimized by philologists especially during the nineteenth century. Medieval studies as a discipline developed in the nineteenth century during the rise of nationalist movements, which often manifested as racial nationalism in Europe and the United States, and philologists actively participated in these movements by projecting contemporary national identity unto a constructed medieval past. These philologists often conflated language and race, and their nationalist scholarship helped justify imperialism. Although the ideas of these philologists are considered outdated, they set the foundation for racist appropriations of the Middle Ages and established nationalist frameworks that continue to influence the academy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 1794, when the British volunteer movement began in earnest, to 1802, when the French Revolutionary Wars came to an end, the established clergy preached numerous sermons to volunteer military units throughout England and in parts of Scotland. These sermons sought to articulate a sense of Britishness in such a way as to command more or less universal assent, meaning assent both to the ongoing war effort and to the national enterprise more broadly considered. Volunteers across the country were taught to see Great Britain as a nation chosen by God to stand alone against the onslaught of French principles, and they were encouraged to derive a sense of purpose and meaning from their local contributions to the national struggle. The volunteer sermons bridged the gap between local attachments and national commitments, and in so doing they played a significant role in the formation of a national consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is Chinese nationalism? Is nationalism the most effective framework for understanding how people in China are making sense of the world today? These are among the questions raised by Allen Carlson in his 2009 article 'A flawed perspective: the limitations inherent within the study of Chinese nationalism', which developed a provocative critique of decades of scholarship. Acknowledging the insights of Carlton's questions while disagreeing with his proposed conceptual shift towards national identity construction, I propose a further shift towards national identity deconstruction. In doing so, I combine the political insights of Hong Kong nationalists with the theoretical insights of deconstruction. This shift redirects the study of Chinese nationalism away from an abstract conceptualisation of nationalism to a more precise definition of the phenomena under study, as well as moving the debate on potential impacts away from international relations to consideration of the complex dynamics of China's ethnic politics. New definitions of both nationalism and minzu (of minzu zhuyi) are developed, reconceptualising the phenomena heretofore known as 'Chinese nationalism' as external symptoms of underlying tensions between conflicting identity narratives. In conclusion, the practical implications of this reconceptualisation are considered, exploring potential future paths for the People's Republic of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rather than addressing the Kurdish conflict in Turkey directly, this study focuses on how the rising nationalist populism bears on Kurdish voters supporting the pro‐Kurdish party HDP. There are very few studies on how Kurds are affected by the nationalist populism often expressed in Turkey by the governing People's Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı) with its slogan "domestic and national," even though the literature offers a broad variety of studies on the Kurdish conflict. To fill this gap, this study is supported by focus group discussions with the Kurds in Turkey who support the HDP, based on a sample of the Kurds living in Istanbul, which is sometimes referred to as the "largest Kurdish city." This study claims that the populist slogan of the "domestic and national" not only marginalises the Kurdish interviewees but also weakens their sense of belonging to Turkey, thus encouraging them to establish their own national identities. An important result of the focus group meetings is that AKP's polarising policy not only causes polarisation among Turks but also among the Kurds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces our themed section on The Left(s) and Nationalism(s), which provides a comparative analysis of the relationship between nationalism and different left‐wing parties in Western Europe. It highlights the innovative comparative perspectives offered by this themed section, which not only concerns a series of different geographical cases studies but also involves the ideological plurality of the Left. The larger research question that our contributors address is how different left‐wing parties have dealt with the inherent ideological tension between the universality claimed by the Left and the particularism inherent in nationalism, as a doctrine and a principle of political legitimacy. The article stresses three main contributions of our themed section: (1) Western European left‐wing parties do engage with the themes of nationalism and nationhood, but they often rely on convenient silence to solve some of the contradictions with their progressive ideology. (2) None of these parties have formulated thick versions of the respective national identities. (3) State‐wide left‐wing parties have used instrumental conceptions of nationhood to address the challenge of separatist parties, but only with mixed results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Finnish national identities because they expressed the shared experiences of newly established Finnish communities, and they were crucial in constructing a new nation. It also explores created images of the Finnish and Finland, as well as community construction in Republican China, especially after Finland gained independence in 1917. Another aim is to examine those Finnish political, cultural and economic activities that supported their identity construction in China. The specific emphasis will be on analysing the largest and sometimes cross‐functioning Finnish groups in China: the governmental officials and the commercial community. By using qualitative methods, namely, discourse