Search

In Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health, a 6–3 majority of the US Supreme Court overturned 50 years of established precedent, ruling that the Constitution confers no right to abortion. Since first recognition that the constitutional right to privacy encompassed a (negative) right to pre-viability abortion in 1973, Supreme Court decisions have slowly chipped away at the substance of this right. Dobbs, however, marks a significant shift in abortion (and general) jurisprudence, by deploying an originalist interpretation of the constitution to deny that such a right exists. Consequently, States may now regulate abortion how they see fit, including by introducing complete prohibitions. This note illustrates how Dobbs has dire consequences for reproductive freedom as we have known it, with disastrous legal and practical ramifications for abortion-seekers, pregnant people, and all people with the physiology to become pregnant. Furthermore, the Court's use of an originalist approach to rescind a constitutional protection signals further moves to derecognise other rights such as contraception, as well as same-sex intimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dignity is increasingly central to the justificatory logic of US Supreme Court decisions. Yet the perils inherent in this jurisprudence of dignity, which we argue frames the right to dignity as a right to recognition, have been overlooked. Understanding dignity as synonymous with recognition clarifies its effects: dignity dethrones the autonomous, rights-bearing individual, instead figuring individuals as intersubjectively vulnerable and dependent upon institutional recognition. Dignity also casts state action as innocent, elides structural harms, and exacerbates injuries of marginalization. Applying our theoretical frame to Obergefell v. Hodges, we argue that the effects of the emerging jurisprudence of dignity are troubling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]