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Internationally, there is considerable inconsistency in the recognition and regulation of children's genetic connections outside the family. In the context of gamete and embryo donation, challenges for regulation seem endless. In this paper, I review some of the paths that have been taken to manage children' being closely genetically related to people outside their families. I do so against the background of recognising the importance of children's interests as moral status holders. I look at recent qualitative research involving donor‐conceived people and borrow their own words to make sense of a purported interest to know (of) their close genetic ties. I also review ways in which gamete donation may have facilitated new kinds of kinship, which are at the same time genetic and chosen. In short, in this paper, I explore what meaning there could be in genetic connections that is not about parenthood. Further, I argue that the focus on parenthood in previous work in this area may be detrimental to appreciating some of the goods that can be derived from close genetic connections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I claim that live uterus donors ought to be considered for the possibility of compensation. I support my claim on the basis of comparable arguments which have already been applied to gamete donation, surrogacy, and other kinds of organ donation. However, I acknowledge that there are specificities associated with uterus donation, which make the issue of incentive and reward a harder ethical case relative to gamete donation, surrogacy, and other kinds of organ donation. Ultimately, I contend that while reimbursement for the costs incurred by live uterus donors should be treated as a necessary ethical minimum, how much further we ought to remunerate uterus donations remains an open question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evidence suggests that one reason doctors provide certain interventions in assisted reproductive technologies (ART) is because of patient demand. This is particularly the case when it comes to unproven interventions such as 'add‐ons' to in vitro fertilisation (IVF) cycles, or providing IVF cycles that are highly unlikely to succeed. Doctors tend to accede to demands for such interventions because patients are willing to do and pay 'whatever it takes' to have a baby. However, there is uncertainty as to what moral weight should be placed on patient‐led demands in ART, including whether it is acceptable for such demands to be invoked as a justification for intervention. We address this issue in this paper. We start by elucidating what we mean by 'patient‐led demand' and synthesise some of the evidence for this phenomenon. We then argue that a doctor's professional role morality (PRM) yields special responsibilities, particularly in commercialised healthcare settings such as ART, because of the nature of professions as social institutions that are distinct from markets. We argue on this basis that, while there may be reasons (consistent with PRM) for doctors to accede to patient demand, this is not always the case. There is often a gap in justification between acceding to patient‐led demands and providing contested interventions, particularly in commercial settings. As a result, acceding to demand in such settings needs a strong justification to be consistent with PRM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: In vitro fertilisation (IVF) is now a common assisted reproductive technology (ART) procedure globally, with 8 million children alive today having been conceived utilising IVF. For many patients, IVF is a difficult experience with many discontinuing treatment because of emotional, relationship and financial stress, or intolerable physical side effects of hormone treatments. Design and Participants: A qualitative study, in which 31 professionals and 25 patients from the ART sector in Australia were interviewed. The interviews were analysed using codebook thematic analysis. Results: Our data indicates there are 'silences' within the therapeutic relationship of IVF, which may limit the capacity for patients to prepare emotionally, financially, or medically for the procedure, and may contribute to psychological distress and dissatisfaction with care. These 'silences' include what the patient 'is not told' by their clinician or 'does not hear' and what the patient feels they 'cannot say'. Discussion: Drawing upon the work of Jay Katz, Charis Thompson, and Miles Little on 'silences' and performance in clinical practice, we argue that although IVF is a complex and multifaceted procedure that is often conducted in a commercial setting, the clinical and therapeutic relationship between doctor and patient remains pivotal to the experiences of patients. The 'silences' within this relationship may impact negatively on decision‐making, and on the delivery and experience of care. Conclusions: Careful attention to the realities of IVF treatment in the clinic room (and awareness of the performances that hide them) should allow for more present and compassionate care. Such care may leave patients more satisfied with their experience and their choices, regardless of treatment outcomes. Patient or Public Contribution: This article draws on interviews with patients who had undergone or were currently undergoing IVF, as well as a range of representatives from the ART community (including reproductive medicine specialists, general practitioners, fertility nurses, counsellors, administrators in ART businesses and embryologists). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The moral acceptability of anonymous gamete donation remains contested. Although the view that the value of parent–child relationships should not depend on genetic ties is "nearly axiomatic" among philosophers and bioethicists, one well‐known dissenter remains: David Velleman. I argue that most rebuttals to Velleman have simply talked past him because they have failed to understand his fundamental point—that donor conception is a violation of human dignity and as such is wrong even if it does not harm individuals. I challenge Velleman on his own terms by endorsing his metaphysical picture before showing that donor conception is not necessarily a violation of human dignity. I show this by arguing that gamete donation is held to a double standard of self‐knowledge. I develop an account of the self that recognizes that certain kinds of challenges to one's flourishing can contribute to an individual's strength and self‐knowledge. I defend my view against objections that genetic knowledge is categorically different from other ways of knowing oneself and I show that donor conception can respect human dignity as long as it meets certain conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]