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This paper offers a comparative study of Israel and Singapore to understand the national security policies of geographically smaller states. These states are militarily powerful, geographically small, and in close proximity with much larger potential adversaries. These states are also different in terms of their relationship with that much larger state as well as their independence narratives. Israel remains in a state of conflict with Iran through Syria and through terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Israel was created through war. On the other hand, Singapore has a complicated relationship with Malaysia based on suspicious cooperation. Malaysia also allowed Singapore independence given differences in the voting behavior of Singaporeans. Both states share a military strategy of preemption or prevention. Since these states are geographically small, striking first may offer Israel and Singapore a better chance at avoiding annihilation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the significant change that has occurred in the balance between offense and defence in Israel's 'hybrid' military strategy in recent decades. Relying on fresh materials concerning the organizational, doctrinal, and procurement processes of Israel's military, we identify a shift from offense towards defence as the preferred way to protect Israel in the face of new security threats. We also show that due to rapidly changing security challenges, limited resources, and the military's organizational culture, this change has been gradual, incremental, improvised, and largely informal. We propose that similar changes may characterize other states facing new security challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]