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The Olympic bidding process prior to 2024 was altered in 2019 to provide greater transparency and reduce unnecessary work related to the preparation for each bid, of which there can only be one host. This paper analyses the process of the 2032 Olympics through the notion of a preferred candidate in Brisbane, Australia. Through a document analysis of five official documents and submissions in the lead up to the IOC announcement of the preferred bid in February 2021, this paper elucidates how the Olympic Movement is shaped and refined to offer a more nuanced perspective of how such a preferred bid could be advantageous in terms of more inclusive legacy outcomes to the IOC, as well as the destination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The January 2011 flood event that impacted southeast Queensland is amongst the most extensive and severe floods in terms of loss of life and property damage that the region has experienced, despite it being only the eighth highest flood on record at the Brisbane City Gauge. The spring of 2010 was the wettest on record for Queensland, New South Wales, and the Murray-Darling Basin (Bureau of Meteorology 2011a) at that time. The flood mitigation dams in the region, Somerset Dam and Wivenhoe Dam, had to be operated for flood mitigation purposes during October 2010, which was the first occasion since February 2001 that Wivenhoe Dam had been called into action due to the Millennium Drought. The wet October was followed by a very dry November which, in turn, was followed by the wettest December on record for Brisbane. Somerset Dam and Wivenhoe Dam were again pressed into action on three separate occasions during December 2010. The resultant releases ensured that only minor flooding resulted in the Lower Brisbane River during these events. However, on the 5th of January 2011, another rainfall event started to unfold across the catchments of the dams. By the 10th of January 2011, an upper-level low combined with a humid easterly flow to bring very heavy rainfall and flash flooding to southeast Queensland and northeast New South Wales. The heaviest falls were in the areas north and west of Brisbane, with three-day totals exceeding 200 mm over most of the Brisbane River catchment. This rainfall event resulted in a flood of record in the Upper Brisbane River and Upper Lockyer Creek catchments that sadly resulted in a substantial loss of life in Toowoomba and the Lockyer Valley, and which required record releases from Wivenhoe Dam. The resultant downstream flooding saw some 14,000 properties impacted, principally in the Lockyer Valley Regional Council, Somerset Regional Council, Brisbane City Council, and Ipswich City Council local government regions. Flood damage was estimated to be around $2.53 billion. This paper discusses the event as it unfolded and the subsequent judicial inquiries, engineering reviews, and legal proceedings that resulted from the consequences of the operation of Somerset Dam and Wivenhoe Dam. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]