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Assisted reproduction often involves biological contributions by third parties such as egg/sperm donors, mitochondrial DNA donors, and surrogate mothers. However, these arrangements are also characterised by a biological relationship between the child and at least one intending parent. For example, one or both intending parents might use their own eggs/sperm in surrogacy, or an intending mother might conceive using donor sperm or gestate a donor embryo. What happens when this relationship is absent, as in the case of 'double‐donor surrogacy' arrangements (DDS)? Here, a child is conceived using both donor eggs and sperm, carried by a surrogate, and raised by the commissioning parents. In this paper, I critically examine proposals to allow DDS in the United Kingdom, and the intentionalist justification for treating this practice distinctly (morally and legally speaking) from private adoption. I argue that the intentionalist approach cannot plausibly justify such a distinction and that other approaches to moral parenthood are also unlikely to succeed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human uterus transplantation (UTx)—the most radical and experimental of all current forms of assisted reproduction—gives rise to a range of complex ethical questions, including those related to individual safety, risk, and informed consent. I have argued elsewhere that the wider social impacts and implications of UTx provision must form part of a comprehensive ethical analysis. My socio‐moral critique of UTx provision has been responded to with a number of defences of possible public funding of UTx. In this paper I examine a select number of those defences. These include: that UTx provision would address harms and needs that already exist and as such have priority; that UTx provision is fully compatible with the needed reform of the procreative context in which it would be offered; that UTx provision would not necessarily involve legitimation or endorsement of what are widely agreed to be problematic pronatalist or geneticist norms; and that UTx provision is required as a matter of justice and consistency with other practices. Importantly, defenders are not proposing a ceteris paribus justification of UTx provision; nor do my responses to their arguments represent a comprehensive opposition to UTx. Rather, my more limited purpose here is to show that whatever other defences may be given of publicly funded UTx provision, those considered here do not ultimately succeed and therefore do not allay the concerns underpinning the original socio‐moral critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I argue that current law and policy governing germline genetic modification are overly broad and in fact prohibit medical interventions normally considered unobjectionable. The root of the problem lies in the fact law and policy tend to espouse a near categorical ban on medical interventions that alter germline DNA. However, if we pay close attention to the biological mechanisms at play we see that many standard medical interventions result in alterations to DNA that can be transmitted to future generations. The correct focus of policy and regulation thus ought to be determining which kinds of transmissible genetic modifications ought to be permitted, and not whether they should be permitted at all. Given that the scientific classification of biological structures involved in the inheritance of traits is unlikely to be in itself ethically significant, ethicists ought to develop a definition of 'gene' fit for ethical purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The birth of the world's first genetically edited babies in 2018 provoked considerable ethical outrage. Nonetheless, many scientists and bioethicists now advocate the pursuit of clinical uses of human germline gene editing. Progress towards this goal will require research, including clinical trials where genetically edited embryos are implanted into a woman's uterus, gestated, and brought to term. This paper argues that such trials would likely conflict with the fundamental research ethical requirement of non‐exploitation. This is because they would expose people who are in a vulnerable situation to risks and burdens that are substantial and not obviously offset by compensating benefits. I consider how the potential for exploitation in such trials might be mitigated, arguing that a feasible and justifiable approach is not easily found. If this analysis is correct, there is a significant ethical obstacle on the path towards clinical use of human germline gene editing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Studies that use standardized ultrasonographic criteria to diagnose adenomyosis in subfertile women are needed. These would improve the understanding of the disease burden and enable further studies on its impact on fertility and assisted reproductive treatment (ART) outcome. The aim of this study was to determine the prevalence of different features of adenomyosis in women scheduled for their first ART, diagnosed at two (2D) and three‐dimensional (3D) transvaginal ultrasonography (TVUS) using