analysis and historical analysis, this study shows how the Finnish community created alternative, sometimes imaginative and frequently anti‐imperialist national identities in the new Republican China. Indeed, by signing the Treaty Principles of Reciprocity and Equal Treatment, it was agreed that Finland and China 'shall enjoy same rights, privileges, favours, immunities and exemptions which [might] be accorded to similar foreign agents in accordance with the principles of international law'. This article argues that Finnish aspirations were positively regarded by many Chinese, and they respected this quite unique national connection with Finland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article in this journal, Josep Lobera and Juan Roch formulate a thoughtful critique of scholarly works on the nationalist dimension of left‐wing populist discourses, and, in their analysis on Podemos, they engage especially with my works on the subject. They argue that not only do Podemos supporters express lower levels of national identification than the rest of the Spanish population, but also that, coherently with its electorate, Podemos avoids talking about issues related to Spanish identity and exhibits a non‐nationalist or even anti nationalist narrative. Contrarily, in my studies I found that Podemos has made extensive use of nationalist rhetoric. In this article I briefly respond to their critique, further clarifying the findings of my works and explaining why they do not match with the findings of Lobera and Roch. More broadly, I see this response as a chance to contribute to the further development of the recent and vibrant scholarly debate on the Left and its relation to nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A national dress is a reflection of national consciousness towards the nation and its cultural heritage. Instead of simply being functional, a national dress is also a script that exhibits people's identities. This study examines how Zimbabweans identify with the national dress as a facet of achieving national identity. Qualitative research methods and Gramscianism were employed in the study. It is revealed that the majority of Zimbabweans fail to identify with the national dress due to political, cultural and economic reasons. The national dress is perceived as a campaign strategy being used by the state to achieve political expediency and to be seen as champion of moral as well as cultural regeneration. Some participants associate the dress with cultural imperialism and waste of resources. Very few participants take the dress as a positive step towards the decolonisation of cultural spaces and identities. Conclusively, the majority of Zimbabweans find the dress insignificant in their lives and in national identity construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are populism and nationalism two inseparable dimensions? The controversial argument is that both exclusionary and inclusionary populism draw on nationalist representations and traditions to construct their political discourse. In the case of Podemos, several scholars have argued that this party presents a nationalistic character based on its invocation of the 'patria' and a demarcated, imagined political community. This article relies on an original data set in order to test this hypothesis related to Podemos's supply and demand. With regard to supply, we explore four party manifestos to elucidate how Podemos refers to the nation, Spanish identity, sovereignty and immigration. To evaluate demand, we analyse the party's supporters' political attitudes and values regarding the nation, assimilation of immigrants and national preferentialism. Our results show that Podemos's supporters express lower levels of national identification than the remainder of the population. Similarly, the former analysis reveals a pro‐immigration position and a tendency of the party Podemos to avoid issues related to national identity. Departing from these results, we draw several implications on the use of nationalism for the categorisation of political parties and, in particular, left‐wing populism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Liberal nationalism has been the subject of increased attention in the wake of the 2010s rise in national populism. It has been seen to offer a concessionary form of national identity which is compatible with the liberal values of inclusivity and egalitarianism. This paper argues that recent attempts to delineate the contours of a specifically liberal national identity fail to highlight much that is distinctively liberal, as opposed to conservative, about its content. The criteria that such attempts propose typically apply almost equally to conservative accounts, thereby overshooting the target. However, further ideological excavation reveals that there is an alternative axis for distinguishing between liberal and conservative conceptions of national identity: democratic inclusivity. The paper further proposes that shifting the emphasis to this dimension, and to liberal and conservative accounts differing aims and formation processes, is conducive to both greater ideological transparency and bridging the gap between theory and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I explore whether, and if so how, national identity affects the level of formal democracy in a country. I theorize and then investigate four assumptions: (i) classical nationalist stances hold that national membership depends on the accident of origin and cultural markers learned by early socialization. This non‐voluntary identity gives human beings a natural sense of belonging in society and fosters solidarity and trust that lead to better democracy; (ii) drawing on ideas about core values of ideal democracy the non‐voluntarist national identity exhibits an inherent contradiction between in‐group bias and intrinsic equality, which leads to lower levels of democracy; (iii) homogeneity in belief about what constitutes national belonging eases the dynamics between majority and minority, which benefits democracy; (iv) the presence of an in‐group identity, understood as a shared fellow‐feeling, boosts trust and solidarity and thereby benefits democracy. Individual‐level data about national identity comes