Saunier, O., Ingremeau, J.J., Hoffman, Ian, Mekarski, Pawel, Yi, Jing, and Botti, Adrian
• Inverse modelling methods are used to identify the source location of undeclared minor releases in 2019, 2020 and 2022. • Calculations suggest that the releases could originate from the same region in Russian Federation. • The most likely origin of the June 2020 release appears to be a primary ion exchange resin of a PWR. New measurement information allows to refine the decay time between 2 and 5 months. • The July 2019 and May 2022 releases contain 46Sc and activated corrosion products, suggesting that the origin of the release is a mixture of various solid wastes, or a recently irradiated graphite of RMBK reactor. Traces of radionuclides have been frequently detected in the European atmosphere for several years. The measured concentrations are usually very low, ranging from 0.1 to 10 μBq m−3, and do not pose any health or environmental problems. This study aims to diagnose the origin of small undeclared radionuclide releases into the atmosphere. An inverse modelling approach that combines environmental measurements and atmospheric transport modelling is first used to assess the source location of the release. In addition, the type and process of the nuclear facility from which the release could originate are investigated by identifying the isotope production pathways and comparing them with known typical inventories. These two parts of the proposed method are complementary and allow us to extract as much information as possible from a set of radionuclide measurement data. In a previous study, the origins of detections of various radionuclides (60Co, 134Cs, 137Cs, 103Ru, 106Ru, 141Ce, 95Nb, 95Zr) in Finland, Sweden and Estonia in June 2020 have been investigated. In this paper, the previous investigation is extended by analysing two additional events that occurred in northern Europe in July 2019 and May 2022, as well an overview of other unknown releases detected in Finland over the last decade. A more detailed analysis of the 2020 event is also provided by analysing new available environmental measurements. The calculations indicate that the source location of the three events appears to be in the same region, in Russian Federation. The most probable origin of the June 2020 release seems to be a primary ion exchange resin, after 2 to 5 months of decay, of a pressurized water reactor with fuel cladding failure, and dispersion of fissile material in the primary. The July 2019 and May 2022 events are of particularly noteworthy due to the simultaneous presence of 46Sc, which is neither produced nor in the fuel, nor in the primary loop of PWR or RBMK nuclear power plants, and typical corrosion-activated products from power plants (60Co). Two hypotheses are proposed to explain this source term: a mixture of various solid wastes or recently irradiated graphite from a RBMK reactor. The reliability of the methodology is demonstrated, in particular in the section dedicated to atmospheric transport modelling, and the successful association with source term analysis provides a valuable tool for future studies and assessments of both minor and major radionuclide releases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]