the revised Morphological Uterus Sonographic Assessment (MUSA) group definitions. Material and methods: This was a prospective, observational cross‐sectional study of subfertile women aged 25 to ≤39 years, that were referred to a university hospital for their first ART between December 2018 and May 2021. Of 1224 eligible women, 1160 women fulfilled the inclusion criteria and consented to participate in the study. All women underwent a systematic 2D and 3D TVUS examination. The primary outcome was the presence of direct and indirect features of adenomyosis, as proposed by the MUSA group. Secondary outcomes were to describe the ultrasonographic characteristics of the different features, as well as any difference in the diagnostics at 2D or 3D TVUS and any association with clinical characteristics such as endometriosis. Results: At least one direct or indirect feature of adenomyosis was observed in 272 (23.4%, 95% confidence interval [CI] 21.0–25.9) women. Direct features that are pathognomonic for the disease were observed in 111 (9.6%, 95% CI, 7.9–11.3) women. Direct features were visible only at 3D TVUS in 56 (4.8%, 95% CI 3.6–6.1) women, that is, 56/111 (50.5%) of women with at least one direct adenomyosis feature. Direct features were more common in women with endometriosis (OR 2.8, 95% CI 1.8–4.3). Conclusions: We found than one in 10 women scheduled for ART had direct features of adenomyosis at ultrasound examination. The present study suggests that the use of 3D TVUS is an important complement to 2D in the diagnostics of adenomyosis. Our results may further improve the counseling of women scheduled for ART and enables future studies on the impact of different features of adenomyosis on subfertility, ART results and obstetric outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: To compare the reported rate of any congenital anomaly and perinatal outcome of pregnancy following blastocyst‐ vs cleavage‐stage embryo transfer using a pairwise meta‐analysis and to evaluate the same outcomes following fresh‐blastocyst, frozen‐blastocyst, fresh‐cleavage or frozen‐cleavage embryo transfer using a network meta‐analysis. Methods: A literature search was performed in PubMed, Scopus and CENTRAL and registers for ongoing studies, from inception to February 2022, for randomized controlled trials (RCTs) with any sample size and observational studies including at least 100 live births per group, comparing the rates of any congenital anomaly and perinatal outcome of pregnancy following fresh/frozen embryo transfer at cleavage (day 2–3) vs blastocyst (day 5–7) stage. Risk ratios (RRs) along with their 95% CIs were pooled via a random‐effects model meta‐analysis. Within a frequentist network meta‐analysis framework, outcomes of all four treatment modalities (i.e. fresh‐blastocyst, fresh‐cleavage, frozen‐blastocyst, frozen‐cleavage) were compared further. Any congenital anomaly constituted the primary outcome, whereas preterm delivery (delivery < 37 weeks), low birth weight (LBW; < 2500 g), gender of the neonate (male), perinatal death and healthy neonate (defined as liveborn neonate, delivered at term, weighing ≥ 2500 g, surviving for at least 28 days postbirth and without any congenital anomaly) were considered as secondary outcomes. Subgroup analyses by plurality (liveborn singleton vs multiple pregnancy) were conducted in the pairwise and network meta‐analyses. The risk of bias was assessed using the RoB2 tool for RCTs and the ROBINS‐I tool for non‐randomized studies. Certainty of evidence was assessed using GRADE. Results: Through the literature search, 550 studies were retrieved and 33 were included in the systematic review. We found no significant difference in the risk for any congenital anomaly between blastocyst‐ and cleavage‐stage transfer (RR, 0.80 (95% CI, 0.63–1.03); 10 studies; n = 192 442; I2 = 85.5%). An increased probability of a male neonate was observed following blastocyst‐ vs cleavage‐stage transfer (RR, 1.07 (95% CI, 1.06–1.09); 18 studies; n = 227 530; I2 = 32.7%). No significant differences in other secondary outcomes or significant subgroup differences between liveborn singletons and multiple pregnancies were observed. The network meta‐analysis showed a significantly lower risk for LBW following frozen‐blastocyst vs fresh‐blastocyst (RR, 0.76 (95% CI, 0.60–0.95)) or fresh‐cleavage (RR, 0.74 (95% CI, 0.59–0.93)) transfer. Frozen‐blastocyst transfer was associated with an increased risk for perinatal death compared with the fresh‐cleavage method (RR, 2.06 (95% CI, 1.10–3.88)). The higher probability of a male neonate following blastocyst transfer remained evident in the network comparisons. All outcomes were assessed to be of very‐low certainty of evidence. Conclusions: Current very‐low certainty of evidence shows that there may be little‐to‐no difference in the risk for congenital anomaly or adverse perinatal outcome of pregnancy following blastocyst‐ vs cleavage‐stage embryo transfer, although there was a slightly increased probability of a male neonate following blastocyst transfer. When considering cryopreservation, frozen‐blastocyst transfer was associated with a reduction in the risk for