from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 2013). Data about democracy comes from Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al., 2021; Pemstein et al., 2021). Results indicate that higher levels of non‐voluntarist features of national identity are strongly negatively correlated with levels of democracy and heterogeneity in beliefs about what constitutes national belonging relating to a higher level of liberal democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most theoretical and empirical approaches to nationalism not only distinguish between ethnic and civic notions of national belonging but also differentiate national identity from national hubris, pride, and attachment. In this research note, we examine recently published research on nationalist sentiments in the United States that takes a different approach. The study in question, 'Varieties of American Popular Nationalism' by Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016), has already become quite influential in the field and has the potential to change how we conceptualise and operationalise attitudes about the nation. In this research note, we revisit its analytical strategy and exploratory methods. We ask two questions. First, does this study allow us to draw conclusions about American nationalism? To answer this, we replicate the original model and then execute additional postestimation analyses, whose results undermine the study's main conclusions. Second, we investigate whether judicious revisions to the study's model generate results that would lead us to the article's same conclusions. The 385 additional models lend no support. Based on this evidence, we argue that the original study's conclusions stem from a misinterpretation of its latent class analysis (LCA), as our own analyses demonstrate that there is no empirical basis for its claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the evolution of Syrian nationalism, showing how the early pan‐Arabist ideals of the Baathist founders morphed into a cult of personality focused narrowly on emotional attachments to the regime. Current Syrian state nationalism is a "constructed primordialism" consisting of vague and sentimental concepts of the Syrian people and their history, despite the fact that the Syrian state in its current territorial identity has only existed for a few decades and incorporates a diverse mosaic of ethnic, cultural, religious and national backgrounds. In the absence of a cohesive pre‐existing community to form the basis of Syrian national identity, the regime tempered its nominal commitment to Arabism with heavily Romanticized rhetoric emphasizing familial bonds of love and devotion between the people and the leader. This primordialist construct has thwarted the emergence of a civic‐oriented national identity in Syria and contributed to tensions underlying the current civil war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on several studies on each of these movements and on primary sources, I claim that Zionism and Québécois nationalism have a unique set of similarities. The first part of this article focuses on the redefinition of national identity made by both movements—the end of a religious‐ethnic identity and a new focus on language and territory—and on its various consequences. In the second part, I compare Zionists' and Québécois nationalists' arguments for sovereignty, demonstrating their similarities, with a shared wish to become a majority, a common fear from assimilation, the same aspiration towards normality, and the same claim that national independence will bring with it a new era of progress. By doing so, I point to possible directions of more thorough comparative analyses bringing these two movements together. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The five papers in this themed section seek to explain national identifications with Syria using diverse methods and focusing on various state and societal actors before and after 2011. Each contribution engages with the distinction of national identities into their 'ethnic/primordial' and 'civic/constructed' elements and examines their meaning within Syria in different times and contexts. Since its independence in 1946, Syria experienced strong tensions between sub‐ and supra‐state identities and experimented with diverse territorial nationalisms in their pan‐Arab and specifically Syrian forms. Through a distinctive mix of ethnic Arab and civic ideological elements, they helped to forge unity among a multiplicity of ethnicities, tribes and sects living on the Syrian territory and thus were moulded in tandem with the interests of those in power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do sexual minorities navigate and negotiate with nationalism? While some scholars consider nationalism as a primarily exclusionary force against sexual minorities, how might we understand sexual minorities' engagement with nationalism? I address these questions by exploring the strategic deployment of sexual and national identities of LGBT movements through the case study of Singapore's annual LGBT‐inclusive event, Pink Dot. In response to the authoritarian and heteronormative state's construction of sexual minorities as non‐national Others, Pink Dot mobilizes both sexual and national identities in an effort to forge a space of inclusion while ensuring its survival. By portraying itself as a uniquely Singaporean event and espousing national identity and belonging through symbolic and performative practices, Pink Dot leverages national identity to minimize differences from and foreground similarities to the majority. In this way, sexual minorities in Singapore endeavor to embed themselves within the narratives of the nation and claim their legitimate belonging while simultaneously projecting a nation more inclusive of sexual difference. The aspirational inclusion of sexual minorities in the national imagery, however, inevitably elicits the state's backlash that narrowly defines the physical and symbolic boundaries of the political project. This analysis advances our understanding of the interactions between the state and social movements in shaping the relationship among the nation, sexuality, and citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]