LBW compared with both fresh‐transfer modalities, and fresh‐cleavage transfer may be associated with a reduction in the risk for perinatal death compared with frozen‐blastocyst transfer. High‐quality RCTs with separate data on fresh and frozen cycles and consistent reporting of culture conditions and freezing methods are mandatory. Individual participant data meta‐analyses are required to address the substantial inconsistency resulting from current aggregate data approaches. © 2022 The Authors. Ultrasound in Obstetrics & Gynecology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of International Society of Ultrasound in Obstetrics and Gynecology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The moral acceptability of anonymous gamete donation remains contested. Although the view that the value of parent–child relationships should not depend on genetic ties is "nearly axiomatic" among philosophers and bioethicists, one well‐known dissenter remains: David Velleman. I argue that most rebuttals to Velleman have simply talked past him because they have failed to understand his fundamental point—that donor conception is a violation of human dignity and as such is wrong even if it does not harm individuals. I challenge Velleman on his own terms by endorsing his metaphysical picture before showing that donor conception is not necessarily a violation of human dignity. I show this by arguing that gamete donation is held to a double standard of self‐knowledge. I develop an account of the self that recognizes that certain kinds of challenges to one's flourishing can contribute to an individual's strength and self‐knowledge. I defend my view against objections that genetic knowledge is categorically different from other ways of knowing oneself and I show that donor conception can respect human dignity as long as it meets certain conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article in this journal, Alex Mullock, Elizabeth Chloe Romanis and Dunja Begović provide an analysis of gestational surrogacy and uterus transplantation (UTx) from the perspective of those who may decide to act as gestational surrogates and womb donors, referred to as 'womb‐givers'. In this article, I advance two sets of claims aimed at critically engaging with some aspects of their analysis. Firstly, I argue that the expression 'womb‐givers' obscures the biologically, socially and politically salient issue that those who engage in these practices are primarily persons and women. My contention is that this is of substance in discussions of the burdens and benefits of gestational surrogacy and UTx, which need to consider the specific position that women occupy in society, and the hierarchies that mediate their lives, experiences and preferences. Second, I argue that, if one were to take seriously the experiences and preferences of the women who may engage in these practices, and their bodily autonomy, then gestational surrogacy and UTx should be regarded as biologically and sociopolitically incommensurable. Mullock et al. overlook important aspects of gestational surrogacy, such as the embodied nature of pregnancy and childbirth, the sociopolitical significance of these experiences, and the often‐oppressive social norms that shape them. Whilst biology is not destiny, I suggest that it is socially and politically 'sticky' when it comes to this significance and norms, especially within the sphere of reproduction. Towards the end of the article, I query the authors' conceptualisation of bodily autonomy and of the instruments that enable its respect and promotion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim: The aim was to provide updated evidence on the association of male body mass index (BMI) with outcomes of assisted reproduction technology (ART). Methods: PubMed, Embase, and Scopus databases were systematically searched. The review included observational studies in patients undergoing ART, that is, either in‐vitro fertilization (IVF) or intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) and compared rate of clinical pregnancy and live birth based on different categories of male BMI. Quality of the pooled findings was assessed using the GRADE criteria. Results: A total of 19 studies were included in the review. Among subjects undergoing IVF, there were no significant differences in the rates of clinical pregnancy among overweight (odds ratio [OR] 1.38, 95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.65, 2.96) and obese (OR 1.86, 95% CI: 0.75, 4.58) BMI, compared to normal male BMI. Similarly, there were no significant differences in the rates of live birth among overweight (OR 1.04, 95% CI: 0.97, 1.13) and obese BMI (OR 0.90, 95% CI: 0.69, 1.18) when compared to males with normal BMI. Further, among those undergoing ICSI, there were no significant differences in the odds of clinical pregnancy among overweight (OR 0.98, 95% CI: 0.73, 1.33) and obese (OR 0.89, 95% CI: 0.62, 1.29). The odds of live births among overweight (OR 0.97, 95% CI: 0.89, 1.05) and obese (OR 0.95, 95% CI: 0.84, 1.07) male BMI were statistically similar to males with normal BMI undergoing ICSI. Conclusions: The low to very low‐quality findings suggest no significant association of overweight and obese BMI with clinical pregnancy and live birth rates among couples undergoing either IVF or ICSI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Cesarean section affects subsequent spontaneous pregnancies because of implantation issues. However, its impact on post-embryo transfer pregnancies is still debated. This review aimed to evaluate the impact of a previous cesarean section on fertility and pregnancy outcomes of women undergoing fresh or frozen embryo transfer.Material and Methods: MEDLINE, Scopus, ClinicalTrials.gov, Scielo, EMBASE, Cochrane Library at the CENTRAL, and LILACS were searched from inception to February 2021. Studies were included if they evaluated reproductive or pregnancy outcomes after fresh or frozen embryo transfer in infertile women with a previous cesarean section relative to women with a previous vaginal delivery. Random-effect meta-analyses to calculate risk ratio (RR) or mean differences with 95% confidence intervals (CI) followed by subgroup analysis for fresh and frozen embryo transfer were performed. Risk of bias and quality assessment were conducted using Newcastle-Ottawa scale and GRADE criteria. The review was registered in the International Prospective Register of Systematic Reviews (CRD42021226297).Results: Ten studies, with data provided for 13 696 participants, were eligible. For embryo transfers after cesarean section, compared with vaginal delivery, there was a significant reduction of the live birth rate (RR 0.88, 95% CI 0.79-0.99) and biochemical pregnancy rate (RR 0.89, 95% CI 0.82-0.96). No statistically significant differences were found for clinical pregnancy rate (RR 0.92, 95% CI 0.84-1.02), ectopic pregnancies (RR 1.00, 95% CI 0.68-1.46), pregnancy loss (RR 1.05, 95% CI 0.94-1.18), multiple pregnancies (RR 0.80, 95% CI 0.63-1.02), stillbirths (RR 0.86, 95% CI 0.27-2.69), birth defects (RR 1.71, 95% CI 0.49-5.96) or birthweight (mean difference 46.82, 95% CI -40.16 to 133.80). Subgroup analysis revealed an increased risk for preterm birth in post-cesarean section fresh embryo transfer pregnancies (RR 1.59, 95% CI 1.16-2.19).Conclusions: Low-grade evidence shows that post-embryo transfer pregnancies in infertile women who had a previous cesarean delivery result in reduced biochemical pregnancy and live birth rates relative to women with a previous vaginal delivery. An increased risk for preterm birth is notable in post-fresh embryo transfer pregnancies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article Thomas Douglas and Katrien Devolder propose a theory of genetic parenthood according to which a human child can have only two genetic human parents. I argue this theory is arbitrarily narrow and fails to account for cases such as hybrids, cloning, chimerism, twinning, parthenogenesis, mitochondrial replacement techniques, and more. I propose an alternate theory of genetic parenthood, one that is prima facie consistent with our commonsense intuitions about genetic parenthood and relevant to a right to procreative autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: In vitro methods of conception are associated with adverse perinatal outcomes. It is unclear if the risk of stillbirth is increased also. Objective: This systematic review and meta‐analysis aimed to estimate the risk of stillbirth in singleton gestations following in vitro methods of conception compared to non‐in vitro conceptions. Search strategy: A comprehensive search in PubMed, Embase, CINAHL, and Cochrane Library was undertaken from database inception to February 2021, with backward citation tracking. Selection criteria: Eligible studies included randomized controlled trials, cohort studies, or case‐control studies that assessed stillbirth following in vitro fertilisation and/or intracytoplasmic sperm injection in comparison to non‐in vitro methods of conception, including spontaneous conceptions, intrauterine insemination, and ovarian stimulation. Data collection and analysis: The Newcastle‐Ottawa Scale was used to assess risk of bias. A summary odds ratio (OR) for stillbirth following in vitro methods of conception compared to non‐in vitro methods was calculated using a random‐effects model for meta‐analysis. Main results: Thirty‐three cohort studies met inclusion criteria. There was an increased risk of stillbirth with in vitro methods: OR 1.41 (95% CI 1.20–1.65); however, the crude baseline risk of stillbirth was low (4.44/1000 total births). Subgroup analysis did not demonstrate an increased risk when in vitro methods were compared to conception without in vitro methods in the context of subfertility. Conclusions: Compared to non‐in vitro conceptions, in vitro conceptions have an increased risk of stillbirth. However, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate whether this risk is associated with in vitro techniques or underlying subfertility. This meta‐analysis found an increased risk of stillbirth in singletons from in vitro methods of conception. This meta‐analysis found an increased risk of stillbirth in singletons from in vitro methods of conception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]